AFGHANISTAN'S GHAZNI PROVINCE GOVERNOR ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003844 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN'S GHAZNI PROVINCE GOVERNOR ON ELECTIONS AND DISTRICT GOVERNANCE Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In early November, Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) representatives met with Governor Usman Usmani to discuss the presidential election outcome and a way forward on our governance agenda. Usmani, a strong Karzai supporter, expressed his support for the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) decision but also took the opportunity to level further attacks on Dr. Abdullah. Usmani told us that he expected to soon leave Ghazni. We pressed Usmani to continue to address long-standing governance issues, particularly the lack of Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) presence in the districts. While we have come to believe that Usmani's capable but exclusionary leadership style has run its course in Ghazni, we hope to leverage what appears to be his last months in office to advance crucial issues on our governance and development agenda. End Summary. PLEASED WITH ELECTION OUTCOME... ¶2. (C) Governor Usmani, a strong Karzai partisan, was visibly pleased that the IEC had declared Karzai the victor in the presidential poll and predicted that the decision would not be open to constitutional challenge. Usmani said that Karzai would seek to establish a unity government composed of all of Afghanistan's ethnicities, and would even be open to Abdullah supporters joining the government if they pledged Qto work for the Afghan people.Q BUT STILL ATTACKING ABDULLAH ¶3. (C) Despite his initial positive words, Usmani quickly fell into his usual rhetoric condemning Dr. Abdullah and his Tajik allies. Usmani said that Abdullah had actively sought to bring about Afghanistan's disintegration, and wanted to create a QNorth Korea and South KoreaQ in the country. Usmani again recounted the crimes of the Northern Alliance and Tajik people against Pashtuns and Hazaras, and said that Afghanistan's Pashtuns had displayed remarkable patience and restraint in allowing the election drama to play out over two months while AbdullahQs forces sought to prevent Karzai from assuming office. Usmani told us that the Pashtuns, whom the Governor claimed were Qnot a people for fighting,Q had written a Qgreat page in their historyQ during the election process. Contradicting his earlier statement that Karzai was open to Abdullah supporters joining his government, Usmani dismissed the alleged efforts of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani to reach out to Karzai. Usmani said Abdullah was Qthe seed of RabbaniQ and neither had a place in a future government. USMANI ON WAY OUT? ¶4. (C) Usmani again expressed his desire to leave Ghazni, and told us that President Karzai had indicated that he might soon move on to another posting. Governor Usmani said that after all the stresses of his current job, he would be happy to return home and Qtranslate a bookQ and spend time with his children. Usmani said that he was unsure of what positions might be offered to him, but said he would continue to serve in a government function if asked by Karzai. (Note: On numerous previous occasions, Usmani has said that Karzai would appoint him to serve as Governor of Herat, a position Usmani clearly wants. In our most recent conversations, the Governor has not raised the possible Herat appointment. End Note.) We previously spoke separately with UsmaniQs chief of staff, who told us that the Governor believed he was in line to serve in a ministerial position in Kabul. There was no further information as to which position this could be. TIME TO GET GIRoA IN THE DISTRICTS ¶5. (C) We told Usmani that the end of the election presented a fresh opportunity to make headway on our governance agenda. While it was unfortunate that many important initiatives had been delayed due to the election uncertainty, we said, we now had the space to move forward. In particular, we pressed Usmani to address the lack of GIRoA presence in the districts. We told the governor that while the provision of security was crucially important, it could not be the sole focus of our collective KABUL 00003844 002 OF 002 efforts. Instead, we said, the Afghan administration and we had to develop a comprehensive plan that sought to deal with governance, development, and security simultaneously. We noted the possible establishment of a District Support Team (DST) in Qarabagh District, and suggested that Usmani work proactively with us to identify gaps in government service in the district and develop a plan to fill them. We suggested that this might make the idea of a Qarabagh DST more palatable, and the governor agreed to our suggestion and pledged to work with the Sub-Governor and line directors to address government shortfalls in Qarabagh. Usmani also said that he would seek in the near-term to go district by district in Ghazni and identify which core line ministries were not present. (Note: In our assessment, there is virtually no GIRoA presence, aside from ANP and sub-governors, in nearly all Pashtun-dominated districts of Ghazni. End Note.) COMMENT: AN INCREASINGLY ISOLATED USMANI NEEDS TO MOVE ON... ¶6. (C) Governor Usmani is an intelligent, savvy and competent leader. He has actively sought close RELATIONS with the PRT, and has proven himself a strong supporter of coalition efforts in Ghazni and Afghanistan as a whole. His 17 months in office mark the longest tenure by a Ghazni governor in years, and he has brought some semblance of stability to the provincial administration. However, in the process he has managed to alienate some local institutions and popular groups. Perhaps because Usmani comes from Kandahar and from a different tribe of Pashtuns than live in Ghazni, his leadership style has been marked by attempts to marginalize and neutralize any group that he perceives to be a challenge to his own transplanted authority in Ghazni. This has included the Provincial Council (which shut its doors months ago after a protracted struggle over corruption allegations against the governor), some sub-governors, his own deputy governor, line directors, and, perhaps most importantly, the local shura structure. We believe that the power of these groups has significantly atrophied during Usmani's tenure, making our current efforts to engage all power brokers in Ghazni on governance and development issues significantly more difficult. With this in mind, we conclude that it may indeed be time for Usmani to move on from Ghazni and provide a new governor with a fresh start on grappling with the immense governance challenges facing the province. (COMMENT, CONT'D) . . . BUT NEEDS TO DELIVER SOME POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS FIRST ¶7. (C) We will certainly attempt to use Usmani's significant POLITICAL abilities during what appears to be his lame duck status to push forward on issues of crucial importance on our governance and development agenda. We believe we identified two key areas where the governor can play an important role in the coming weeks and months: correctly identifying gaps in GIRoA presence in the districts and re-energizing the Provincial Development Council. Usmani does appear willing to lend his assistance on both counts. While neither is in itself a game-changer, fulfilling both would lay the groundwork for further successes in the next administration. End Comment. # Eikenberry