HELMAND MPS DELIVER THANKS BUT ALSO WARNINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000383 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: HELMAND MPS DELIVER THANKS BUT ALSO WARNINGS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) At a February 2, UK-hosted dinner for Members of Parliament from Helmand Province, the MPs collectively delivered four messages. First, they expressed appreciation for the assistance and sacrifices being offered up by the international community, particularly the U.S.; but the mistakes committed by international forces are taking a toll on popular patience. Second, improved coordination between international and Afghan security forces would, in their view, significantly improve common efforts to counteract the insurgency. Third, Afghans at all levels insist that they must remain masters of their own fate. This translates to a demand that any changes to the size or placement of international forces be blessed by Afghan authorities at the highest level. Finally, the group collectively endorsed the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and called for its eventual deployment in Helmand. They suggested it would not be difficult to find the requisite number of local volunteers to man the force in their province. End Summary. The Attendees -------------- ¶2. (C) The event, hosted by the UK deputy head of mission, included five of Helmand,s eight Lower House Members of Parliament (Haji Mohammad Anwar Khan; Shikh Nematullah Ghafari; Daud Mohammad Khan; Haji Mir Ali Khan; and Nasima Niazi) and two of the province,s three Upper House representatives (Haji Abdul Wahed; and strongman and former governor Al-Haj Mullah Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, whom President Karzai has continued to favor for reinstatement as governor despite his record of abuse and narcotics trafficking). Questioning the Tactics of International Forces -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Discussion began on a distinctly sour note, with Daud Mohammad Khan (Akhunzada,s former intelligence chief, described later by our host as "unsavory") demanding why, with thousands of troops in the province, security could not be maintained. He described Helmand,s population as victims, caught between the violence wrought by the Taliban and international forces. Khan spoke of Now Zad and Sangin as once-bucolic tourist sites from which the populations had largely had to flee, in good measure in order to escape aerial bombardments. When, he asked accusingly, are things going to change? "We are human beings too." In a considerably more moderate tone, Nasima Niazi, a women,s rights activist, suggested the people of Helmand are long-suffering and accept that international forces can make mistakes. But, she continued, their patience has by now been greatly strained ) similar civilian casualty incidents as those suffered by people in Helmand would have brought people from the country,s North beyond the breaking point. ¶4. (SBU) Several attendees took aim at what they characterized as a lack of coordination between international and Afghan security forces. By contrast, they contended, working closely with the ANSF -- with international forces profiting from the Afghans, more accurate intelligence just as the ANSF were profiting from the training and equipment they receive from their foreign partners -- would bring huge benefits. A number of deputies also objected to the positioning of international forces, echoing President Karzai in suggesting those forces would more usefully be deployed along the border with Pakistan and Iran. In a similar vein, they questioned why international forces had to take up positions within towns instead of simply securing their perimeters. Shikh Nematullah Ghafari, a Hazara MP from Lashkar Gah, drew approving nods from his fellow MPs when he demanded to know whether plans to deploy additional U.S. forces had been approved by President Karzai and whether he had also signed off on the specific locations to which they would be sent. Issues like this, he insisted, required the assent of Afghan authorities at the highest level. Election Security -------------- ¶5. (SBU) MP Niazi underscored the importance of the upcoming national elections and expressed frustration at those MPs criticizing the Independent Election Commission,s action in putting off those elections until August. She suggested such members of parliament simply have no realistic KABUL 00000383 002 OF 003 notion of the security challenges facing elections in the South. She pressed hard for assurances that U.S. troops would be in Helmand to ensure security for voting. She also bemoaned what she characterized as the limited extent of voter registration in Helmand to date. U.S., UK and Estonian representatives at the dinner pointed out the top priority attached by their governments and the international community as a whole to the August elections. They also noted both ongoing discussions aimed at ensuring a beefed up international troop presence as well as prospects for more ANA troops by the time of the elections. At this point, Daud Mohammad Khan broke into the back-and-forth, in apparent exasperation, suggesting it was absurd to talk about voting in an area where Taliban beheadings and other acts of intimidation are the order of the day. The Elephant in the Room -------------- ¶6. (C) The dynamic of the entire evening was clearly influenced by the presence of former Governor Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (informally referred to as SMA),under whose rule a number of the other deputies and their families had personally suffered. Most of the MPs did not appear to show outright deference to Akhundzada, but they often appeared to take care in choosing their words. The former governor himself could not have been more charming. He went out of his way to express thanks for the contributions of the international community, particularly the U.S., in freeing Afghanistan from the Taliban regime, including at the cost of many military casualties, a sentiment shared by others. He went on to lay out in fairly cogent terms what he sees as the reasons why security has gone downhill in Helmand. Like others before him, he cited the lack of adequate coordination between international forces and the ANSF. He pointed also to unrealistically high expectations on the part of the Helmand population regarding the pace of development assistance. On Pakistan, he complained that too little had been done to destroy insurgent safe havens and criticized his own government for having taken too long to start improving relations with Islamabad. Somewhat ironically, given his own reputed links to narcotics, he singled out as well the growth in the drug industry in Helmand, where processing plants have now been established. ¶7. (SBU) As for the future, SMA stressed the need for greater engagement with elders of the various Pashtun tribes in his province. More U.S. troops would be good for Helmand, he argued, but only if they listen to the advice of such tribal leaders. According to the former governor, success for the country,s international partners in Helmand rests on a three-pronged strategy: listen to tribal leaders, take action against the narcotics trade, and be careful in your actions to reinforce the notion that the Afghan people are their own masters. Otherwise, he warned, people will believe the Taliban propaganda line that the country has lost its independence to the foreigners. Support of APPF -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Asked specifically about the Ministry of Interior,s plans for the Afghan Public Protection Force, soon to be launched on a pilot basis in Wardak Province, the MPs showed strong support. They stressed that the APPF should be different from traditional arbaka (tribal-based militia). It should be carefully controlled, under the authority of either the army or police. MPs also expressed broad support for extending the program to Helmand (note: the UK is considering backing such a move) and agreement that it would not be difficult to find the necessary recruits. They cautioned, however, that individuals from all the tribes would need to be included. Akhunzada argued against a role for Governor Mangal or the provincial chief of police in the selection process. He noted that he had just spoken with Minister of Interior Atmar regarding the program. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Clearly some of the remarks of some of these MPs, such as those on narcotics, and SMA's views on who should manage any eventual APPP in Helmand were intended either to sit well with international listeners or serve their own interests. On the other hand, their repeated words of caution regarding the need to listen to Afghan voices and avoid violating Afghans, sense of independence appeared sincere. Their strong support for APPF in Helmand was noteworthy, but fielding such a force without running crossways of the complicated Pashtun tribal dynamics in KABUL 00000383 003 OF 003 Helmand would be a major challenge and COMISAF has requested that the concept be implemented on a trial basis in Wardak before others rush in with their own versions of it. It is worth noting that most of these MPs spend little time in Helmand, citing security concerns. They do maintain strong links to people there, but their situational awareness is largely second-hand. We and the UK embassy are currently looking for ways to better connect these MPs with their constituents. One of the potential benefits of more direct contact with Helmand realities, we hope, could be a tempering of the tendency of many of these MPs to take a decidedly negative, unhelpful line in speaking with the media. DELL