CHALLENGES CONFRONTING NATO TRAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003823 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019 TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: CHALLENGES CONFRONTING NATO TRAINING MISSION-AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Assistant Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli. Reasons 1.4 (b)&(d). ¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) was formally declared to be at &initial operating capability8 (IOC) on November 21, when U.S. LTG William Caldwell assumed command of NTM-A and the pre-existing, U.S.-only Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A, which planned and implemented ANA/ ANP training prior to the standup of NTM-A, is optimistic that the integrated CSTC-A/NTM-A command will be able to introduce an accelerated training program by the end of December - if NATO allies and partner states provide the requisite trainers and mentors. CSTC-A/ NTM-A are also developing plans to increase training capacity should NATO Allies approve higher ANA and ANP personnel ceilings. We should acknowledge and applaud Allies/Partners deploying trainers/mentors in the field, even as we continue strongly to encourage Allies/Partners to stand in the widening gap between the existing number of trainers/mentors and the number needed to keep pace with intended ANA and ANP growth. End Summary. Dual Command -------------- ¶2. (SBU) NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) began preliminary operations October 20 and was declared to be at &Initial Operational Capability8 (IOC) on November 21, when U.S. LTG William Caldwell formally became the dual-hatted commander of NTMA and CSTC-A. CSTC-A/NTM-A is a single integrated command, one of ISAF,s two three-star subordinate commands (along with the recently-established ISAF Joint Command (IJC) the war-fighting operational headquarters. ¶3. (SBU) NATO conceived NTM-A as a mechanism to help the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) develop into professional, corruption-free organizations able to assume lead responsibility for Afghanistan,s security, providing opportunities for NATO Allies and Partners to demonstrate their commitment to ANSF development. Under the new scheme, NTM-A will focus on force generation and institutional training while CSTC-A will focus on ministerial and institutional development, as well as resourcing trainers and mentors for training teams, equipment, etc. for the fielded force. Although primarily focused on operations, IJC will coordinate with NTM-A to provide training for ANSF units at the district level. When the dust settles, the NTM-A/CSTC-A Headquarters will have a NTM-A staff of 216 and a CSTC-A staff of 587 at Camp Eggers in Kabul and on other Force Operating Bases (FOB)/Combat Out Posts (COP) around Afghanistan. ¶4. (SBU) NTM-A training for ANA and ANP will be coordinated by two Combined Training Advisory Groups (CTAGs): CTAG - Army (CTAG-A) and CTAG-Police (CTAG-P). NTM-A officers will be integrated into interagency Civil-Military Working Groups co-chaired by the Embassy and ISAF in order to ensure ANSF training is informed by other U.S. and international efforts to introduce reforms and initiatives to address shortcomings in governance, rule of law, and development. ANA ) On its Way -------------- ¶5. (SBU) As of October 20 the ANA had 95,523 personnel on the books and has grown on average by 2200 per month over past 12 months, with a target requirement of 3,000 per month. Programs designed to increase recruiting, decrease attrition and increase retention should help GIRoA reach the authorized ceiling of 134,000 personnel by the end of October 2010, but concerns remain about the ability of the ANA to recruit adequate personnel. MoD Training Centers are providing standardized training for up to 8,000 soldiers in each 8-week training phase. Additional training sites will soon come on line in temporary facilities in Kandahar (November 2009), Mazar-e Sharif (December 2009) and Herat (January 2010),pending additional construction of facilities. As additional training facilities come on line, the KABUL 00003823 002 OF 003 rate of training should accelerate. MoD Combat Service Support Schools in Kabul and Mazar-e Sharif will train enablers (specialists in, e.g., logistics, materiel, and medicine) and come on line in November 2009 and June 2010, respectively. ANP ) Greater Challenges -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Training the ANP poses greater challenges than training the ANA. Recruitment and retention of ANP personnel is more difficult, in part because the ANP suffers from much higher killed and wounded in action rates than the ANA. Also, in contrast to the ANA,s standardized training program for inductees which has been in place for more than 5 years, during that same period less than 20% of ANP personnel have received more than a two-week cursory orientation from their local district command. Persistent reports of substantial numbers of &ghost police8 for whom salaries are paid without anyone reporting for duty have caused concern that MoI manning reports may be inaccurate. For this reason the Ministry of the Interior and CSTC-A have launched a Personnel Asset Inventory (PAI) which requires ANP personnel to personally report for verification of their status; this includes providing biometric data. Pending the completion of the PAI in early spring 2010, planners are assuming that the ANP had 93,809 personnel as of 20 October 2009. IJC ) Taking the Baton -------------- ¶7. (SBU) With the activation of the IJC on October 12, responsibility for programs to develop the fielded force transferred from NTM-A/CSTC-A to the IJC. Most notably, this includes the Focused District Police Development (FDPD) through which U.S. Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) and NATO/Partner POMLTs (Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams) train ANP recruits for eight weeks at school, then deploy with them to the field where they continue to mentor their ANP partners in basic policing and survivability skills. CSTC-A recruits the PMTs and POMLTs (each POMLT consists of 7 to 16 mentors),which remain under NTM-A command during the initial 8-week training, but transfer to IJC command when they deploy to the field with the trainees. A new reform program, Directed District Police Development (DDPD),will provide additional reform capacity by delivering the FDPD program of instruction in districts rather than at a regional training center. IJC field commanders will administer DDPD in their areas, supported by NTM-A/ CSTC-A. ¶8. (SBU) CSTC-A estimates that over 60,000 police on the ANP payroll have yet to receive professional police training. Further, although CSTC-A/NTM-A have succeeded in recruiting an adequate number of trainers, Embedded Training Teams (ETTS) and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) to train the ANA to the currently approved staffing ceiling, CSTC-A/NTM-A is concerned that the ANP will continue to suffer from a serious shortfall in Allied/Partner trainers, PMTs and POMLTs. Of 196 POMLTs ISAF is seeking to fill, with 7 to 16 mentors in each, NATO/partner states have only deployed staff for 14 POMLTs to date. Accelerating Training/ANSF Growth Exacerbates Mentor Shortfalls -------------- ¶9. (SBU) As CSTC-A and NTM-A complete growth of the ANA and ANP to currently established ceilings (ANA ) 134,000 and ANP 96,800) and accelerate ANP reform, they are also developing plans to increase training output should higher ANA and ANP personnel ceilings (e.g., COMISAF,s recommended 240,000 for ANA and 160,000 for ANP) be approved by NATO Allies and the Afghanistan Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board when it next convenes, probably in mid-January. Such acceleration will exacerbate already serious shortfalls in trainers and mentors and stretch existing training facilities. Over 60 percent of ANP personnel still need to complete initial training. ¶10. (SBU) In Kabul, the problem is manageable. Of 216 NTM-A Crisis Establishment (CE) positions NATO Allies/Partners to date have pledged to fill 183. KABUL 00003823 003 OF 003 A significant portion of the NTM-A posts filled represent lateral transfers from within CSTC-A with a few additional transfers from ISAF; however, staff pledged by NATO and non-NATO contributing states are arriving to take up their responsibilities. The thirty-three positions not yet pledged by Allies include a critical staffing gap in the area of Police Training, CTAG-P, which has 11 of 33 positions not pledged by any nation. The NTM-A positions are included in the current ISAF Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). COMISAF expects that Allies will pledge additional staffing for billets at the December 7 ISAF Force Generation Conference. However, if the ceilings for ANA and ANP increase to the COMISAF-proposed ceiling of 240,000 and 160,000, to cover each of the 475 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) districts, 39 Border police battalions within 5 zones, and 4 brigades with 25 battalions of Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The number of personnel needed on a POMLT will be dependent on the threat level of the area the team will be operating. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) It hardly needs repeating that the development of the ANA and ANP into effective and professional organizations able to provide security to vulnerable populations throughout the country is critical to GIRoA,s ability to win back the loyalty of populations alienated by police and governmental corruption and/or the absence of governance. As more trainers become available, the pace of training should accelerate. However, to optimize the quality of ANP training, many more POMLTs are needed to accompany trainees when they deploy to their home districts. Thus, training existing ANP personnel to a minimal competent level will remain a major multi-year police development undertaking even if all NTM-A requirements identified by NATO are met. ¶12. (C) The establishment of NTM-A has put a multilateral face on training and may provide an impetus for NATO Allies and non-NATO contributing states to be more forthcoming in contributions of OMLTs and POMLTs. Conversely, we should remain alert to any indication that some Allies/Partners will see the establishment of NTM-A as providing them an &out8 to send officers to Kabul at the expense of committing mentors down in the battlespace. The risks of insurgent attack assumed by OMLTs and especially POMLTs when they deploy with their units can be substantial. In the case of the POMLTs, mentor participation down at the district level ) where ANP suffer casualties at a rate more than four times the rate incurred by the ANA - should enhance ANP contributions to security and accelerate the pace of anti-corruption efforts within the force. We should acknowledge and applaud Allies/Partners deploying OMLTs and POMLTs in the field, even as we continue strongly to encourage Allies and Partners to stand in the widening gap between the existing number of mentors and the number needed to keep pace with intended ANA and ANP growth. END COMMENT. Eikenberry