PRT NURISTAN: GOVERNOR JAMALUDDIN OFF TO A SLOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000382 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: PRT NURISTAN: GOVERNOR JAMALUDDIN OFF TO A SLOW START Classified By: PRT Director Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Nearly three months after his appointment as governor, Jamaluddin Badr has yet to make an impact on key political, security and development issues in Nuristan. Jamaluddin,s analysis of the situation does, however, demonstrate a critical understanding of the province,s most important issues. The governor agrees that key ineffective district administrators need to be replaced, that the provincial line directors and the Provincial Development Council (PDC) need to be energized, and that deteriorating security in certain districts must be addressed. Jamaluddin frequently requests support from the PRT, which accommodates as appropriate, but his alleged efforts to obtain resources or decisions from GIRoA have proven unsuccessful. The Nuristani public is beginning to question the governor,s honesty and his ability to address the province,s numerous troubles. The First Three Months -------------- ¶2. (C) Governor Jamaluddin Badr spent his first three months in office getting acquainted with Nuristan,s capital, Parun, and assessing the provincial and district governments and police. Like his predecessor, he concludes that the government and the police are neither functional nor competent. He is reportedly seeking the dismissal and replacement of his deputy and four of Nuristan,s seven district administrators. (Note: Jamaluddin's predecessor sought to have many of the same officials replaced.) Jamaluddin considers the provincial police chief to be honest but notes that he wields limited power and resides predominantly in Kabul. The governor meets with PRT officials alone, stressing that he does not trust anyone in his government and adding that he has few allies in Kabul. Security Concerns -------------- ¶3. (C) Jamaluddin expresses a strong interest in security for his home district of Bargi Matal but has not yet addressed the province,s most security-challenged districts of Waygal and Kamdesh. Security in these areas continues to deteriorate and the Afghan government exercises little or no power. The governor has requested a battalion of Afghan army soldiers for the province but the request has thus far been refused by the Defense Ministry. Jamaluddin has also requested additional offensive military operations from Coalition Forces, and he comments that the U.S. is too soft and overly concerned with civilian casualties. Despite pressure from the PRT for the governor to coordinate security issues with the Kunar governor, no effort has been visibly made. Jamaluddin is increasingly worried about his personal safety while in Parun and reportedly rarely travels outside of his compound. (Note: The central valley road is dangerous south of Parun to Kunar, however, other officials who do not have personal security use the road.) Jamaluddin is concerned that the police are corrupt, possibly colluding with the enemy, and do not offer him adequate protection. Development Focus -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The governor,s current development focus is on key provincial roads and beautification (and city planning) of the capital. Jamaluddin claims he has very few resources from the central government. As a result, he is a frequent caller to the PRT, requesting funding for a laundry list of items including staff, personal security guards, satellite phones, computers, and a massive governor's complex similar to Nangarhar Governor Sherzai,s Jalalabad compound. The governor convened a Provincial Development Council (PDC) meeting in January 2009. While the meeting lacked organization and focus, the fact that it occurred was notable (it is only the second PDC since at least early 2008). The governor has a strong interest in the PRT,s project contracting, but has been dissuaded by PRT officials from personally recommending contractors. Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Many politically-minded Nuristanis are beginning to question the governor,s effectiveness and honesty. He is increasingly criticized for taking no significant action during his first three months in office. KABUL 00000382 002 OF 002 DELL