POMEGRANATES RIPE FOR COIN: A COUNTERINSURGENCY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003798

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS EAID AF
SUBJECT: POMEGRANATES RIPE FOR COIN: A COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATION CASE STUDY FROM KAPISA PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN

REF: KABUL 03776

Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Director Hoyt Yee
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: TaGab, a GIRoA critical district and home
to thriving Taliban, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG),and
criminal networks, has been targeted by Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) Kapisa as the focus of its
counterinsurgency efforts. The initial phase of the effort,
&Operation Red," is based on the formation of a pomegranate
cooperative, which hopes to open up markets in Kabul, India,
Dubai, and beyond and fetch much higher prices than the
hard-pressed (and insurgent-linked) farmers of TaGab have
traditionally received from Pakistan-based buyers. Having
created much good will among the people and leaders of TaGab,
PRT will build on this effort through continued stabilization
and development programs. The effort continues to involve
diverse U.S., international, and Afghan players. Despite
continued optimism, however, Operation Red has been replete
with stumbling blocks, setbacks, and the need for patient and
persistent prodding by the PRT's integrated civil-military
team and our partners. It is a case study for both the
possibilities and pitfalls of counterinsurgency operations.
End Summary.

Roots of the Insurgency
--------------


2. (SBU) TaGab District, located at the southern end of
Kapisa Province, has a long history of conflict. Its
inhabitants are primarily Pashtun of the Gilzai tribe. The
TaGab Valley marked the furthest continuous point of Soviet
advance to the northeast during the Soviet occupation, the
main Northern Alliance (NA)/HiG front lines during the civil
war, and the NA/Taliban line of demarcation during the
Taliban era. It is strategically located near the approaches
to both Kabul and Bagram AIR Field. The Taliban, HiG, and
criminal warlords have all found ready recruits in TaGab, and
insurgent attacks against coalition forces have been on the
upswing, with improvised explosive device (IED),indirect
fire, and direct fire incidents an almost daily occurrence.
As described REFTEL, however, the Kapisa-based insurgency is
non-ideological and lacks significant command-and-control
elements. Local leaders with diverse points of view continue
to point out that most fighters are unemployed young men
looking to earn quick cash. They stress that "every one of
them would drop their rifles" if there were more economic
opportunity. (Note: On November 1, French Task FORCE
Lafayette became the battle space owner. PRT Kapisa will
continue to operate in Kapisa, working in coordination with
the French. End note.)

Pomegranates: Ripe for Exploitation
--------------


3. (SBU) Operation Red began with conversations between
Special Forces (SoF) operating out of Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Kutschbach and local leaders. The elders described how
Pakistani traders would engage pomegranate farmers in a
downward bidding war and then trucking syndicates would
demand high prices to get the produce to market. SoF
contacted PRT Kapisa with a request for assistance. In
September, PRT Kapisa was joined by the Kentucky National
Guard Agriculture Development Team (ADT),USAID contractors,
French CIMICs (civil affairs),and a representative from a
modern pomegranate juicing factory in Kabul. These players
called a shura (community meeting),which was attended by
leading elders, Islamic figures, and some 70 local
pomegranate farmers. GIRoA was represented by the Director
of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (DAIL),and the
provincial government was represented by the sub-governor.
Security was provided by SoF, a Police Mentor Team, Romanian
special forces, the French army, and Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF).


4. (S) During the shura, USAID contractors offered to help
farmers establish a legal cooperative and market their
pomegranates to Dubai and India. PRT offered to pay for
boxing and shipping the fruit to the juicing company for the
first year. ADT, working with the DAIL, agreed to on-going
assistance to improve the health and productivity of the
pomegranate crop through technical assistance. The French
outlined plans to build a cool storage facility in the
district. At the conclusion of the shura, the sub-governor
quickly organized those farmers in attendance into a
cooperative. Within days there were 160 members
(representing perhaps the majority of TaGab's pomegranate

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growers) and an executive board with representation from
TaGab's five main regions was elected. Both traditional and
sensitive reporting throughout the area, including in
critical neighboring districts, indicated that the effort was
well-known and well-regarded by the populace. The PRT also
learned that the program was so popular that the Taliban
decided not to attempt any disruption. Colonel Zelwar, the
local chief of police and a positive influencer, stated:
"The Taliban knows that if it tries to harm this effort, the
people will rise up against it." (Note: In the two months
since the first pomegranate shura, the number of locals who
have reported IEDs and planned ambushes on coalition forces
has increased significantly. End note.)

Problems Crop Up
--------------


5. (S) Almost immediately, however, there were signs that
the process would not be smooth. The farmers have been
reluctant to risk any of their own capital on the enterprise.
They balked at even paying for passports and visas for two
representatives to go to Dubai and India to make deals, even
though airline tickets, hotels, and the cost of shipping four
tons of pomegranates to these markets was already being paid
for. At a follow-up shura, board members tried to goad the
PRT into paying USD 2,000 per truck load of pomegranates to
the juicing factory just 90 kilometers away. Also, the board
member chosen to negotiate a good price with the juicing
company was found to have undercut his own cooperative by
making a separate deal at a lower price for his own fruit.
As the board dithered, other local farmers cut deals with the
factory to sell some 750 metric tons of pomegranates apart
from the co-op. Even more seriously, sensitive reporting
indicates that the Taliban, while not seeking to disrupt
Operation Red, has pressured the cooperative into paying a
"zeqat" or Islamic tax to the insurgent network. The total
amount could range from 7 to 20 percent.

Patient and Persistent Diplomacy Bears Fruit
--------------


6. (S) To counter the problems described above, PRT Kapisa
has permanently stationed a seasoned civil affairs sergeant
at FOB Kutschbach to interact with co-op and local leaders
daily. PRT's USAID and State Reps have also traveled to
TaGab several times, both with ADT and DAIL, and individually
to educate, encourage, and exhort. We have offered solutions
to legitimate problems, pushed back on bogus requests, and
patiently built relationships with key players. At one
crucial juncture when it looked like Operation Red would fall
apart, we brought in two highly-respected local elders to
cajole the co-op board out of its hesitancy. We also used
the elders to identify the board member who attempted to
forge his own deal at the expense of the others. He has
since been replaced. Regarding the Taliban zeqat, PRT is
preparing an Information Operation (IO) to use the issue to
create psychological space between the insurgents and
farmers. The co-op has now signed a contract for an initial
30 metric ton shipment to the juicing factory at a price 40%
higher than what farmers received last year. The co-op is
hopeful that it will receive even more favorable prices as
the harvest continues. The planned shipments of two tons of
pomegranates to Dubai and two tons to New Delhi in order to
foster further international deals are also underway. TaGab
also produces rare seedless pomegranates, which have received
offers as much as five times the traditional rate. (Note:
These high prices have actually been a source of some of our
difficulties, as farmers engage in high-stakes brinkmanship
for ever better prices. End note.)

Branching Out and Harvesting the Good Will
--------------


7. (S) PRT Kapisa has designed a multi-phased
counterinsurgency operation based on the initial success of
the pomegranate cooperative. The next step will be for the
ADT, again working with the DAIL and local extension agents,
to provide training on pruning, fumigation, and
fertilization. The PRT will then hire trained military aged
men to do pruning and other orchard-care projects over the
winter. These and additional cash-for-work projects will
dissuade those men from seeking work in Pakistan and Iran
where some are recruited into the insurgency. We will take
biometrics from those men as well. The pruning and other
projects should also greatly increase next year's pomegranate
yield. Furthermore, insurgents often use the
never-before-pruned orchards as staging grounds for attacks.
The newly trimmed trees will offer much less cover during

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the spring fighting season.


8. (SBU) PRT Kapisa plans to follow up on Operation Red by
fostering cooperatives for other agricultural products. We
will also work to form trucking, carpentry, masonry, and
other economic enterprises in TaGab in close concert with our
Afghan partners at various levels. A continuous IO effort
will tout the benefits of locals working hand-in-hand with
GIRoA, finger insurgents for stealing locals' hard-earned
cash, and emphasize the need for other critical districts to
join in similar efforts so their people too can benefit.

Final Pickings
--------------


9. (C) Comment. Nothing about this process has been easy
and it must be expected that we will face continuing
roadblocks. Furthermore, this success could be difficult to
duplicate in other highly kinetic areas. One advantage in
TaGab is that the district center is located less than a
kilometer from the entrance to FOB Kutschbach, and just
outside an ANSF compound run by a dedicated anti-insurgent
police chief. This security bubble has allowed the PRT and
ADT relatively unhindered access to our interlocutors. It is
the deepening relationships that have allowed the operation
to move forward. Also, it is clear that many farmers (and
some of the local leaders) we are dealing with have had or
continue to have close ties with insurgents. This offers
both a challenge and an opportunity. Finally, now that the
French have taken over the battle space in Kapisa, we must
continue to seek their support and participation. End
comment.
Eikenberry