SPANTA PLUGS KABUL CONFERENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003789

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: SPANTA PLUGS KABUL CONFERENCE

REF: A. KABUL 3773


B. KABUL 3742

Classified By: Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Convening a meeting of foreign ambassadors
on November 25, Afghan Foreign Minster Rangeen Spanta
highlighted the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan's (GIRoA's) request that a high-level conference,
hopefully at the ministerial level, be convened in Kabul in
early 2010. His request was met with general assent, with
the British, American, German and Indian representatives
speaking up to voice their agreement. The UK suggested the
Kabul conference might be in March or April. There was
widespread agreement that any Kabul conference as well as the
28 January London conference and their preparations be Afghan
led. In a private meeting thereafter with Coordinating
Director for Development and Economic Affairs Wayne, Spanta
said Karzai had told him on November 24 that he would not
accept having a London conference prior to a Kabul
conference. Spanta indicated that Karzai may still be upset
that the January 28 date had been made public before PM Brown
had sought his agreement to that date. In any case, Spanta
said that he saw the wisdom of having the Kabul event in the
spring to allow for good preparation, but Karzai was not yet
in agreement. He also expressed concern that Foreign
Ministers might not agree to meet again in Kabul so soon
after London. Spanta specifically asked for assurance that
Secretary Clinton would be willing to return to Kabul in
March or April for a ministerial meeting. End Summary.

--------------
Afghan First?
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister Spanta convened over forty
ambassadors and international representatives to the Foreign
Ministry on November 25 to discuss potential upcoming
conferences on Afghanistan. In that discussion (see paras
4-7),Spanta accepted that there would be a London conference
on January 28 and discussed the idea of holding a second
conference in Kabul with the general assumption that it would
be held in March or April. However, the Foreign Minister
indicated during a private follow-on meeting with Ambassador
Wayne that Karzai was upset at not having been notified in
advance before the January 28 conference date was made public
by the UK Prime Minister. Spanta noted that Karzai had many
times asked for the Kabul conference to be held first and
that he (Spanta) had asked for US support for the concept in
his meeting with Secretary Clinton in September. While
Karzai has subsequently accepted the UK proposal, Spanta
warned of a "strong possibility" that President Karzai would
try to convene a Kabul conference in mid-January to ensure
that the Kabul conference would occur first.


3. (C) Spanta cited a conversation he had with President
Karzai on November 24 in which Karzai stressed that he wanted
a ministerial meeting in Kabul first. Spanta said he
understood the difficulties of getting such a meeting well
prepared by mid-January given that Afghan ministers would be
new to their jobs and the end-of-year holidays would inhibit
work. He said he would try to convince Karzai of the wisdom
of having the Kabul ministerial meeting in March or April.
The Minister said, however, that he was concerned that it
would be difficult to convene a ministerial-level conference
just months after London, which would also be at the
ministerial level. He particularly requested that Secretary
Clinton make every effort to attend the Kabul conference.
Ambassador Wayne said he would pass that request to
Washington. Wayne also raised the idea of holding a JCMB
meeting in Kabul prior to London where Afghan ministers could
lay out their view of the agendas work plans for London and a
subsequent Kabul conference, as a way to address some of the
President's concerns. Spanta offered no direct response
other than to reiterate Karzai's concern that he had not been
informed prior to the announcement of the London date.

--------------
Setting the Agenda
--------------


4. (C) In the larger ambassadorial meeting, Spanta was
sanguine, describing a Kabul conference as complementary
to the London conference. Linking the two conferences, and
creating synergy between them, Spanta noted, would be
crucial to their success. Spanta had also reviewed and
approved of SRSG Kai Eide's proposals earlier this year for
the conferences, and said he especially appreciated Eide's
goal of ensuring Afghan-ownership of the conferences. Spanta
recommended that both conferences address security,
reconstruction, development, anti-corruption and good

KABUL 00003789 002 OF 002


governance. He stressed the importance of the Afghan
audience for these meetings. "The time for talking about
Afghanistan is over," he said. "The time has come for the
Afghans to talk among themselves about how they will move
their country forward." He acknowledged that the London
conference will help shore up support for donor countries
with their domestic audiences, with a message showing a
transition will take place to Afghan ownership.


5. (C) Several attending ambassadors voiced their strong
support for the Kabul conference. British Ambassador Sedwill
sought to justify the choice of January 28 for the London
conference. Following Karzai's impressive inaugural speech,
Sedwill said, the international community needs to develop a
plan to help support Karzai's stated initiatives. Further,
the international community may likely have to reshape its
plans for Afghanistan in light of President Obama's decision
next week. London would provide the international community
a venue to coordinate adjustments to their strategies, but a
Kabul conference was very important.


6. (C) As for the agenda, Ambassador Sedwill said, "we are
in your hands." He stressed the need to boost flagging
public support in donor countries. The Kabul conference
should come second in March or April, he argued, because
Karzai needs time to select his new government and to develop
his agenda. The Kabul conference will offer Karzai's new
administration the chance to "make their pitch" to the Afghan
people, he suggested. The German Ambassador seconded the UK
remarks, saying that "Karzai has said all the right words,
and now we're waiting for him to do the right deeds." The
Kabul conference, he said, will give Karzai the means to show
how he intends to fulfill the promises laid out in his
inaugural speech.


7. (C) On the issue of the agendas for the two conferences,
the Indian Ambassador stressed that equal attention must be
paid to all of the key issues confronting Afghanistan, not
just security, as some had suggested. The EU Ambassador
argued that the conference should be on a political level,
not overly focused on security, and that holding a subsequent
conference in Kabul would present a rich symbolic opportunity
for the Afghan government to boost its political credibility
in the eyes of its people. Putting in a plug for Afghan
leadership of the conference, the UNAMA Deputy SRSG
underscored the importance of having Afghans take the lead on
developing the agenda, suggesting a series of meetings
convened by the Afghans in Kabul with UNAMA and key donors.
(Privately, Spanta told Ambassador Wayne that a working group
of key Afghan ministries would be assembled to work with the
international community to build the agendas.) In the
broader discussion, Wayne argued that Afghan leadership in
the conferences and in setting the agendas was a priority and
noted the importance placed on moving ahead with implementing
the vision discussed by President Karzai in his inauguration
speech. Both in the broader discussion and in private with
Spanta, Wayne also stressed the importance of good
preparatory work and collaboration to make sure that the
Kabul conference reflected well-developed plans of action for
achieving agreed objectives.

--------------
Sub-national vs National-level Assistance
--------------


8. (C) Privately, Spanta also mentioned to Wayne that he had
heard rumors the United States and other donors were
considering allocating the bulk of their countries'
development funds for the provinces, thus bypassing the
central government. Ambassador Wayne clarified that Embassy
Kabul's approach is to enhance the capacity of local and
district governance in ways that strengthen the links between
Kabul, the provinces and districts. The goal, he stressed,
is not to take money or resources away from the central
government, but to work on improving the connection between
Kabul and the provinces and the delivery of services to the
population. The IDLG has been asked to come up with a pilot
district governance program, for example, with the goal of
making the central government more legitimate by enhancing
its ties on the local level. Spanta expressed agreement with
this approach, but said he was very concerned with reports of
programs which might serve independent local power bases:
Afghanistan has suffered too much from local and regional
power holders, he said.

Mussomeli