KARZAI'S INAUGURATION SPEECH: PREVIEW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003700 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM AF SUBJECT: KARZAI'S INAUGURATION SPEECH: PREVIEW Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis Ricciardone, Reason 1.4 (b) an d (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: After weeks of quiet interventions and outright drafting support, the U.S. appears to have gotten most of our priorities into the inauguration speech draft as of November 17. Karzai is capable of undermining this progress by inserting criticisms of the international community that drown out his own admissions of wrongdoing and promises of reform. While Karzai appears ready to make the right statements on security, he is giving no clarity on specific anti-corruption proposals. End Summary. -------------- Embassy engagement -------------- ¶2. (S) President Karzai gave the Ambassador several cabinet ministers as the contact points for Embassy input for the inauguration speech, starting almost a month ago. The Embassy drafted key building blocks, and worked with the Foreign and Finance Ministries in particular to flesh out the U.S. priorities. The Ambassador also used his meetings with the President to underscore that the speech must meet two key needs: explain to the Afghan people what they can expect from their government over the next five years, and win American "hearts and minds" by asserting Afghan leadership and responsibility in the areas of security and anti-corruption. ¶3. (S) At the same time, other local embassies (especially the UK and France) and even world leaders have sent a constant stream of private and public messages about the speech to Karzai. We have observed that the Palace is now shrugging off many suggestions and most criticisms, especially criticisms directed at Karzai personally. ¶4. (S) At a November 15 palace meeting that included Ambassador Eikenberry, General McChrystal, Defense Minister Wardak and others, President Karzai was pragmatic and interested in suggestions for the contents of the address. His initial preference had been to give a short speech with few specifics, he said, but since the USG had made the speech "a big deal" he had changed his approach. Karzai told Ambassador Eikenberry he would work on the speech personally November 16. (Comment: As cooperative as he has appeared, he will likely put back in some of the more negative comments he reportedly wanted to include all along (which we have gotten excised.) One such comment is adding the phrase "and international troops" to a sentence that had pointed out Afghan fears of both insurgents and predatory government officials. As the French Ambassador put it recently, Karzai "balances two paragraphs attacking the international community for every sentence of self-criticism." End comment.) -------------- What we may expect: on security -------------- ¶5. (S) Karzai committed at the meeting to saying that Afghanistan will seek to take the lead in combat operations "in key areas of the country" within three years, and to lead throughout the country within five years. Under this timetable, the participants agreed, U.S. and other coalition troops would continue to play a major combat role, certainly over the next three years, but would gradually shift largely to a training, advisory and support role by the end of Karzai,s new five-year term. Karzai accepted Eikenberry,s explanation that public announcement of this timetable in the speech while additional troop deployments are under consideration would have an important impact on U.S. public opinion: showing that our commitment was not open-ended, due to Karzai's desire to take over the lead combat role. Wardak appeared uncomfortable with the agreed-upon timetable, emphasizing throughout the need for continued U.S. presence. ¶6. (S) Karzai was eager to announce that his government would take over responsibility for detainees now held by the U.S. and proposed saying that Afghanistan would assume responsibility for detention operations "as soon as possible." Eikenberry reminded him that taking full detainee responsibility was a major undertaking and suggested Karzai might want to announce an intention to complete the shift by the end of his term. Karzai emphasized he wanted the handover to happen "sooner than that" and that he would announce that intention in the speech. ¶7. (S) Karzai said he did not plan to announce the goal of increasing the Afghan security forces specifically to 400,000 because he was "not sure it will happen." He emphasized Afghanistan would not have the ability to pay for an army and police force of that size, a point echoed by Wardak. The Defense Minister also voiced concern about the agreed-upon timetable for Afghans to take lead combat responsibility, emphasizing throughout the need for continued U.S. support KABUL 00003700 002 OF 002 even beyond five years. He mentioned the Afghan desire to become a Major Non-NATO Ally, but it remains unclear whether Karzai will put this aspiration into the speech; we have separately informed the MFA that such a request would need a full policy review. ¶8. (S) Karzai resisted a suggestion that he declare his commitment to winning the war and pay tribute to the soldiers, both foreign and Afghan, who have given their lives. Karzai appeared perplexed about the need to say anything about "winning the war" and insisted he had already made public statements about casualties. -------------- -------------- What we may expect: on reform and reconciliation -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S) It remains unclear what the speech will include about addressing corruption. Karzai did not address the issue with us, and a senior aide said afterward that he was unsure what the president would say although the Palace understands the vital importance of this topic and of moving beyond the generalities of Karzai's November 2 acceptance speech. The aide clarified that there will be an Afghan government proposal, possibly a new agency devoted to addressing corruption, but he was not sure what proposals would be made in the inaugural address. ¶10. (S) Foreign Minister Spanta said in a meeting with D/Ambassador Ricciardone on November 16 that he favored a "strong anti-corruption body." He mentioned strengthening the High Office of Oversight (HOO) and said Karzai "had accepted this idea," but he too was unclear if specific measures would be included in the speech. He hinted that he might accept appointment to head a "strengthened, independent HOO" provided he received "full protection" for himself and his family. The Deputy Director of the High Office for Oversight (HOO) told us November 17 that President Karzai does plan to discuss the HOO in his inauguration address, welcoming the organization,s revision to include international participation. According to Ershad, the President will "invite the international community" to participate in the actual group when formed, but also in its development. Spanta emphasized that he was a lead drafter of the address and had sent a draft to Karzai recently that would be sent around to other ministries and advisors for suggestions; the promised to send us a copy of this version later on November 17. ¶11. (S) On reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents, Karzai was even more circumspect. He said he would announce a desire to pursue reintegration but "not go into specifics, because we don,t have specifics." He said that Afghanistan,s National Directorate of Security would be responsible for developing a reconciliation/reintegration strategy to be implemented by the Independent Directorate of Local Governance. EIKENBERRY