PLANNED SOUTH KOREAN PRT IN AFGHANISTAN: A FEW

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DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL KS AF
SUBJECT: PLANNED SOUTH KOREAN PRT IN AFGHANISTAN: A FEW
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5. (C) We also passed along to DCM Park two questions
arising from the field. First, how much assistance in
ensuring the security of their new PRT and its operations
were the South Koreans likely to seek from the U.S.? Second,
what would be the relationship of a South Korean PRT to any
U.S. PRT also operating in the areas of their deployment? On
the first, Park indicated Seoul is well aware that security
is deteriorating even in the north; that the situation in
Kapisa adjacent to their likely preferred location, Parwan,
is "very bad"; and that it would not be possible to guarantee
their people "100 percent security." He said simply that "we
will do our best" but "may need some assistance from the U.S.
side in this regard" (not further defined).


6. (C) On the question of de-confliction, Park believed that
for political reasons at least, Seoul would want to have an
"independent" facility, but he did not think his authorities
had focused on its relationship with a neighboring U.S. PRT.
Certainly, he said, they would want their people to
coordinate, but he felt certain Seoul had not focused on the
notion of "lead" or "support" roles. Park referred to
earlier discussions between the last South Korea team to
visit Afghanistan and the U.S. military task force on Bagram
regarding a possible geographic or task-specific division of
responsibilities in Parwan. If both Korean and U.S. PRTs
there would have strong reasons for focusing on the Bagram
area, he suggested a specialization by task might make sense:
the Koreans could concentrate on development while the U.S.
could devote itself primarily to security and governance.
The Korean DCM undertook to pass along the questions for
further consideration in Seoul.


7. (C) Comment: We infer that, at a minimum, the South
Koreans will be looking for U.S. assurances that quick
reaction force intervention could be provided, if necessary,
to any Korean PRT in Parwan. This may be of some concern to
us, since the Koreans, as a small nation that already
withdrew its military from Afghanistan once after the loss of
a soldier, could become an attractive target for insurgent
attack.


8. (SBU) If the South Koreans do seek to establish a wholly
separate, development-only PRT, they will be breaking new
ground. According to the ISAF model, PRTs are intended to
address all three lines of operation (security, governance,
development),and we know of none that currently focuses
exclusively on development. There is also no precedent for
having two truly separate PRTs operating in the same province
(although the degree of the South Korean,s &independence8
remains to be clarified). There are, however, many examples
of multi-national PRTs, including a few with task
specialization. At the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, for example,
the Swedes are the lead nation and their partners, the
Finns, focus on corrections and police training. In Ghazni,
the Poles bring their own resources to the single, U.S.-led
PRT, but are co-located and coordinate closely with us.
EIKENBERRY