THE MORNING AFTER: THE KARZAI CAMP LOOKS AHEAD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003506

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: THE MORNING AFTER: THE KARZAI CAMP LOOKS AHEAD

Classified By: PolCouns Annie Pforzheimer reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: At a meeting with Ambassador Eikenberry
November 3, the day after being declared the winner of the
presidential elections, President Karzai appeared ready to
get to work on his second term, buoyed by the call from
President Obama. He accepted the need for forward momentum:
his inauguration speech with the announcement of his compact
with the Afghan people, the selection of competent Ministers
in key positions, and a possible International Conference in
Kabul some months from now that would ratify and implement
the compact. Karzai held a press conference later the same
morning at which he promised to address corruption and "clean
this stain from our garments." Separately, six key cabinet
ministers made similar affirmations to Ambassador Ricciardone
and other members of the International Community (IC). They
also asked us to influence Abdullah to concede clearly and
soon. End Summary

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KARZAI LOOKS FORWARD
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2. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry met with President Karzai on
the morning of November 3. Karzai expressed appreciation for
President Obama's "good" phone call. Karzai said he
understood the need for, and was ready to move ahead with, an
inaugural speech announcing his compact with the Afghan
people. The Ambassador underscored the importance and
significance of a timely announcement of clean and competent
Ministers in key positions. Karzai agreed, and said he would
move forward with this. (Note: Press reports of General
Dostum arriving in Afghanistan looking for a payoff for his
election support indicate the difficult political task ahead
of Karzai. End Note.) Ambassador Eikenberry gave five themes
for the way forward: 1) partnership, 2) common goals, 3)
determination, 4) urgency, and 5) steady commitment. Karzai
said he agreed and would use these themes at his press
conference.


3. (U) A few hours later, President Karzai held a press
conference where he accepted the IEC's decision as legal and
constitutional. He said the Afghan people were the real
winner in the electoral process, and thanked the ANSF, ISAF,
the UN, and the IC for their sacrifice. He said the new
Afghan government would be a national unity government, and
that the "door is open to everyone." However, he said that
this unity meant he "had no opposition and did not need any."
He affirmed that the Afghan government will have a strong
partnership with the IC, especially the U.S., but that
"further clarification of our relationship is needed in
regards to assistance." He acknowledged that Afghanistan has
problems with corruption, but was now ready to "clean this
stain from our garments."

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KARZAI'S TEAM BRAINSTORMS WAYS TO LIMIT CORRUPTION
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4. (C) French Ambassador Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt organized
a morning after breakfast to brainstorm on the post-election
plan of action with six key Afghan Ministers: Interior
Minister Atmar, Finance Minister Zakhilwal, Education
Minister Wardak, Commerce Minister Sharani, Agricultural
Minister Rahimi, and IDLG Minister Popal. Ambassador
Ricciardone, EU Representative Sequi, British Charge Tom
Dodd, and German Charge Christian Buck participated. The
topics included corruption, rule of law, and better
governance.


5. (C) The French Ambassador opened the meeting with a
review of the Paris Accords of June 2008, that called for
joint audits to limit corruption. The Afghans and IC agreed
that addressing corruption and rule of law must be key
priorities in the next five years. The Ministers asked that
the IC acknowledge the progress made on corruption, but
admitted that Karzai's release of prisoners was hurting
everyone's credibility, and that presidential leadership was
essential -- Wardak undertook to take this message, in
particular, "back to the President." They agreed with
Ricciardone's suggestion to broaden the onus of granting
amnesty away from the executive, or require some sort of
additional approval, perhaps by Ministers or the Parliament.


6. (C) The French Ambassador also asked how the Afghan
government could be better organized to improve performance,
noting the French Cabinet Secretariat as an example, not a
suggestion. The Ministers thought that a strengthening of
the role of the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA) could
be a solution. They explicitly recognized the need for a
stronger anti-corruption mechanism than the current High

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Office of Oversight, and repeatedly enlisted the Paris
Statement's call for "joint audits." There was no mention of
establishing a CEO position.


7. (C) The Ministers also asked the IC for assistance in
convincing Abdullah explicitly to accept the IEC decision and
to concede gracefully. The IC representatives reported all
were doing so, and confirmed that none of their governmental
or organizational leaders had phoned messages to Abdullah,
pending clarification of his acceptance of the IEC
certification.


8. (C) Zakhilwal said that a good inaugural speech was
important, and wanted to coordinate the input of the IC,
noting that the U.S. had already provided some ideas to the
first draft. The Ministers agreed that Karzai's choices of
clear competent people for cabinet and governor positions was
key. However, Atmar said that the "political reality" needed
to be acknowledged by the IC, to include a dignified position
for key Karzai-supporter Ismael Khan. Zakhilwal opined,
however, that Khan no longer wants the Energy Ministry, since
the "interesting part" was taken away (referring to the
collection of utility payments to a private company); he
thought Karzai would find some other way to accommodate him.
EIKENBERRY