STOPPING THE PROLIFERATION OF FERTILIZER-BASED

S E C R E T KABUL 003505 SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, T, ISN, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PLEASE PASS TO DIRECTOR, FBI, AND USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 TAGS: PTER ETTC EAGR KDEM MOPS PGOV AF WA PK SUBJECT: STOPPING THE PROLIFERATION OF FERTILIZER-BASED HOMEMADE EXPLOSIVES ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy Kabul is implementing an action plan in conjunction with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA),the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and partner embassies to halt the proliferation of fertilizer-based homemade explosives (HME). Insurgents are using HME, particularly explosives derived from Ammonium Nitrate (AN),with increasing frequency and lethality in IED attacks on Afghan civilians, Afghan National Security Forces and ISAF troops. ISAF forces in Regional Command South (RC-South) have begun seizing AN fertilizer, which has been banned since 2005, although the ban has neither been enforced by GIRoA entities nor widely known or understood among Afghans. Because AN has some legitimate uses for which alternatives are not readily available, we see regulation as preferable to a blanket ban. We are pressing GIRoA to establish, with international support, a coordinated inter-ministerial enforcement regime and public awareness campaign to interdict imports of AN fertilizer and to exchange current AN stockpiles for less dangerous alternatives. Regardless of how effectively GIRoA may attempt to control AN, however, Pakistani cooperation will be critical to success, as Pakistan is the largest supplier of AN-based substances to Afghanistan. We defer to Embassy Islamabad,s judgment on how best to influence the GoP, and suggest adding AN to the agenda for the upcoming Security Trilateral. End Summary. The Threat -------------- ¶2. (S/REL ISAF) According to ISAF,s Counter-IED Task Force, IEDs made from ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer are by far the greatest killer in Afghanistan. Since 2008, casualties from IEDs or VBIEDs containing AN have doubled. Coalition deaths due to AN-based explosives have risen from 130 in 2008 to 229 through September 2009, while Coalition wounded have risen from 575 to 1302. The majority of attacks and the greatest percentage increase are in RC-South: from 64 to 159 killed and from 317 to 811 wounded. Afghan National Security Forces and civilians continue to represent the greatest losses, with 751 killed by AN-based IEDs in 2008, and 1090 through September 2009. ¶3. (S/REL ISAF) HQ ISAF Counter-IED Branch has confirmed that AN-based homemade explosives have been used in the deadliest attacks on civilians and Coalition Forces, and the bombs are growing in size. On October 8, insurgents used a suicide VBIED containing roughly 500 pounds of homemade explosives to attack the Indian Embassy in Kabul, resulting in 12 deaths and at least 80 civilians wounded. On October 15 a U.S. military Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle was ripped in half by 1500 pounds of AN-based homemade explosives. With a street value of $550 per metric ton of AN, a bomb of this size cost about $350 to make, but it took four U.S. lives and destroyed a $570,000 vehicle. The incident is only the second catastrophic attack on an MRAP in Afghanistan, but it represents a disturbing development. ¶4. (S/REL ISAF) Ammonium nitrate fertilizer yields a powerful, inexpensive and easily-made explosive. Adding a small amount of a simple carbon source, such as diesel fuel, is all that is necessary to turn AN into ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO),a popular commercial blasting agent, which then requires only a high-explosive detonator to initiate. While other popular fertilizers, such as urea, can also be made into explosives, they require significant additional chemical processing and specific precursor chemicals such as nitric acid or sulfuric acid to become effective. Additionally, processing batches of urea large enough to be used for IEDs creates a large exothermic reaction and thus a significant heat signature, which can be detected by Coalition airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Action Plan -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In Afghanistan, AN makes up only about five per cent of all fertilizer. Cheaper, more effective alternatives, such as a combined use of diammonium phosphate (DAP) and urea, are readily available and is the fertilizer combination USAID, USDA and other donor nations are promoting for Afghanistan. In the U.S., farmers still widely use AN because of certain desirable properties (e.g., it provides a faster release of nitrogen to boost vegetable quality prior to harvest),but the U.S. closely regulates its production and distribution. We have concluded that regulation is a more appropriate course of action for Afghanistan than a blanket ban, since AN does have some specific uses where alternatives are not readily available here. For example, AN used in industrial blasting cannot be as easily replaced. For mines, quarries and construction sites, it may be necessary to allow use of AN, in which case it should be regulated and tracked. ¶6. (SBU) The Embassy has mobilized a working group including GIRoA, ISAF, and partner embassies(thus far the UK, Canada, The Netherlands, Australia, Denmark) to stop the proliferation of AN-based IEDs throughout Afghanistan, and to mitigate the threat. The group is working to: -- halt imports of AN-based fertilizers; -- support GIRoA efforts, assisted by ISAF, particularly in the South, to seize AN-based fertilizers and, for a limited time, compensate legitimate farmers and/or traders who were unaware of the ban; -- develop a targeted public diplomacy campaign to: educate the Afghan public on the dangers of AN-based fertilizers; inform them that the long-standing ban will be enforced and that compensation will be offered for a limited time; and mitigate any resentment caused by fertilizer seizures; -- better equip and train border police and customs officials to detect AN-based fertilizer, precursor chemicals and other explosives/devices; -- establish a licensing or other regulatory scheme to control importation and use of ANFO in Afghanistan,s critical mining, quarrying and construction industries; -- include AN-related issues on the Canadian)led Dubai Process agenda which deals with Af-Pak border issues; and -- flag this issue via Washington for inclusion on the agenda of international bodies focused on the control of dangerous materials. ¶7. (C/REL ISAF) On September 23, Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) Mohammad Asif Rahimi formally confirmed in a letter to the Ministers of Defense and Interior, the National Security Director and COMISAF, that since 2005 &ammonium nitrate fertilizers are already illegal and are wholly banned in Afghanistan8 and that GIRoA authorities are authorized to confiscate such supplies. Consequently, on October 14 MG de Kruif issued RC-South FRAGO (Fragmentary Order) 005-233, directing ISAF forces in RC-South to seize AN fertilizer stockpiles and, if intended for legitimate use, to pay farmers sufficient amounts to buy alternative products. The FRAGO describes current ISAF actions as the initial phase, from which &we will transition to the GIRoA-led counter AN campaign ensuring that our efforts are fully nested and complimentary with their programs.8 ¶8. (C/REL ISAF) The Ambassador, Deputy Ambassador, and Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs have pressed a number of ministers individually to coordinate on this issue, and GIRoA working level staff have met several times with Embassy and ISAF action officers. Defense Minister Wardak promised Ambassador Eikenberry he would host an inter-ministerial meeting to collectively discuss the way ahead. Preoccupation with the run-off election delayed the event, but Wardak finally convened such a meeting, with highly publicized announcement of the AN ban, on October 31, attended by Ambassador Eikenberry. THE PAKISTANI DIMENSION -------------- ¶9. (C/REL ISAF) Both smuggling and legal importation of AN-substances - primarily from Pakistan - present challenging problems. Most of the AN used in Afghanistan comes from Pakistan through the Weesh-Chamin and Towr Kham border crossings. Pakistan has two major AN production facilities and is opening a third, which we understand is heavily subsidized for domestic use, even though much of the production is in fact exported. Official figures show $135 million of AN fertilizer was imported into Afghanistan from Pakistan last year, which, due to the subsidies, may represent a substantial financial loss for the Government of Pakistan. Diplomatic coordination with Pakistan will be essential as Afghanistan works to stop the proliferation of AN-based explosives. Despite potential financial and jobs-related domestic issues, interdiction may well be in Islamabad,s interest, since up to 50% of bombs in Pakistan are also made from fertilizer-based HME. Embassy Kabul has begun consultations with Embassy Islamabad on a coordinated Af-Pak strategy on AN and HME, deferring to Embassy Islamabad,s judgment on how best to collaborate with the GoP. We invite Embassy Islamabad,s views as to adding cooperation on AN to the agenda for the upcoming Security Trilateral. EIKENBERRY