HELPING AFGHANS CHECK FOR UNDISCLOSED CASH MOVEMENTS AT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003504 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/A, AND EEB TREASURY FOR M. KAPLAN, A. WELLER, AND J. CASAL DHS FOR IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT - OPERATIONS DHS FOR CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION - INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EFIN SNAR ETRD KCRM KCOR PGOV AF SUBJECT: HELPING AFGHANS CHECK FOR UNDISCLOSED CASH MOVEMENTS AT KABUL'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT -- OPERATION FLY AWAY I ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On October 25 and 26, an Embassy Kabul interagency team worked with Afghan authorities to conduct an information gathering operation at Kabul International Airport, examining whether both arriving and departing passengers properly document currency they are bringing into or out of the country. The operation also provided a force multiplier for Afghan customs during peak hours and contributed to a more robust revenue collection environment. Concerns identified out of the exercise include failure to screen VIPs and their luggage adequately, lack of control over access to the inbound customs areas, lack of adequate ramp access control, and no examination of handheld personal property carried by airline employees leaving the ramp through the customs area. The following are among the recommendations emerging from the exercise: better control sheets and standard operating practices to verify the amounts of currency carried by travelers and to seize the money if warranted, improved measures to facilitate customs examination and the collection of any duties owed, tighter screening of VIPs and their luggage, and strengthened procedures governing access to the ramp and other airport facilities. To help implement the recommendations, U.S. BMTF will deploy two Customs and Border Police monitors at the airport within the next 30 days. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On October 25 and 26, a team comprised of Afghan Customs Department (ACD) and Afghan Border Police (ABP)officers, with support from the U.S. Border Management Task Force, Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA),and the Transportation Security Agency, conducted an information gathering operation -- "Operation Fly Away" -- at Kabul International Airport. The operation focused on ensuring both arriving and departing passengers had completed all currency declaration forms. The operation also identified several important gaps in the areas of customs and general airport security. ¶3. (SBU) Afghan officials conducting the operation identified two money couriers with undeclared currency leaving Afghanistan. The two turned out to be from the Russian Embassy in Kabul and were traveling with $50,000 and $15,000 respectively. When asked by the Afghan Customs Department to complete a currency declaration, the travelers asked someone from the Russian Embassy to come and help complete the form. The Embassy sent someone to help the two staff members. Both passengers stated they were unaware of the requirement to declare money coming or going from Afghanistan. Under Afghan law, anyone carrying one million Afghani ($20,000) must declare the cash to Afghan Customs authorities upon departure or arrival (Note: the amount is $10,000 in the U.S.). There was no protest at the airport by the Russians of their treatment by the Afghan officials. ¶4. (SBU) No passengers were detected bringing money into Afghanistan during the operation. However, several passengers did fail to declare goods and Afghan Customs officials had them pay the requisite duties. ¶5. (SBU) In addition to the identified couriers, the operation revealed several procedural gaps: -- When passengers arrive into or depart from Kabul they are not asked if they are carrying more than one million Afghani (or the equivalent). -- The Currency Declaration forms are not numbered/sequenced. -- There are problems with the translations the Currency Declaration forms and an inadequate number of forms are available at the airport. -- Neither the inbound nor the outbound area of the terminal has a private room to count money for verification purposes. -- Standard procedures for fund verification are not in place, nor are there the money counting machines, scales, or other items necessary to routinely enforce the law. THE NEED TO IMPROVE CUSTOMS INSPECTION AND COLLECTION -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The operation also uncovered several serious gaps in how customs duties are assessed, collected, and catalogued. These gaps KABUL 00003504 002 OF 004 include: -- Afghan officers rely heavily on the x-ray machine to do all examinations. There are also too many people at the x-ray machine. -- There are no signs posted showing what the duty rates are and what each Afghan citizen is allowed to bring into the country. The staff lacks a Standard Operating Procedure for collecting duties owed and supervisors rarely engage employees. -- The customs officers do not itemize goods for duty collection. -- The "green" and "red" zones are reversed and do not operate effectively. -- Customs officers do not engage with the traveling public. -- There is insufficient supervision of customs officials' activities. AIRPORT SECURITY CONCERNS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Also during the operation, participants observed a number of serious security concerns at the airport. These security concerns affect other aspects of airport operation and should be remedied. Specific security concerns include: -- VIPs are not thoroughly screened and are allowed to bypass security. -- VIPs do not need to be present to claim their baggage and frequently utilize a third party to introduce and/or collect baggage. -- Arriving and departing conveyances are not properly screened for contraband. -- Lack of control over who enters the Passport Control Area. -- Lack of control over who enters the inbound customs area where baggage is collected. -- Passengers are allowed to leave the customs area and re-enter with their hand luggage. -- No examination of handheld personal property of airline employees leaving the ramp through the customs area. -- Ramp access is not controlled; there is no valid security presence on the ramp. Vehicles come and go on the ramp without adequate controls. No foreign object detection is done on the vehicles entering the ramp area. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AIRPORT OPERATIONS -------------- ¶8. (SBU) After the operation concluded, the Border Management Task Force, in consultation with other participating agencies, put forward several recommendations to improve procedures at Kabul International Airport: a) Enhancing cash declaration compliance -- Control sheets and Standard Operating Procedures should be developed for the Afghan Customs Department for the verification of currency entering/leaving and the seizure of money. -- All passengers should be asked if they are carrying more than one million Afghanis (or equivalent in negotiable instruments) and, if the answer is yes, complete a currency declaration form. If the person cannot read or write, someone at the airport should be available to assist. -- The Currency Declaration Form should be revised, translation problems corrected, and the forms numbered sequentially. The forms should also be separately available in triplicate, vice bound in books as they are now. KABUL 00003504 003 OF 004 -- An audio/video message should be made and broadcast in the airport for passengers describing the cash declaration laws (in Pashtu, Dari, and English). -- Two rooms should be identified for verifying currency (one in the inbound and as well as one in the outbound area). These rooms should be equipped with an adequate number of machines to count currency. -- An Afghan Customs Department officer and an Afghan Border Police officer should be stationed at the final search point prior to entering the outbound lounge. b) Increasing compliance with Afghan customs regulations -- Establish clear green and red zones. -- A Standard Operating Procedure must be written for customs duty collection, along with one for compliance and enforcement. -- Reasonable goals need to be established for the collection of customs revenues at the airport. -- All VIPs must be present for baggage collection and customs declaration. -- Only Afghan Customs and Border Police should be allowed behind the x-ray machine. -- Other law enforcement must submit a request and plan in order to be in the customs area. -- An Afghan Border Police officer should be placed at all entrances of the customs area to ensure only authorized personnel have access. -- The Afghan Customs Supervisor should be required to sign off on all duty collection forms. -- Central Bank personnel should be provided space in the customs area to take physical possession of duty payments. -- No travel expeditors should be allowed in customs area. -- No airline personnel other than those with flights are allowed in the customs area. c) Tightening security procedures at KIA -- Standard Operating Procedures for security should be written and discussed with staff. -- An Airport Security Taskforce should be established, led by the authority responsible for coordinating implementation of security controls. -- A new VIP process should be developed to serve as interim operating procedures and incorporated into the airport security program. -- A formal checkpoint to control passenger and employee access to the new airport terminal is necessary. -- A new badge access system should be implemented. The system should include a mechanism for temporary workers as well. An interagency committee of Afghan law enforcement/transportation officials should issue the badges. A color-coding method should be used to delineate access to various parts of the airport. -- The ABP should deploy necessary physical security to control the ramp. Global Security (a private contractor providing security at the airport) could help provide an additional layer of security for the building's interior. -- Procedures are needed for authorized agencies requiring access to airport security areas. -- A closed circuit TV (CCTV) system should be installed and appropriate secure location in the airport identified where the CCTV KABUL 00003504 004 OF 004 can be monitored and security tapes stored. This location will also require communication upgrades to ensure connectivity with appropriate law enforcement and airport officials. Established operating procedures for ABP personnel and training in those procedures should be established. WAY AHEAD - OPERATION FLY AWAY II -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Moving forward, plans are underway for Operation Fly Away II, incorporating the DHS ICE program "Hands Across the World." Doing so will require the government of the UAE to participate along with DHS/ICE personnel assigned to Dubai. All participating agencies in Operation Fly Away I will be included the next operation. ¶10. (SBU) In a concerted effort to implement the recommendations outlined above, BMTF will deploy two Customs and Border police mentors at the airport within the next 30 days. EIKENBERRY