FIRST REACTIONS TO ABDULLAH'S ANNOUNCEMENT: RELIEF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003494

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: FIRST REACTIONS TO ABDULLAH'S ANNOUNCEMENT: RELIEF

REF: KABUL 3493

Classified By: PolCouns Annie Pforzheimer reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: While many Afghan interlocutors are glad
that the long and tumultuous 2009 Presidential elections
process might be over, the political classes apparently have
not given up their deal-making. The night of his November 1
press conference withdrawing from the race, Dr. Abdullah had
dinner with Ambassador Eikenberry where he showed some of the
strong emotions of the day, noting his "relief", then
gradually relaxed into a conversation on his strategy for the
next few years. In a Karzai meeting with jihadi and
mujahadeen leaders the morning of November 2, five of eight
voted to have the IEC announce that Karzai was the election
winner, which transpired at 4 PM (reftel). Abdullah
supporters expressed mixed feelings about his carefully
worded announcement, some pushing for a boycott, others an
interim government and a refusal of the IEC announcement,
while still others are hoping for a Professor Rabbani
negotiated deal with Karzai. End Summary.

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ABDULLAH RELIEVED, BUT UNDECIDED?
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2. (S) The night of his November 1 press conference, Dr.
Abdullah and one aide had dinner with Ambassador Eikenberry
before he began another round of meetings with supporters
starting at 9 pm. Abdullah showed some of the strong
emotions of the day when he arrived, talking about his
"relief", but gradually relaxed into a conversation on his
strategy for the next few years. Abdullah spoke at length
about his motivations for both his run and subsequent
withdrawal, blaming his final decision to withdraw on Karzai
who denied even one, symbolic change to the IEC (firing IEC
Chairman Ludin) that could easily have been accomplished
during the short second-round campaign period. Abdullah said
that his other reason for withdrawing was the growing
ethnicized nature of the rhetoric being used to get out the
Pashtun vote. He noted that the vast majority of his
supporters had wanted a "boycott" but he decided, at the last
minute, to avoid that term.


3. (S) Looking ahead, Abdullah's contribution to greater
governance and institutionalization of democracy is for now
fairly vague - he is not clear whether he wants a "national
movement", a political party, or just influence in
Parliament. He agreed with the Ambassador that extending the
central government to the provinces, districts and villages
was extremely important but pointed out that, in the absence
of effective government an alternative power network had
grown into being - one that featured drug traffickers, petty
warlords, terrorists and corrupt officials.


4. (S) As of November 2, however, there were some indications
that Abdullah is considering a statement that would condemn
the November 2 IEC certification of Karzai's election. Such
a move would open the door to a legal challenge, which would
derail his status of loyal opposition.


5. (S) Some members of Abdullah's campaign, in particular
those without strong allegiances to Rabbani, continue to hope
for more of a challenge to Karzai. They expressed their hope
that the IEC decision will be challenged on legal grounds by
the IC as well as Afghans such as Abdullah, leading (somehow)
to an interim administration and the holding of a second
round in the spring. They explained that this is the reason
why Abdullah has refused to give the IEC his decision to
withdraw in writing.


6. (S) According to a leading Shomali commander aligned with
the Northern Alliance, Amanullah Guzar, Abdullah,s decision
to withdraw was not his own, but that of his supporters who
are fed up with Karzai's corrupt and ineffective government
and who believe that fraud would be a bigger problem in any
second round. He said that Afghans are thankful for U.S.
efforts to deal with the fraud and want to see additional
pressure applied to Karzai to step down to make room for an
interim administration, selected by the U.S. and the
international community (but not to be led by Zalmay
Khalilizad) that would be elected in the spring with the
parliament. Karzai would be allowed to run, but would be
without the advantages of the presidency he abused in the
first round. Guzar, who appeared agitated during much of the
meeting, said that if Karzai remained there would be violence
which Abdullah would be powerless to prevent and which could
eventually engulf foreign forces.

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STILL, A DEAL?

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7. (S) However, while Guzar said that he and the other
commanders prefer to see a Karzai-less interim administration
with elections next year they are willing to accept another
Karzai term in return for a certain number of positions in
the government. This position would be based on the Rabbani
list handed to Karzai before the election. Guzar said this
would be a "poisonous pill" for them to swallow, but that
they would do it for the good of the country.


8. (S) Tajik and reluctant Karzai-supporter MP Fazel Aimaq
told us many Abdullah supporters were "disappointed" with
Abdullah's announcement to not participate in the second
round, in particular because many of them had spent
considerable personal funds on the campaign, as well as taken
personal risk. They asked, if Abdullah was going to concede,
why did he wait so long to do it? Director of the
Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Haroun Mir,
largely viewed as anti-Karzai, told us that many high profile
Abdullah supporters, to include Professor Rabbani, would use
the question of Karzai's legitimacy as leverage to obtain
positions in Karzai's government or to push for an interim
government. Salahuddin Rabbani told us that Rabbani
supported the "middle of the road" Abdullah announcement that
neither called for a boycott, nor offered a silent
withdrawal. He admitted "other supporters," wanted a full
boycott, but that they agreed this was dangerous, also noting
that both Rabbani and Abdullah did not want to upset the IC,
nor burn their bridges with Karzai.


9. (S) Professor Rabbani's son Salahuddin Rabbani told
Poloff that the "door still remained open" for a deal with
Karzai. He said Karzai had passed Professor Rabbani a note
on November 1 listing supporters he was offering jobs, to
include Salahuddin. Professor Rabbani refused, saying that
they were advocating for policy changes, not just jobs, to
include a decentralization of the government. Salahuddin
said that they thought these Karzai maneuvers were a
transparent attempt to divide the Abdullah team. However, he
said Karzai should reach out to his father. Poloff told him
that we would not oppose such negotiations but that any calls
for a boycott would be dangerous. Since Karzai has indicated
to intermediaries that he will offer "something" to Abdullah
and his supporters once his reelection is confirmed, the
Rabbani camp tells us they are cautiously optimistic about
their prospects.


10. (S) MP Aimaq told us that Abdullah's ambitions were
personal fame, not power. Therefore, he preferred to keep
the press and the IC on his side. He said Abdullah would
never accept a deal with Karzai, as he would demand an equal
partnership, not a position that Karzai could later withdraw,
as he did to Abdullah when he was Foreign Minister. Junbesh
MP Shakar Kargar told us that Rabbani was Abdullah's
"scorpion under the rug," who was manipulating him and hoping
to make Abdullah lose face, in order to set Rabbani up for
positions in a Karzai government. MP Haji Iqbal (Kapisa,
Tajik) told us many Abdullah supporters had already abandoned
Abdullah in favor of a Rabbani deal with Karzai. (Note: we
have heard that these supporters, at a minimum, want to be
reimbursed for their Abdullah campaign expenses. End Note.)
Iqbal said Abdullah, as the face out front, could never
benefit from an important position. Kargar further said
Abdullah was the Tajik "sacrificial lamb," who served to path
the way for the next Tajik candidate in the 2014 presidential
race.

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KARZAI PLEASED
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11. (S) Ambassadors Eikenberry and Ricciardone were with
President Karzai during the Abdullah press conference
November 1. Overall, Karzai's team reacted favorably to
Abdullah's tone and to the fact that he avoided the word
boycott, and termed the speech not "overly confrontational."
At that meeting Ambassador Eikenberry emphasized his
understanding for the need for both constitutional legitimacy
and political legitimacy, and hoped that the IEC would
shortly come to a conclusion. Karzai, oddly, questioned the
Ambassadors directly if they had been financially supporting
Abdullah's campaign. When they denied it, Karzai said,
"well, if you are not paying him, that proves the Iranians
are."

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SOME KARZAI SUPPORTERS PUSHED FOR SECOND ROUND
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12. (S) Junbesh senior leadership told the Ambassador on

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November 2 that they had wanted Karzai to go to a second
round to increase his legitimacy, and so Afghanistan could
benefit from a "strong government." (Comment: Junbesh, as
well as Hezb-e-Islami, do not want competition for cabinet
positions, and therefore prefer the second round versus a
deal with Abdullah. End Comment.) Later, Deputy Junbesh
Chairman MP Saee returned from a meeting at the Palace, and
told us that Karzai held a meeting with jihadi and mujahadeen
leaders the morning of November 2, and five of eight voted to
have the IEC announce that Karzai was the election winner
(Afghanistan Islamic Invitation Party leader Sayyaf,
Hezb-e-Islami branch leader Sabawoon, Ulema Council Head
Shinwari, Afghan Millat Leader and Finance Minister Ahadi,
and Energy Minister Ismael Khan voted to end the elections
now, while Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan Arghandewal,
Hezb-e-Wahdat leader Akbari and Junbesh Deputy Chairman Sayee
voted to go to a second round).


13. (S) The Lawyers' Union members met at the
Intercontinental Hotel to discuss the 'legitimacy of the
runoff election'. It had the feel a pre-planned Karzai
pep-rally than a serious, professional debate over the legal
necessity of a second round. President Karzai,s office
issued invitations to the event, billing it as a press
conference, but Karzai himself did not appear. Approximately
275 people attended and there was both local and
international media coverage. The speakers we heard were
unanimous in their consensus that the international community
is to blame for the current election crisis and that a second
round should go forward to establish that the President has a
true mandate from the people.
EIKENBERRY