ABDULLAH AND KARZAI TO MEET ALONE OCT 28

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003459

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL DATE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 20191028
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ABDULLAH AND KARZAI TO MEET ALONE OCT 28

REF: KABUL 3445

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Classified By: Ambassador Francis Ricciardone reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone and UN Special
Representative Kai Eide continued pressing the Abdullah and
Karzai camps on October 28 to meet face-to-face to attempt to
reach an understanding on whether and how they can
collaborate on a reformist national unity program. In return
for this, Abdullah might concede the election. Although
Abdullah remains skeptical about Karzai's commitment to any
real positive changes for Afghanistan in the next five years,
Abdullah remains "open minded" about negotiating with Karzai
for the good of Afghanistan. Late on October 25 the two
sides agreed on the venue for the meeting: Abdullah yielded
to Karzai, and has agreed to meet him at the presidential
palace offices late this evening. Ricciardone and Eide
recommended working on an outline of a future deal at that
meeting, but Abdullah said that after such a rigorous
campaign, any initial meeting might be just to "feel each
other out." End Summary.

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Abdullah Skeptical But Open
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2. (S) Abdullah, SRSG Eide, and Deputy Ambassador
Ricciardone met October 28 to continue attempts to nudge him
to negotiate face-to-face with Karzai. Due to Eide's
security restraints after the attack on the UN guest house
earlier in the morning leaving at least six dead, the meeting
was moved to the Embassy from the home of Dr. Abdullah. The
morning's events loomed over the meeting, as Eide noted the
guest house compound was primarily a UN Elect compound,
casting further stress over the current period of electoral
uncertainty. Hours after this meeting, Abdullah said he felt
the impact of these latest victims on his decision to meet
Karzai.


3. (S) Abdullah, in a better humor than on October 27
(reftel),said that after his discussion with Ambassador
Eikenberry, he realized his October 26 press conference at
which he laid down extreme conditions for participating in a
second round "was a mistake." He had thought about
Ambassador Eikenberry's statement that "lives were at stake"
with his decisions on the elections process. Although
Abdullah remains skeptical about Karzai's intentions to make
any real positive changes for Afghanistan in the next five
years, he said he remains open minded about negotiating with
Karzai for the good of Afghanistan. Abdullah's bottom line
is that he does not trust Karzai, and thinks the idea of
international witnesses to the process would be helpful.

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Venue Dispute
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4. (S) Of the location options offered by Eide for Abdullah
to meet one-on-one with Karzai, two seemed most probable:
either Eide's residence, or Presidential "Palace II". Eide
noted that his residence would be very difficult due to
security limitations after the morning's attack, noting that
shutting down several important streets to nearby embassies
would decrease the likelihood of a discreet meeting. He said
Palace II was separate from the Presidential Palace and Eide
could arrange to be the host of the meeting there, and offer
a photo opportunity with the UN flag in the event that the
meeting leaked to the press. Abdullah, however, insisted on
Eide's residence, noting that if "Karzai did not make at
least this concession, it would be indicative of his
absolutist bargaining position," and therefore Abdullah would
prefer not to meet at all.

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Substance of an Agreement
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5. (S) Ricciardone suggested some elements of a common
program with Karzai, basically restating some of Abdullah's
more realistic suggestions to include:

-- an overhaul of the IEC and electoral process,
-- a review of the electoral law to include a more democratic
way of selecting governors, and
-- an official position for Abdullah (perhaps as head of a
Constitutional review commission).

Publicly,

-- both candidates must appear together to launch a
solidarity platform,

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-- neither side must be humiliated,
-- both should declare Abdullah's concession is based on the
need to prevent more deaths and to work together to defeat
the common enemies of Afghanistan,
-- and agree that this concession is a legal end to the
election process.

Privately,

-- Karzai agrees to work with key Abdullah supporters,
-- to appoint clean and competent ministers,
-- and this, in turn, would allow the UN, the United States,
and the world community to affirm their support for the
Karzai-Abdullah solidarity platform.

Abdullah said all of these were good starting points, and
Karzai would no doubt be amenable to most, but voiced concern
that after a rigorous campaign period, this first meeting
would likely be an opportunity to "feel each other out." He
understood time was short. Eide agreed to set the meeting up
for the evening of Oct. 28, pending Karzai's acceptance.

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Meeting Set
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6. (S) Karzai Chief of Staff Daudzai told us later that
Karzai would not accept meeting Abdullah at Eide's residence,
but instead Palace II was an acceptable option. After
several more conversations with Ricciardone and Eide,
Abdullah finally relented. As of 19:00 Kabul time, the two
sides plan to meet at Palace II at 21:00, where Eide will be
photographed with both parties in front of the UN flag.



EIKENBERRY