ABDULLAH DEFLATED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003445

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ABDULLAH DEFLATED

Classified By: Political Counselor Annie Pforzheimer for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Eikenberry met with Karzai,
Abdullah and several of their key advisors separately on
October 26 - 27. Each side expressed appreciation for our
contacts with them and the opposite camp in support of the
election process and at the same time, a possible political
accommodation between the two sides that might obviate a
difficult second round. Abdullah seemed saddened by his
situation, but expressed an interest in overcoming the
election standoff for the good of the country. Ambassador
pressed him hard against his advisor's pressure to boycott a
second round. Ambassador urged Karzai to be magnanimous in
his dealings with Abdullah and stressed the need for the
second round to be credible. Ambassador told Wolesi Jirga
Speaker Qanooni that Abdullah had to "step back from the
ledge of declaring a boycott." Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan
(HIA) Chairman Arghandewal told Ambassador that Karzai should
shun any deal with Abdullah; while Karzai advisor Sanjar said
that Karzai will not make a deal based on Abdullah's "list"
of demands. End Summary


Abdullah Looks Forward
- - - - - - - - - - -


2. (S) On October 26, Abdullah held a press conference where
he issued 15 demands for the second round election.
Ambassador Eikenberry met with Dr. Abdullah on October 27 to
discuss his demands and the way forward. The mood was sober
and Dr. Abdullah seemed saddened. He was recovering from a
root canal the day before, and joked that he also suffered
from "the political flu." The Ambassador told Abdullah that
the international community (IC) was disappointed that
Abdullah's demands were putting the process into question.
He said that some Abdullah advisors had selfish reasons for
advising him to take this compromising position, especially
after he had gained the respect of the IC for his restraint
and positive campaign during the first round.


3. (S) Abdullah voiced concern that without "at least some"
of his demands being met, the Afghan people would not believe
in the elections process enough to vote. He said his
advisors had strong opinions, but it was his followers who
had convinced him of this move. Abdullah said he had three
choices: 1) strike a deal with Karzai that would meet a
"reasonable amount" of his demands, and then to proceed to
the second round, 2) "swallow the bitter pill" and boycott
the elections, or 3) if nothing was done, continue with the
process anyway.


4. (S) Ambassador Eikenberry noted that a boycott would lead
to Karzai winning, regardless, and would only put Abdullah in
a weakened position. Instead, he could consider his
long-term political future, where he could play a
constructive role perhaps as the leader of a loyal
opposition, or another position of importance. Abdullah
noted that he had a lengthy history of working with Karzai,
and over this period of time had realized that there was no
hope for real change with Karzai. Therefore, an agreement at
this stage would be "very difficult." He said if he did not
feel strongly about this, he would not have "volunteered for
this most difficult of jobs." However, Abdullah did express
interest in overcoming this elections standoff for the good
of Afghanistan.


Open Door to Talks
- - - - - - - - -


5. (S)Karzai Chief of Staff Omar Daudzai informed us shortly
after this meeting that Karzai was amenable to meeting
Abdullah with no preconditions. Abdullah subsequently
confessed that he also agreed to the meet. (As of the evening
of October 27, the two sides were converging on an agreement
over a "neutral venue.") The Ambassador advised Abdullah to
focus not on the next two weeks, but rather the long-term
future of Afghanistan when talking to Karzai


MFA Spokesman Comments on Abdullah's Demands
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (U) When asked about Abdullah,s demands at an October 27
press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman
Hamidzada said that if his demands were within the limits of
Afghan law, they are fine. If they were not within those
limits, they are not fine. Regardless, he said Abdullah,s
demands do not matter as the issue will be resolved by a
second round election.



KABUL 00003445 002 OF 003


Karzai Thanks Us for Abdullah Intervention; We Urge
Magnanimity
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-


7. (S) Ambassador met alone with President Karzai mid-morning
on October 27 for about an hour, focusing on the elections.
Karzai appreciated the Ambassador,s interventions with
Abdullah supporters (Rabbani, Qanooni, and Massoud) in which
Eikenberry had stressed the need for Abdullah to stay with
the process, keep his demands reasonable, and "pull back from
the ledge." Karzai said that he also appreciated the
Ambassador,s comments in the media that the U.S. was not
pushing a coalition government. The Ambassador noted that
Abdullah wanted some of his key ideas about devolving central
government power included in a future unity platform, and was
not only motivated by a desire for ministries. Karzai
pointed out that Abdullah,s supporters, on the other hand,
were strongly motivated both by an immediate desire for power
and also by the desire to make Abdullah self-destruct so they
would not have to deal with him as a future national
political figure and threat to their own power. The
Ambassador urged Karzai to be magnanimous because his own
political position was so much stronger than Abdullah,s;
Karzai responded that he had concerns about speaking to
Abdullah directly because he would impose preconditions and
because Abdullah might make their discussion public.


8. (S) The Ambassador told Karzai that the U.S. not only is
admonishing Abdullah to stay with the process, we are making
another key point, publicly and privately -- the second round
must be credible. The security ministries, recent assertion
that they could support 1000 more polling sites than the IEC
had originally suggested (and almost 500 more than on August
20) was completely unsubstantiated by the idea that the
country was "more secure" than during the first round. He
advised Karzai to call IEC Chairman Ludin to hear his
recommendation, which in the end should reflect both the
security assessment and the IEC and UN,s technical judgment
of how many sites to open. He pointed out to Karzai that
insecure sites were the most vulnerable to fraud, so while we
sympathized with the discussion about Pashtun enfranchisement
we could not support any action which would call the
legitimacy of the election into doubt. He said that if sites
were opened without both candidates having agents present,
the system should require an automatic audit to remove any
concerns or doubts; Karzai agreed to this option.


Meetings with Key Advisors
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

To Qanooni: Abdullah Needs to "Step Back from the Ledge"



9. (S) In a private dinner on October 26, Ambassador told
Wolesi Jirga Speaker Qanooni that Abdullah had to "step back
from the ledge" because his demands were too extreme, using
them as a pretext to boycott the election would diminish, but
not derail the election process. Qanooni, who said he was on
good terms with both Abdullah and Karzai (although known to
be in Abdullah,s inner circle) asked what the U.S. wanted to
see in terms of a deal. The Ambassador reiterated that the
U.S. wanted to defend the constitution and the elections, and
that if Abdullah boycotted the process he would "lose
everything." As the loser of the 2004 elections, Qanooni
alleged that the country had become more divided in the five
years of Karzai,s rule and that his own supporters had been
methodically pushed out of government positions, and asked
"can we afford five more years of Karzai?" He said that
Karzai felt that he did not need to give Abdullah anything in
a negotiation - and that both sides were being counseled
badly. Abdullah, he thought, should be pushing for some of
his key ideas to be adopted at least in small ways, such as
having qualified and clean governors and cabinet ministers
appointed via consultation with Parliament. Qanooni promised
to convey to both candidates the Ambassador,s unequivocal
message that history would judge this group of politicians
harshly if they do not complete the election process in a
manner consistent with the constitution.


Arghandewal: Karzai Should Shun Abdullah Deal



10. (S) Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) Chairman Arghandewal
told Eikenberry on October 26 that he and his party have told
Karzai of the need for a second round. They believe Karzai
is certain to win and, therefore, should not make any deals
with Abdullah. HIA is rallying their supporters to turn out
for Karzai on election day. Arghandewal hopes participation
will be strong.


KABUL 00003445 003 OF 003



11. (S) Arghandewal voiced concern about the "arbitrary" way
elections officials were deciding to close some polling
centers. The Ambassador said it was important that too many
centers not be opened as it would make fraud and security
issues a significant issue again. Arghandewal said he and
his supporters were dedicated to cracking down on fraud at
least in districts where they have influence.


12. (S) Arghandewal said that a "political solution" was
needed to deal with Hekmatyar and the Taliban. The issue is
not them, he said, it is the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis are
holding these groups "hostage" in their country - if they do
not help the Pakistanis, and are on the terrorist black list,
the Pakistanis threaten to send them to the Americans. They
are "forced" to fight in Afghanistan by the ISI. On a
recent trip to Pakistan by Arghandewal, the ISI offered to
provide Arghandewal weapons and support to fight against the
coalition presence, and criticized his HIA for working with
the government.


Karzai Advisor: Criticizes Abdullah, Says Karzai Won,t Deal



13. (S) Karzai advisor Sebghatullah Sanjar told poloff on
October 27 that Karzai will not make a deal with Abdullah, at
least not along the lines of Abdullah's 15 public demands.
Sanjar questioned the quality of Abdullah,s advisors,
arguing that whoever told him to make the list of impossible
demands was putting him in a difficult position. He believes
that Abdullah,s demands are "tantamount to announcing that
he is the loser" and puts Abdullah in a difficult corner.
Now either he will have to back down and appear weak, or
withdraw. In either case, Abdullah loses, according to
Sanjar.


14. (S) Sanjar said that the initial rumors that the West
would support Abdullah (as part of a conspiracy) have all but
died away. He said "hopefully" now Karzai will start
believing the U.S. when they tell him that they are willing
to work with him.


15. (S) According to Sanjar, the Taliban has agreed to
support the election in parts of Afghanistan, such as
Nangarhar, Helmand, Khowst and Paktia due to their Pashtun
ethnic bias towards Karzai, and against the "Tajik" Abdullah.
He said that they will keep the areas secure so voting can
take place.
EIKENBERRY