Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3395
2009-10-22 16:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SECOND ROUND PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST

Tags:  PREL PGOV AF 
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VZCZCXRO7384
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3395/01 2951635
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221635Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2429
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003395 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST

Classified By: PolCounselor Annie Pforzheimer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003395

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST

Classified By: PolCounselor Annie Pforzheimer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Now that President Karzai has accepted the
decision to hold a second round on November 7, other elements
of Afghan society have been quick to follow. Preparations in
the areas of security, fraud mitigation, and voter education
have reportedly begun within the central and local
governments. MPs and other politicos are now attempting to
foretell which power-brokers will deliver which voting bloc
to which of the two candidates -- so they can back the
winner. Despite the open door between Abdullah and Karzai
for a possible coalition/unity government, negotiations have
not begun in earnest. End Summary.

--------------
Security
--------------


2. (S) Security will affect not only voter safety at the
polling locations, but also voter turnout and fraud. ISAF
has committed to providing AIR delivery of polling materials
and in extremis support of the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) on election day. Given the need to beef up
anti-fraud measures significantly, and therefore security
measures, a more robust ISAF role before and after election
day is under discussion. The FRAGO from ISAF/IJC explaining
the elections-related responsibilities of regional commands
is being published October 22. Troop movements for the
elections will be decided following the publication of this
order.


3. (S) On October 20 Interior Minister Mohammad Atmar ordered
his staff to begin planning and on October 21 Defense
Minister Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak followed suit, pledging
publicly that he intends to help provide "better security"
than in the first round. There is still no decision whether
the thousands of ANSF officers in training during this period
can be re-routed to help with election security. On October
21, the Interior and Defense Ministries (MOI and MOD) jointly
decided to reassess their ability to protect polling
locations in 18 districts. At a joint ISAF/ANSF planning
meeting on October 22, the ANSF announced that the MOD, in
consultation with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),
will be the final arbiter on which polling location can be
secured and which cannot. The MOD again appears to oppose
the IEC regarding site security realities, requesting that
the IEC open more polling locations. In the meeting,
UNDP/ELECT-Afghanistan Director Margie Cook, stated that the
MOD and the IEC will finalize the polling locations by
October 25, and we are following up to ensure this date does
not slip.

--------------
Fraud
--------------


4. (S) As of October 21, the IEC stated publicly that it

intends to decrease polling centers by about 400 in order to
ensure there is adequate security and oversight at all
locations. However, an IEC employee on October 22 provided
us, in confidence, what he claimed was a draft list of
polling locations that the IEC is still reviewing. This list
shows a much larger number of centers subtracted than the IEC
has reported publicly, although his information was likely
aimed at supporting his argument that Pashtuns are being
disenfranchised. By far the biggest decrease in polling
centers on this list is 720 for RC-South, followed by 305 for
RC-East. The only province to see no decrease is Parwan.
Uruzgan and Jawzjan will lose only one polling station and
Bamiyan two. By comparison, Helmand province will supposedly
lose 120 polling locations, by far the largest decrease.
However, concerns about disenfranchisement must be balanced
against the IEC's judgments about fraud. Polling locations
that were not adequately protected in the first round were
the primary sources of fraud. In an separate meeting, Dr.
Najafi told Ambassador Carney that MOI Atmar and other
Ministers are intensely pressuring the IEC not to decrease
polling locations in Pashtun areas, despite doubts that the
ANSF can secure them.


5. (S) The international community will again fund observers
from the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan
(FEFA). FEFA hopes to mobilize 7,000 observers across the
country, but a maximum of 5,000 is more realistic. The EU
Observer Mission (EUEOM) is planning a small observer mission
of only 14 to 16 observers and only in the safer but
relatively low-fraud areas of RC-North, RC-West, and Kabul.
This decision comes on the heels of EUEOM's accurate
appraisal of the level of fraud in the first round, which led
to the GIRoA's angry rebuttal and a threat from the Afghan
Attorney General's Office of Interpol charges against EUEOM
head, General Phillipe Morillon, for the fraud allegations.


KABUL 00003395 002 OF 003



6. (S) Only some of the USG-funded NGOs who observed in the
first round are submitting proposals for observer missions
for the run-off. Those NGOs are proposing drastically
reduced numbers and a focus on Kabul, rather than sending
observers to the insecure areas where observation will be
much more of an issue. The International Republican
Institute (IRI) has not yet decided on whether or not to
submit an observer proposal. The Asian Network for Free
Elections (ANFREL)/The Asia Foundation is also undecided, but
seems reluctant to deploy any observers. The National
Democratic Institute (NDI) will send only four international
observers, while Democracy International is proposing 14
international observers. Both of these organizations also
propose sending Afghan observers to additional locations, but
not in large numbers. The OSCE's Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is expanding its
ongoing advisory mission to "elections stakeholders." They
will concentrate on longer-term electoral issues, such as
voter registration and electoral capacity building, rather
than sending out a traditional observer mission.


7. (S) The IEC, which began planning for a possible second
round in late September, ordered indelible ink, polling kits,
and ballot papers from overseas at the direction of
UNAMA/UNDP ELECT and with Embassy Kabul encouragement. As of
October 22, the IEC has already begun transporting materials.
Unfortunately, they are doing so without assurances of
proper security at the provincial warehouses or other
destinations. This time, we are emphasizing that all ballots
must be adequately secured before the vote as well as
afterwards. USAID will fund private security contracts, if
acceptable to the IEC, to guard sensitive warehouses but the
IEC order to advance with materials distribution comes ahead
of USAID's procurement process. (Comment: We believe these
IEC actions may be both deliberate and due to
disorganization. End comment.)


8. (S) The IEC has stated repeatedly that they will not
re-hire any worker where there is clear and convincing
evidence that he/she committed fraud in the first round.
Where there is not clear evidence, a worker could be re-hired
but moved to a different location. The IEC declared at an
October 22 UNAMA Communicators meeting that it has already
chosen 200 District Field Coordinators (DFCs) not to re-hire
for the second round and warned the remaining 2,950 not to
re-hire any questionable polling center workers or else be
held personally responsible for any problems that arise.
They also reported plans to let several Provincial Electoral
Officials go or to switch them to other provinces. Whether
or not low-level workers, or even the Commissioners
themselves, will eventually be charged or prosecuted is
unclear. To our knowledge there are no plans at this time to
have senior officials removed from the IEC before the run-off.

--------------
Turnout
--------------


9. (S) Turnout will likely increase in a few areas, as is
predicted for the Pashtun areas of Herat, and decrease in
many others due to weather, apathy, and security fears.
Community council members in Garmsir told PRT officers they
expected a higher turnout in Helmand. Several MP
interlocutors raised the idea with us that Afghans will view
this election along strictly ethnic lines and view it as a
contest not between two men, but a referendum on Tajiks
versus Pashtuns. The MPs believed that this would act to
increase interest and ethnic pride, and therefore turnout.
One interlocutor opined that "even the Taliban" will come out
to vote for Karzai in the second round, out of ethnic pride.
NGO leaders at an October 21 event were largely positive
about the prospect of a second round with much higher
turnout; they did not mention ethnic tensions as an issue
saying instead that people will simply have an easier time of
deciding with only two candidates to chose from. However,
one Afghan-led human rights NGO based in Kandahar projected
that turnout will decrease, due to security fears and local
perceptions that numerous Kandaharis were killed or maimed
while trying to vote.


10. (S) Turnout of not only voters, but also election
workers, remains a concern. Local IEC officials in Nangarhar
report that UNDP/ELECT has still not paid laborers or other
administrative costs, including rent for the local IEC
office. IEC officials in Nangarhar say they regularly get
locked out of their office by the landlord and have to talk
their way back in. With unpaid laborers from the first
round, they are unsure about their ability to contract for
services in the second round. UNDP/ELECT's procurement
process is famously slow but it is additionally hampered by
the IEC's disorganization. The IEC never issued even one of
its budgeted small grants for voter education in the first
round, missing a major opportunity to increase voter turnout.

KABUL 00003395 003 OF 003


We see no reason to believe that ELECT's efficiency or IEC
processes will improve in this round -- including voter
outreach. On the other hand, trusted internal IEC sources
are not completely pessimistic with us about their ability to
get the honest poll-workers from the first round to return.

--------------
Predictions and Just Plain Rumors
--------------


11. (S) Karzai is happily manufacturing rumors and projected
outcomes, and politicians are angling to find out who the
winner will be -- so they can be sure to back him in time.
At this juncture, a deal between Abdullah and Karzai is
possible, but still remote. Abdullah has reached out, but
Karzai apparently has not responded and seems increasingly
likely to go through with a second round to prove his
legitimacy to the Afghan people. Meanwhile, Abdullah is
concentrating on winning over Hazaras and Uzbeks. Persistent
rumors predict General Dostum switching allegiances to
Abdullah, as well as Human Rights Commission president and
Hazara leader Dr. Sima Samar. Some predict Bashardost's
votes will go to Abdullah, others think they will split three
ways between Abudllah, Karzai, and no-shows. Other rumors
suggest that Water and Power Minister Ismail Khan and Foreign
Minister Spanta may be considering backing Abdullah and
carrying much of Herat with them. MP Hajji Iqbal claims that
Yaseni and other Pashtun former presidential candidates are
supporting Karzai and told us that this election contest will
divide strictly along ethnic lines.


12. (S) One Embassy contact alleged that Iran will be
deciding this weekend which of the two candidates to support.
If it does make a definitive decision, he said, its funding
could be expected to have a significant impact on the
strength of the campaign. Both Karzai and Abdullah have been
repeatedly accused of receiving Iranian campaign funds.
However, with Karzai's resources as the incumbent, Abdullah's
campaign would be more noticeably affected if he lost any
Iranian financial support he may be receiving.


13. (S) PRT reports have not been as negative as might have
been expected. Preparations are beginning in areas across
the country. Needs assessments vary. In Khost, local
officials are requesting fewer polling locations to allow
them to ensure security. The Ghor Chief of Police also has
concerns about Kabul's responsiveness to his security-related
requests. Nangarhar is worried about the lack of funds to
pay the electoral office rent and staff. Generally, most
reports have set aside complaints about the idea of a second
round and moved rapidly toward achieving it.


14. (S) The tone of our conversations with MPs have changed
as well. Prior to the announcement, MPs decried the idea of
a second round, in particular Karzai's supporters. Since the
October 20 announcement, many MPs have begun expressing
support. Most are now calculating which power brokers will
switch sides and whether a deal will be made before November

7. However, one MP -- a Pashtun from Kapisa Province -- told
us October 22 that if there is a deal, any government that
follows will be "meaningless".


15. (S) Comment: While it seems likely that Karzai and
Abdullah will both attempt to accomplish what fraud they can
in this round, they lack the same lead time to plan and
implement that they had in advance of the first round.
Though elections expert Carlos Valenzuela has made the
comment that "electoral fraud is always worse the second time
around," the rapid follow-on nature of this runoff election
may be just what is needed to prevent the types of fraud
witnessed in the first round. End comment.
EIKENBERRY

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