Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL3395
2009-10-22 16:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SECOND ROUND PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST

Tags:  PREL PGOV AF 
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VZCZCXRO7384
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3395/01 2951635
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221635Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2429
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003395 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST

Classified By: PolCounselor Annie Pforzheimer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003395 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST Classified By: PolCounselor Annie Pforzheimer, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Now that President Karzai has accepted the decision to hold a second round on November 7, other elements of Afghan society have been quick to follow. Preparations in the areas of security, fraud mitigation, and voter education have reportedly begun within the central and local governments. MPs and other politicos are now attempting to foretell which power-brokers will deliver which voting bloc to which of the two candidates -- so they can back the winner. Despite the open door between Abdullah and Karzai for a possible coalition/unity government, negotiations have not begun in earnest. End Summary. -------------- Security -------------- ¶2. (S) Security will affect not only voter safety at the polling locations, but also voter turnout and fraud. ISAF has committed to providing air delivery of polling materials and in extremis support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) on election day. Given the need to beef up anti-fraud measures significantly, and therefore security measures, a more robust ISAF role before and after election day is under discussion. The FRAGO from ISAF/IJC explaining the elections-related responsibilities of regional commands is being published October 22. Troop movements for the elections will be decided following the publication of this order. ¶3. (S) On October 20 Interior Minister Mohammad Atmar ordered his staff to begin planning and on October 21 Defense Minister Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak followed suit, pledging publicly that he intends to help provide "better security" than in the first round. There is still no decision whether the thousands of ANSF officers in training during this period can be re-routed to help with election security. On October 21, the Interior and Defense Ministries (MOI and MOD) jointly decided to reassess their ability to protect polling locations in 18 districts. At a joint ISAF/ANSF planning meeting on October 22, the ANSF announced that the MOD, in consultation with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), will be the final arbiter on which polling location can be secured and which cannot. The MOD again appears to oppose the IEC regarding site security realities, requesting that the IEC open more polling locations. In the meeting, UNDP/ELECT-Afghanistan Director Margie Cook, stated that the &#
x000A;MOD and the IEC will finalize the polling locations by October 25, and we are following up to ensure this date does not slip. -------------- Fraud -------------- ¶4. (S) As of October 21, the IEC stated publicly that it intends to decrease polling centers by about 400 in order to ensure there is adequate security and oversight at all locations. However, an IEC employee on October 22 provided us, in confidence, what he claimed was a draft list of polling locations that the IEC is still reviewing. This list shows a much larger number of centers subtracted than the IEC has reported publicly, although his information was likely aimed at supporting his argument that Pashtuns are being disenfranchised. By far the biggest decrease in polling centers on this list is 720 for RC-South, followed by 305 for RC-East. The only province to see no decrease is Parwan. Uruzgan and Jawzjan will lose only one polling station and Bamiyan two. By comparison, Helmand province will supposedly lose 120 polling locations, by far the largest decrease. However, concerns about disenfranchisement must be balanced against the IEC's judgments about fraud. Polling locations that were not adequately protected in the first round were the primary sources of fraud. In an separate meeting, Dr. Najafi told Ambassador Carney that MOI Atmar and other Ministers are intensely pressuring the IEC not to decrease polling locations in Pashtun areas, despite doubts that the ANSF can secure them. ¶5. (S) The international community will again fund observers from the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA). FEFA hopes to mobilize 7,000 observers across the country, but a maximum of 5,000 is more realistic. The EU Observer Mission (EUEOM) is planning a small observer mission of only 14 to 16 observers and only in the safer but relatively low-fraud areas of RC-North, RC-West, and Kabul. This decision comes on the heels of EUEOM's accurate appraisal of the level of fraud in the first round, which led to the GIRoA's angry rebuttal and a threat from the Afghan Attorney General's Office of Interpol charges against EUEOM head, General Phillipe Morillon, for the fraud allegations. KABUL 00003395 002 OF 003 ¶6. (S) Only some of the USG-funded NGOs who observed in the first round are submitting proposals for observer missions for the run-off. Those NGOs are proposing drastically reduced numbers and a focus on Kabul, rather than sending observers to the insecure areas where observation will be much more of an issue. The International Republican Institute (IRI) has not yet decided on whether or not to submit an observer proposal. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)/The Asia Foundation is also undecided, but seems reluctant to deploy any observers. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) will send only four international observers, while Democracy International is proposing 14 international observers. Both of these organizations also propose sending Afghan observers to additional locations, but not in large numbers. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is expanding its ongoing advisory mission to "elections stakeholders." They will concentrate on longer-term electoral issues, such as voter registration and electoral capacity building, rather than sending out a traditional observer mission. ¶7. (S) The IEC, which began planning for a possible second round in late September, ordered indelible ink, polling kits, and ballot papers from overseas at the direction of UNAMA/UNDP ELECT and with Embassy Kabul encouragement. As of October 22, the IEC has already begun transporting materials. Unfortunately, they are doing so without assurances of proper security at the provincial warehouses or other destinations. This time, we are emphasizing that all ballots must be adequately secured before the vote as well as afterwards. USAID will fund private security contracts, if acceptable to the IEC, to guard sensitive warehouses but the IEC order to advance with materials distribution comes ahead of USAID's procurement process. (Comment: We believe these IEC actions may be both deliberate and due to disorganization. End comment.) ¶8. (S) The IEC has stated repeatedly that they will not re-hire any worker where there is clear and convincing evidence that he/she committed fraud in the first round. Where there is not clear evidence, a worker could be re-hired but moved to a different location. The IEC declared at an October 22 UNAMA Communicators meeting that it has already chosen 200 District Field Coordinators (DFCs) not to re-hire for the second round and warned the remaining 2,950 not to re-hire any questionable polling center workers or else be held personally responsible for any problems that arise. They also reported plans to let several Provincial Electoral Officials go or to switch them to other provinces. Whether or not low-level workers, or even the Commissioners themselves, will eventually be charged or prosecuted is unclear. To our knowledge there are no plans at this time to have senior officials removed from the IEC before the run-off. -------------- Turnout -------------- ¶9. (S) Turnout will likely increase in a few areas, as is predicted for the Pashtun areas of Herat, and decrease in many others due to weather, apathy, and security fears. Community council members in Garmsir told PRT officers they expected a higher turnout in Helmand. Several MP interlocutors raised the idea with us that Afghans will view this election along strictly ethnic lines and view it as a contest not between two men, but a referendum on Tajiks versus Pashtuns. The MPs believed that this would act to increase interest and ethnic pride, and therefore turnout. One interlocutor opined that "even the Taliban" will come out to vote for Karzai in the second round, out of ethnic pride. NGO leaders at an October 21 event were largely positive about the prospect of a second round with much higher turnout; they did not mention ethnic tensions as an issue saying instead that people will simply have an easier time of deciding with only two candidates to chose from. However, one Afghan-led human rights NGO based in Kandahar projected that turnout will decrease, due to security fears and local perceptions that numerous Kandaharis were killed or maimed while trying to vote. ¶10. (S) Turnout of not only voters, but also election workers, remains a concern. Local IEC officials in Nangarhar report that UNDP/ELECT has still not paid laborers or other administrative costs, including rent for the local IEC office. IEC officials in Nangarhar say they regularly get locked out of their office by the landlord and have to talk their way back in. With unpaid laborers from the first round, they are unsure about their ability to contract for services in the second round. UNDP/ELECT's procurement process is famously slow but it is additionally hampered by the IEC's disorganization. The IEC never issued even one of its budgeted small grants for voter education in the first round, missing a major opportunity to increase voter turnout. KABUL 00003395 003 OF 003 We see no reason to believe that ELECT's efficiency or IEC processes will improve in this round -- including voter outreach. On the other hand, trusted internal IEC sources are not completely pessimistic with us about their ability to get the honest poll-workers from the first round to return. -------------- Predictions and Just Plain Rumors -------------- ¶11. (S) Karzai is happily manufacturing rumors and projected outcomes, and politicians are angling to find out who the winner will be -- so they can be sure to back him in time. At this juncture, a deal between Abdullah and Karzai is possible, but still remote. Abdullah has reached out, but Karzai apparently has not responded and seems increasingly likely to go through with a second round to prove his legitimacy to the Afghan people. Meanwhile, Abdullah is concentrating on winning over Hazaras and Uzbeks. Persistent rumors predict General Dostum switching allegiances to Abdullah, as well as Human Rights Commission president and Hazara leader Dr. Sima Samar. Some predict Bashardost's votes will go to Abdullah, others think they will split three ways between Abudllah, Karzai, and no-shows. Other rumors suggest that Water and Power Minister Ismail Khan and Foreign Minister Spanta may be considering backing Abdullah and carrying much of Herat with them. MP Hajji Iqbal claims that Yaseni and other Pashtun former presidential candidates are supporting Karzai and told us that this election contest will divide strictly along ethnic lines. ¶12. (S) One Embassy contact alleged that Iran will be deciding this weekend which of the two candidates to support. If it does make a definitive decision, he said, its funding could be expected to have a significant impact on the strength of the campaign. Both Karzai and Abdullah have been repeatedly accused of receiving Iranian campaign funds. However, with Karzai's resources as the incumbent, Abdullah's campaign would be more noticeably affected if he lost any Iranian financial support he may be receiving. ¶13. (S) PRT reports have not been as negative as might have been expected. Preparations are beginning in areas across the country. Needs assessments vary. In Khost, local officials are requesting fewer polling locations to allow them to ensure security. The Ghor Chief of Police also has concerns about Kabul's responsiveness to his security-related requests. Nangarhar is worried about the lack of funds to pay the electoral office rent and staff. Generally, most reports have set aside complaints about the idea of a second round and moved rapidly toward achieving it. ¶14. (S) The tone of our conversations with MPs have changed as well. Prior to the announcement, MPs decried the idea of a second round, in particular Karzai's supporters. Since the October 20 announcement, many MPs have begun expressing support. Most are now calculating which power brokers will switch sides and whether a deal will be made before November ¶7. However, one MP -- a Pashtun from Kapisa Province -- told us October 22 that if there is a deal, any government that follows will be "meaningless". ¶15. (S) Comment: While it seems likely that Karzai and Abdullah will both attempt to accomplish what fraud they can in this round, they lack the same lead time to plan and implement that they had in advance of the first round. Though elections expert Carlos Valenzuela has made the comment that "electoral fraud is always worse the second time around," the rapid follow-on nature of this runoff election may be just what is needed to prevent the types of fraud witnessed in the first round. End comment. EIKENBERRY

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