THE AGHA KHAN TRIES TO SOLVE ELECTORAL IMPASSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003383

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: THE AGHA KHAN TRIES TO SOLVE ELECTORAL IMPASSE

Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary and Comment. The very well-informed Aga Khan
told assembled ambassadors 14 October that he had met
separately with President Karzai and leading opposition
candidate Abdullah Abdullah, and had told them that the
political process in Afghanistan has failed. He urged the
two candidates to establish a common program for Afghanistan
and then create a government designed to implement it.
Attending ambassadors applauded his engagement and suggested
the Ismaili leader follow up with President Karzai,
emphasizing the need to respect the electoral process.
Ambassador Eikenberry added that discussions with both
candidates have gone forward on a broad range of issues that
should contribute to a common program that the Aga Khan might
use for specifics in his follow up discussions. With his
access and the high level of assistance the Aga Khan
Development Network (AKDN) affords to Afghanistan, the Aga
Khan is a serious voice that Afghans, including Hamid Karzai,
respect and listen to. End Summary and Comment.



2. (U) Background: The Agha Khan became Imam of the Shia
Imami Ismaili Muslims in 1957. He is the 49th hereditary Imam
of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims and a direct descendant of
the Prophet Muhammad though his cousin and son-in-law Ali,
the first Imam, and his wife Fatima, the Prophet Muhammad's
daughter. The Ismailis live in 25 countries, mainly in West
and Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and North
American and Western Europe. The Aga Khan was born on
December 13, 1936, in Geneva. He grew up in Kenya and
attended school in Switzerland. He graduated from Harvard
University in 1959 with a BA Honors Degree in Islamic
history. He is Director of the AKDN, which focuses on
health, education, culture, rural development,
institution-building, and the promotion of economic
development. The AKDN's Afghanistan program includes
large-scale rural development, health, education, and civil
society programs; microfinance; rehabilitation of historic
neighborhoods; the Babur Gardens in Kabul; the Roshan mobile
phone network; and, the renovation of the five-star Serena
hotel in Kabul. End Background.


3. (C) On 14 October the Aga Khan met with Ambassadors of
the United States (Eikenberry and Carney),France, UK, India,
Pakistan, Germany, EU, and the Commander of International
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). The Aga Khan's
representative, Ali Mawji, organized the event. After
presentations by the assembled guests that generally
emphasized Afghanistan's perilous security and political
conditions, the Aga Khan embarked on an informative tour d'
horizon, including details of his suggestions following
earlier meetings with President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah. The
Aga Khan focused on three main concerns: the role of
Afghanistan's neighbors and opportunities to gain support
from them; regional perceptions of the development future of
Afghanistan; and, his assessment of the current political
situation here.


4. (C) Underscoring the important role of Afghanistan's
neighbors, the Aga Khan assessed to the diplomats that each
of the presidential candidates could draw on possible support
from their circles of neighboring friends. Regarding his
regional perceptions of the development future of
Afghanistan, he emphasized that its provinces are in
different stages of development, and therefore, will need
varying approaches to development. This is particularly
critical for border provinces that share ethnic groups across
frontiers. He questioned whether Afghanistan's neighbors
share his analysis. A common regional view is necessary in
order to reach consensus on cross-frontier development -- a
concept which has already worked in Badakshan province where
the lesson of cross-frontier ethnicity has proved crucial.



5. (C) Security is another essential precondition because
ethnic groups must feel safe, the Ismaili leader stated. To
succeed, one must assess conditions at the frontiers, paying
particular attention to ethnic group demography in these
border areas, including the viability of working with each
group. In his view, irrespective of the election results, we
must "drive hard" on development wherever we can. He asked
COMISAF to keep an eye on security in the north and the west,
both "areas of promise."


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6. (C) The Aga Khan's third point centered on the political
situation. The Aga Khan explained that he had solicited
Karzai's and Abdullah's views on the future of the country in
the face of a failed political process. He recounted that he
had advised both candidates that, regardless of the election
outcome, they should work together. The Aga Khan had urged
them to devise a common agenda for the next three to five
years, which would require promptly establishing
communications to discuss their program. The key element to
the program would be appointing competent people in the key
ministries.


7. (C) The Agha Kahn had also asked them to consider
whether, in the event a second round was required, would it
be in Afghanistan's best interest to hold Parliamentary
elections scheduled for next spring? Given the high level of
risk entailed in holding two elections within a ten-month
period, he had urged the two candidates to consider avoiding
this scenario. The Aga Khan believed the candidates are
aware that they should assume some responsibility over this
matter, but he was uncertain whether their role would be
positive or negative.


8. (C) In his presentation, the Agha Kahn mentioned his
awareness that the Afghan Constitution does not allow for a
prime minister; whatever position Abdullah would occupy must
be constitutional and must factor in parliamentary
sensitivities. He concluded to his Afghan interlocutors that
this is a matter the Afghans must resolve, suggesting that
establishing clear goalposts would lend structure to this
tenuous period and reduce the centrifugal tendencies of
Afghanistan's political class. He took on board without
comment the French Ambassador's suggestion that a "Senior
Minister" be named who could perform the role of a PM,
without the title, but that ensuring parliamentary acceptance
would be vital.


9. (C) In response to questions and observations, the Aga
Khan noted that he does not favor changing the Constitution.
Rather, the new government should be allowed to first
function long enough to build momentum. Later there would be
time to discuss the Constitution. In this context, the Aga
Khan reiterated the critical role ethnicity plays, in
particular the cross-frontier realities of the Pashtun
community. Key here is that the ethnic group looks, not at
the frontier, but at themselves and their position vis-a-vis
other ethnic groups. By extension, the implication of this
dynamic is important for dealing with the insurgency;
stabilization in the ethnic communities can assist efforts to
reintegrate elements of the insurgency.


10. (C) Ambassador Eikenberry observed that the electoral
process is on wobbly rails, with the risk of seeing things
blow up, which if it does, would impact the current U.S.
debate. The Aga Khan expressed concern that the two Afghan
men might agree in principle, but not on a set of objectives
and on an agreed program. The Ambassador then noted the
existence of a detailed dialogue with both candidates about a
five-year agenda. He reported that the response from both
Abdullah and Karzai has been positive thus far and could
serve as a basis for a common perspective that the Aga Khan
might use should he follow-up with the two.
EIKENBERRY