PARWAN'S POWER BROKERS WANT TO AVOID POST ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 003361

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/A, SCA/FO
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PARWAN'S POWER BROKERS WANT TO AVOID POST ELECTION
VIOLENCE

Classified By: Deputy IPA Coordinator Hoyt B. Yee for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A pro-Karzai member of parliament (MP) from
the eastern province of Parwan told us October 18 that a
decision to have a second round of elections would be a
set-back for the U.S. and Afghanistan. He and other Parwan
power brokers believe a violent reaction by Abdullah
supporters in the event of a first-round Karzai victory is
highly unlikely. End summary.


2. (C) Parwan Department of State (Dos) representative and
Task Force (TF) Gladius commander met with Parwan Wolesi
Jirga member (and head of its Security Committee) Haji Almas
October 18. His main message was that a second round in the
election would be a disaster -- first and foremost for the
U.S., but also for Afghanistan -- because it would provoke
vindictive Pashtuns to lose faith with the Afghan government.
Those in government would start turning toward the enemy,
and Iran and Pakistan would be there to support them. Afghans
would suffer, but the U.S. would suffer more.


3. (C) Almas passionately expressed his frustration with the
United States for allowing the political situation to reach
the current stand-off and claimed he could have produced a
win for Ashraf Ghani or Mirwais Yaseni if the U.S. had
enlisted him and others like him six months ago. He admitted
never having been enthusiastic about Karzai, but said he
stood behind him because Karzai seemed the only choice. On
the current political crisis, Almas vacillated - insisting
the U.S. has been manipulating the process, and resignedly
conceding that our view of politics is so much broader than
his that he could not comprehend what we may or may not be
doing.


4. (C) Almas dismissed the idea that Abdullah supporters
would take to the streets in protest, or the consequences
that could stem from these protests, as hardly worthy of
serious consideration. Almas reasoned that Abdullah's
supporters are much more reasonable than emotional Pashtuns,
and that Abdullah himself is nothing but a Rabbani puppet
anyway. Almas was certain Abdullah would accept a first
round Karzai victory, but implied we should be talking with
Rabbani.


5. (C) Comment: Almas is among the most significant political
figures in Parwan, and one of the few high-profile Karzai
supporters. He was one of the strongest of many mujahedeen
and anti-Taliban commanders in the province, and has
maintained that influence. It was clear that he wants
Karzai's re-election to progress as smoothly as possible.
Nevertheless, his impassioned analysis of the current
situation was delivered in a language of national, not
personal or parochial, interest. His assessment of Abdullah
was more interesting (though clearly also motivated at least
partly by politics),since most influential commanders in
Parwan are Abdullah supporters. Since the election, TF
Gladius has raised concerns about the prospect of violence
here with a wide variety of people. Abdullah and Karzai
supporters alike have consistently said not to worry:
Parwan's power brokers, whatever their allegiance, all know
and respect each other and will not allow the worst to
happen. TF Gladius (Parwan) has seen credible reports of
diverse groups of commanders -- including Haji Almas --
gathering together to strategize to avoid violence. End
Comment
EIKENBERRY