PARWAN'S POWER BROKERS WANT TO AVOID POST ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 003361 SIPDIS STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/A, SCA/FO STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: PARWAN'S POWER BROKERS WANT TO AVOID POST ELECTION VIOLENCE Classified By: Deputy IPA Coordinator Hoyt B. Yee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: A pro-Karzai member of parliament (MP) from the eastern province of Parwan told us October 18 that a decision to have a second round of elections would be a set-back for the U.S. and Afghanistan. He and other Parwan power brokers believe a violent reaction by Abdullah supporters in the event of a first-round Karzai victory is highly unlikely. End summary. ¶2. (C) Parwan Department of State (Dos) representative and Task Force (TF) Gladius commander met with Parwan Wolesi Jirga member (and head of its Security Committee) Haji Almas October 18. His main message was that a second round in the election would be a disaster -- first and foremost for the U.S., but also for Afghanistan -- because it would provoke vindictive Pashtuns to lose faith with the Afghan government. Those in government would start turning toward the enemy, and Iran and Pakistan would be there to support them. Afghans would suffer, but the U.S. would suffer more. ¶3. (C) Almas passionately expressed his frustration with the United States for allowing the political situation to reach the current stand-off and claimed he could have produced a win for Ashraf Ghani or Mirwais Yaseni if the U.S. had enlisted him and others like him six months ago. He admitted never having been enthusiastic about Karzai, but said he stood behind him because Karzai seemed the only choice. On the current political crisis, Almas vacillated - insisting the U.S. has been manipulating the process, and resignedly conceding that our view of politics is so much broader than his that he could not comprehend what we may or may not be doing. ¶4. (C) Almas dismissed the idea that Abdullah supporters would take to the streets in protest, or the consequences that could stem from these protests, as hardly worthy of serious consideration. Almas reasoned that Abdullah's supporters are much more reasonable than emotional Pashtuns, and that Abdullah himself is nothing but a Rabbani puppet anyway. Almas was certain Abdullah would accept a first round Karzai victory, but implied we should be talking with Rabbani. ¶5. (C) Comment: Almas is among the most significant political figures in Parwan, and one of the few high-profile Karzai supporters. He was one of the strongest of many mujahedeen and anti-Taliban commanders in the province, and has maintained that influence. It was clear that he wants Karzai's re-election to progress as smoothly as possible. Nevertheless, his impassioned analysis of the current situation was delivered in a language of national, not personal or parochial, interest. His assessment of Abdullah was more interesting (though clearly also motivated at least partly by politics),since most influential commanders in Parwan are Abdullah supporters. Since the election, TF Gladius has raised concerns about the prospect of violence here with a wide variety of people. Abdullah and Karzai supporters alike have consistently said not to worry: Parwan's power brokers, whatever their allegiance, all know and respect each other and will not allow the worst to happen. TF Gladius (Parwan) has seen credible reports of diverse groups of commanders -- including Haji Almas -- gathering together to strategize to avoid violence. End Comment EIKENBERRY