LAGHMAN GOVERNOR FACES SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF POPULAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000330 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2019 TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: LAGHMAN GOVERNOR FACES SIGNIFICANT LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOLLOWING SPECIAL OPS REF: KABUL 131 Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Two Special Operations Forces operations conducted in the Alishang district of Laghman Province on January 6 and Galuch Valley on January 23 resulted in the deaths or capture of several suspected insurgents, but also in allegations of civilian casualties. The events provoked anti-Coalition protests and Coalition-friendly Governor Mashal told us the operations undermined his political authority. Mashal, until now a strong and effective ally, has publicly distanced himself from his Coalition partners. On February 1, PRT and Maneuver Task Force officers provided a total of USD 77,000 in condolence payments to relatives of the dead. End summary. Background -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) On January 6, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a night-time raid on the homes of identified insurgents Bahadar Shah and Gul Pacha in the village of Masamute a Bala in Alishang district of Laghman province. Armed villagers engaged SOF soldiers, and in the ensuing firefight, several residents of the village were killed, in addition to the two confirmed insurgent fighters who were leaders of an IED cell operating in Laghman province. Initial media reports were positive, although casualty figures varied widely. SOF reports following the operation claimed 32 insurgents killed, including a woman combatant. SOF reported two arms caches destroyed, two High Value Targets (HVTs) killed, and one detainee. Coalition media operations were quick and effective, portraying the dead as enemy combatants who had engaged CF. However, President Karzai quickly called Coalition claims into question, and dispatched a Presidential fact-finding delegation to investigate. The delegation concluded that 19 innocent civilians were killed, in addition to the two insurgents. One person was detained, according to the investigation. ¶3. (S/NF) On January 23, a similar incident occurred in Galuch valley of Mehtarlam District, in which 15 people were killed in a firefight with armed village residents who engaged the SOF. According to a NATO/ISAF report, the targets of the 23 January operation included Qader Khan, a known Al Qaida collaborator. Following the operation, a joint ISAF-Afghan Government mitigation team met with shura elders and Laghman Governor Lutfullah Mashal on January 25. In conjunction with the PRT and the Maneuver Task Force, Mashal approved a plan to provide &solatia8 payments. Thirty-five thousand dollars were paid to relatives of the Galuch dead, and forty-two thousand dollars to relatives of those killed in Masamute. In a departure from previous practice, the payments were given wide press coverage. Questioning Methods -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) In an animated meeting with the Brigade Regional Advisor following the first incident, Mashal expressed his concern that unilateral U.S. operations undermined his authority and brought into question the legitimacy of the Coalition presence in Afghanistan in the minds of the populace. While Mashal said he favored the raid and the target, he was adamant that the methods employed had the effect of separating the population from the government. Taliban &Guardians?8 -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Following the first operation, Mashal said that he came under pressure from local Members of Parliament, and was summoned to give testimony to the Military Commission of the Senate. President Karzai instructed the governor to publicly criticize the Coalition. Governor Mashal persuaded President Karzai that public attacks on the Coalition were not in GIRoA,s interest, although he did later &scold8 Coalition Forces for their mistake. Tribal elders told the governor that Taliban elements had approached them and offered to exact revenge for the deaths if the villagers would agree to host an insurgent base of operations. While some elders appeared to believe that they had found a &guardian8 in the Taliban, Governor Mashal believed the village would reject the proposal to allow the village to be used as a base of KABUL 00000330 002 OF 002 operations. Hearts and Minds -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Mashal argued that as governor he needs to engage the &hearts and minds8 of the people of Laghman. Mashal estimated that he had secured the support of ninety percent of the population, and that the deaths in Alishang cost him thirty percent of that support. Following the second incident on January 23, there were protests that included some rock-throwing. Two U.S. soldiers were hit by rocks, but not seriously injured. U.S. officers estimated the size of the carefully orchestrated protest at no more than three hundred (though some media reports erroneously claimed &thousands8 took part). Involving the Afghans -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Mashal, who was a cultural advisor for then-Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, and later the spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior, insists that the solution lies in involving Afghans and conducting operations of this nature &the Afghan way.8 The governor said he clearly understood the need for operational security for these sensitive operations. He strongly argued for the inclusion of Afghan security forces in any of these operations. By engaging the Tribal elders and involving Afghans, the likelihood of local resistance would be greately reduced. ¶8. (C/NF) Governor Mashal emphasized that he found no fault with the conduct of the soldiers, who responded to hostile intent from armed villagers. Rather, it is the planners and cultural advisors to the SOF who need to reconsider the methods employed in these raids. The Arbakai tradition of village self-defense is designed to respond to unknown armed intruders, and every Afghan male has a weapon. By involving Afghans, and adapting tactics, this operation could have produced a major success. The Afghan government and security forces would be shown to be acting against insurgent elements, and the close cooperation between ANSF and Coalition Forces would have strengthened the view within the population that the Coalition is here to support the government, rather than acting unilaterally. ¶9. (U) The Task Force Commander has reviewed this message. WOOD