AFGHANISTAN SCENESETTER FOR CODEL INOUYE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003177 SENSITIVE SIPDIS H PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR INOUYE FROM AMBASSADOR EIKENBERRY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OREP MCAP MASS PGOV PHUM PREL AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN SCENESETTER FOR CODEL INOUYE 1, (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Kabul and I warmly welcome CODEL Inouye to Afghanistan. Even as the political situation remains in flux pending the Presidential election outcome, Embassy Kabul, ISAF/USFOR-A and our international partners are working with the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and entities across Afghanistan to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies. We are facilitating a rapid increase in the size and capability of Afghan security forces in order to establish a sustainable, indigenous capability for providing security -- and thus the requisite conditions for improving governance, promoting the rule of law, developing the economy, etc. -- throughout the country. The ANA predicts its numbers will reach 134,000 by October 2010 and GIRoA is planning for its police force to reach 160,000 by October 2013. A GIRoA-led process to identify "pilot districts" in which the government, donors and Afghan and coalition security forces collaborate to clear, hold and develop local areas is in the nascent stages. ¶2. (SBU) In the midst of widespread security challenges, Afghanistan must also establish conditions for self-sustaining economic growth and strengthen its fiscal regulations and practices so that it can develop a healthy business environment, eliminate corruption and reduce dependence on foreign aid over time. On the development side, we have shifted our focus to projects designed to create jobs and are supporting GIRoA efforts to increase domestic revenues, increase budget transparency, and grow a cadre of capable, functional civil servants hired on the basis of merit. Our new counternarcotics strategy focuses on interdicting high-level processing and trafficking targets and the systems that support them, and creating incentives for farmers to turn to licit crops. The July creation of Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) positions in the East and South has strengthened civil-military coordination, a priority for this Mission. The SCRs coordinate the work of all U.S. civilian personnel in his/her region and ensure that civilian and military assets work together to advance our strategic goals. END SUMMARY. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Complex Security Situation and Mission Strategies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated over the last two years. You will have heard that a bomb blast occurred just this morning (October 8) between the Ministry of Interior and the Indian Embassy. Attacks decreased somewhat during Ramadan in August-September, but, partly because ISAF and USFOR-A are increasingly targeting insurgent sanctuaries and safe havens, have again reached about 400 per week -- their highest levels since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. At the same time, Karzai's government suffers from an inability to deliver essential services, compounded by endemic corruption, political intimidation, poverty, criminality, the continuing insurgency and ethno-tribal politics -- all exacerbated by three decades of war and misrule since the Russian invasion of 1979. Nevertheless, there are numerous Afghans, including those who have returned from abroad, who are dedicated to rebuilding their country. The energy and ambition of Afghan youth are particularly striking at the burgeoning university campuses. Nevertheless, the Afghan government and people await President Obama,s decision on a strategy for further U.S. engagement here. ¶4. (SBU) Against this background, ISAF continues to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy, centered on protecting the population and reducing civilian casualties -- objectives key to Afghan popular and government support for all we do. At the same time, ISAF is working to provide the security necessary to enable the complementary and growing civilian programs designed to help strengthen Afghanistan's society and government. Our Mission is coordinating with GIRoA, ISAF and other international partners to rapidly increase the quality and size of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Afghan Army is growing by more than 2,500 per month, according to ISAF,s Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A),who project troop strength of 134,000 by October 2010. The Ministry of the Interior is planning for a 160,000-strong police force by 2013, although Interior Minister Hanif Atmar cautions that this remains a planning figure. Vigorous reform programs are also underway to reduce help corruption, especially within the Afghan National Police (ANP). ¶5. (SBU) Outside Kabul, coordinated U.S. civilian-military efforts focus on strengthening local government and measurably improving the delivery of basic government KABUL 00003177 002 OF 004 services. Our goal is to help support more visible, effective and honest governance at the sub-national level, with well-functioning links to the center. Particular programs include integrated civilian-military Brigade Task Forces, PRTs and District Support Teams. We are supporting a new GIRoA-led process to identify a limited number of "pilot districts" in which GIRoA, donors and Afghan and coalition security forces would collaborate to clear and hold areas where the Afghan government is unable to provide basic services and ensure population security. We will then implement development projects based on self-identified community needs. We work with traditional leadership structures and with those who have proven themselves ready to cooperate with the constitutional government and abide by the rule of law. Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak connections between the capital and provinces, distrust and long-standing personal, ethnic and tribal rivalries, as well as the presence of insurgents or criminals, complicate our task. ¶6. (U) New Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) positions, created in July for Regional Commands (RCs) East and South, have brought increased management, direction and oversight to civilian officers working in the field, and have strengthened civil-military cooperation. Planning is underway to create additional SCR positions in RC-West and RC-North. The SCR is the U.S. civilian counterpart to the RC military commander; s/he coordinates the work of all U.S. civilian personnel in his or her region, ensuring that civilian and military capabilities are working together to advance our strategic and counterinsurgency goals. We plan to establish similar positions in the North and West. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Elections Still Unresolved - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Afghans are still awaiting the results of the August 20 Presidential elections. On September 16 the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) announced preliminary presidential election results with incumbent President Hamid Karzai in the lead at 54.52 percent, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah at 27.75 percent and Ramazan Bashardost at 9.2 percent. Continuing challenges include resolving issues related to charges of widespread fraud, conducting a limited recount, and completing a separate independent process to adjudicate numerous election-related complaints. Slim odds still favor a first-round victory for Karzai but the outcome is far from certain; some random sampling of the 3,498 polling stations, ballots will be audited by the ICC/EEC (Electoral Complaints Commission) because of questionable results. We had publicly cautioned that these would not be perfect elections, but stressed that we expect they will represent the will of the majority of the people. What ultimately matters is whether the Afghan people accept the electoral outcome and whether the new president forms a capable and honest cabinet that will help the new administration deliver services to the people. We expect that during your visit the IEC will determine, and might also announce, whether there will be a second round in the presidential election process. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Little Momentum on Taliban Reconciliation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - ¶8. (SBU) Many Afghans welcomed President Obama,s March 27 and Secretary Clinton,s July 15 commitments to work with local leaders to promote reconciliation with Taliban who renounce al-Qaeda, lay down their arms and show they are willing "to participate in the free and open society enshrined in the Afghan Constitution." Nonetheless, reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent leaders remains controversial and difficult. Many Afghans welcome the possibility of reduced violence and greater stability, while others (non-Pashtuns, women, and some civil society groups) fear an intra-Pashtun deal that could come at the expense of their interests. Some fighters who might otherwise be inclined to reintegrate are concerned that the U.S. may withdraw from Afghanistan leaving them vulnerable to reprisals from radical Taliban. We expect the new Afghan administration, regardless of leadership, will make developing a comprehensive reintegration program a priority. - - - - - - - - - - - - - Strengthening the Economy - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (SBU) Due in part to the long years of conflict, Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the KABUL 00003177 003 OF 004 world, and is facing spending increases that are outpacing revenue year-over-year. Heavy spring rains boosted agricultural production in 2009, however, yielding bumper wheat, vegetable and fruit crops. This, along with growth in the services sector, has spurred projected economic growth for 2009-2010 to about ten percent. Inflation is under two percent, and the Afghan currency is stable. Relatively young, dynamic and reformist Ministers of Finance, Commerce and Agriculture are taking positive steps to improve the business climate, and we are encouraging the government to implement major economic reforms to support private sector development. Afghanistan's key economic challenge is to establish conditions for self-sustaining growth and strengthen fiscal policies and practices so that it can develop a healthy business environment, eliminate corruption and reduce dependence on foreign aid over time. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Fast-Tracking our Assistance and the Longer Term - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - ¶10. (U) Within this economic climate, our approach to foreign assistance is focused on increasing our effectiveness and establishing a genuine partnership with GIRoA to benefit the Afghan people. We are supporting GIRoA efforts to increase domestic revenues, increase budget disbursement and transparency and grow a cadre of functional civil servants hired on the basis of merit. We are shifting our focus to projects designed to create jobs, including by promoting agricultural productivity, alternative livelihoods, infrastructure development, education and vocational training, capacity building, good governance and the rule of law. At the national level, more U.S. assistance is being channeled through the Afghan government's core budget. The increased numbers of civilian and military in the field will allow us to partner with sub-national officials and extend the reach of the GIRoA to district levels. We are shifting our assistance to smaller, flexible and faster contract and grant mechanisms to increase decision-making at the more local levels. A coordinated civilian-military coalition and an effective U.S. regional counterinsurgency strategy will provide the necessary secure space within which assistance efforts can operate. We are also encouraging local procurement initiatives so monies spent will more directly benefit the Afghan economy and people, and allocating resources by region and sector to support stability and build Afghan government capacity. For example, USAID infrastructure activities in the south and east currently employ 26,000 Afghans in the power, water and transportation sectors. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - Narcotics: Positive Trends, Challenge in the South - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) The September 2 UN Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey indicated that poppy cultivation decreased by 22 percent this year (following a 19 percent decrease in 2008),while production decreased by 10 percent (the difference accounted for by higher yields). The number of poppy-free provinces has risen from 18 to 20; all of the provinces in the Northern region are poppy free for the first time in almost a decade. Nevertheless, Afghanistan still accounts for 90 percent of the world's opium, and poppy cultivation remains a serious problem in the troubled south and west, where six provinces account for 97 percent of the country,s poppy crop. The fight in Afghanistan is not merely about narcotics, but stemming the narcotics trade will be key to breaking the narcotics-financing chain to the insurgency and combating endemic corruption. ¶12. (SBU) Our new counternarcotics strategy moves away from costly eradication efforts that have yielded limited results and alienated large segments of the population. We are now going after high-level processing and trafficking targets and the systems that support them, and creating incentives for farmers to turn to licit crops. Our agriculture programs give farmers easier access to permanent alternatives to poppy cultivation; our development programs provide incentives for local communities not to grow poppy. DEA will expand its presence from 9 to 70 agents, and INL will increasingly shift its focus to supporting greater interdiction efforts. We are also increasing our public information efforts to educate communities about the risks of growing poppy, the possibilities of alternate livelihoods and the dangers of addiction. Similarly, we promote the rule of law by helping build Afghan law enforcement institutions, prosecutorial services, courts and corrections systems. KABUL 00003177 004 OF 004 - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gaining Traction on Gender and Human Rights - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) A thin but outspoken stratum of Afghan society increasingly is giving voice to a desire for positive political reform and social change -- reflecting the outlook of a young but determined demographic in this conservative society. There have been recent improvements in legislation protecting women, and in the period running up to the Presidential elections there was unprecedented coverage of candidate debates, fora and interviews, widening the content and quality of information available to the public. Nonetheless, other aspects of Afghanistan's human rights record remain poor, including violence and discrimination against women, lack of due process and weak rule of law, and intimidation restricting the exercise of free speech. In the face of powerful conservative religious and tribal patriarchal traditions, the Afghan government has shown a lack of sustained will to press forward a systematic campaign to promote and protect human rights, particularly women's rights. ¶14. (SBU) Civil society campaigners for gender equity, however, have an impact far beyond their low numbers and offer hope and inspiration for the future. Most of our Afghan civil society interlocutors say the process which led to reform in the published version of the Shia Personal Status Law (SPSL) is a step forward in advancing women's rights, but several articles in the SPSL still contradict Afghan women's constitutional right to equality. Most believe the law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women is a strong law that will protect women's rights. The Women,s Commission in Parliament is currently working with international and Afghan legal experts as well as civil society to further strengthen the law. - - - - - Management - - - - - ¶15. (SBU) To properly implement our strategies to improve responsiveness in Afghan institutions and local capacity, we require an increased U.S. civilian presence alongside the increases in U.S. military personnel. In August 2009, the Mission had 470 U.S. civilians in Afghanistan, including 159 in the field; we anticipate reaching 944 civilian positions by the end of the year, of which 380 will be in the field. The new civilians will join various State Department and USAID elements, Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutors and the FBI (Legal Attach),the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, Homeland Security (DHS),Transportation (DOT) and Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC),as well as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In Kabul, we are helping Afghans create a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and building its capacity to deliver services to the public. Strong ministries include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education, Finance, Communications, Rural Development, Counternarcotics, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and the Afghan Central Bank. The Interior, Agriculture and Finance Ministries enjoy strong leadership, while the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice, confronted with a complex legal system that combines sometimes inconsistent elements of Sharia, tribal, and Western law, suffer from the acute lack of qualified professionals. ¶16. (SBU) Our efforts to double the U.S. civilian staffing complement and acquire the requisite expertise have resulted in immense administrative and management challenges, including recruitment, hiring, clearing, training, funding and orienting personnel, as well as providing workspace and life-support requirements. We also face growing difficulties in recruiting local staff in certain specialties, as there is great competition for the small pool of well-qualified candidates. We have acquired a 7.5-acre parcel of land adjacent to the East side of the Mission compound and are continuing to press for more property, both in Kabul, and in Mazar-e Sharif and Herat, where we plan to open consulates. While the Afghan government is cooperative, political uncertainty has delayed finalizing and implementing agreements, including leases for Mazar and Herat. EIKENBERRY