COMISAF TALKS SECURITY, ELECTIONS, RECONCILIATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003079 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2019 TAGS: KDEM MOPS PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: COMISAF TALKS SECURITY, ELECTIONS, RECONCILIATION WITH GHAZNI GOVERNOR, TRIBAL ELDERS Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On September 15, COMISAF, Deputy Commander US forces Afghanistan LTGEN Rodriguez and RC-East Commander MG Scaparotti conducted a Battlefield Circulation (BFC) in Ghazni. Aside from meeting with Task Force White Eagle commanders, COMISAF held separate discussions with Ghazni Provincial Governor Usman Usmani and a collection of Ghazni tribal elders. Usmani, a strong Karzai partisan, expressed a hardening of his position on opposition challenges to the presidential election in Ghazni. While previously appearing open to the Electoral Complaints Commission examining allegations of vote irregularities in Ghazni, Usmani told COMISAF that any further challenges to the integrity of the vote in Ghazni would &upset the people.8 The tribal elders endorsed the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan, and told COMISAF that the Afghan people did not view them as occupiers. The tribal elders voiced their strong support for engagement with reconcilable elements of the Taliban, and urged COMISAF to separate Al Qaeda and its allies from those who took up arms due to the lack of opportunity in Ghazni. End Summary. BETTER SECURITY COOPERATION REQUIRED -------------- ¶2. (C) On September 15, COMISAF met with Ghazni Governor Usman Usmani in the governor's office. The governor told COMISAF that the security situation remained problematic in the province, and that increased NATO efforts were required to bring the situation under control. Usmani said that the Afghan National Army (ANA) remained understaffed in Ghazni, filling only two battalions out of the assigned brigade, and that the Afghan National Police (ANP) lacked adequate training. Usmani also told COMISAF that he believed coordination among the ANA, ANP, and coalition forces was lacking. He cited an example from the previous evening, when ANP elements allegedly fired on Polish coalition troops in Ajiristan district. (Note: Task Force White Eagle investigated the incident in question, but no coalition forces were injured in any incident on September 14. End Note.) GOVERNANCE IMPEDED BY LACK OF TALENT -------------- ¶3. (C) Usmani also requested increased international assistance for development. The governor said that in particular Ghazni could use increased irrigation projects, and any initiatives that would build factories to produce &high quality goods.8 Regarding governance, Usmani told COMISAF that the human capital was lacking to provide effective leadership in the province. Usmani said it was hard to find even district sub-governors with the requisite high school education. When pressed by Deputy Commander US Forces Afghanistan LTGEN Rodriguez, Usmani conceded that it was difficult to recruit the top talent to come to Ghazni. Usmani also complained that the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) technically appoints sub-governors, a fact which limits the amount of oversight the Governor can exert. Usmani cited the example of the sub-governor of Malistan, who he claimed had not called the governor in eight months. OPPOSITION &UPSETS THE PEOPLE8 -------------- ¶4. (C) Usmani offered a vigorous defense of the conduct of the elections in Ghazni. Usmani said he was &proud8 that the election was an Afghan-led process, but he worried that &opposition8 attempts to cast doubt on the vote would only &upset the people.8 Usmani told COMISAF that there was little substance to the fraud allegations, and they stemmed from the &losers,8 inability to accept the results. Usmani also seemed to suggest that if he, sub-governors, and tribal elders had really attempted to skew the electoral results in favor of President Karzai, then the president would have received twice as many votes in Ghazni. Usmani also questioned how fraud could have occurred when &ISAF transported all the ballots.8 (Comment: Usmani is a strong Karzai partisan and his remarks are consistent with his previous efforts to downplay the widely-acknowledged electoral fraud allegations in Ghazni and deflect attention to what he asserts are &opposition8 efforts to challenge a legitimate election. End Comment.) TRIBAL ELDERS: SEPARATE AL QAEDA ALLIES FROM SOME TALIBAN -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) COMISAF also met with approximately 30 tribal leaders representing Ghazni,s different districts. (Note: Governor Usmani arranged the meeting at our request, and the participants appeared to be largely supportive of the KABUL 00003079 002 OF 002 governor. Local and Polish media representatives were present for the duration of the meeting. End Note.) The elders asked COMISAF to do more to address the deteriorating security situation, and increase the capacity of the ANA and ANP. In addition, the elders expressed strong support for COMISAF,s suggestion to seek reconciliation with certain elements of the Taliban. Several tribal leaders stressed the importance of separating Al Qaeda and its supporters from those whose motivation for joining the Taliban is joblessness and lack of opportunity. Finally, two tribal leaders spoke openly of Pakistani support for insurgent elements in Afghanistan, and urged COMISAF to do everything possible to block this support and control the Afghan-Pakistani border. COMISAF pledged to do his best, and LTGEN Rodriguez urged the tribal leaders to use their positions of influence to play the key role in improving security. COALITION NOT &OCCUPIERS8 -------------- ¶6. (SBU) COMISAF, asking for &honest and direct8 answers, asked the tribal elders if coalition forces were viewed as &occupiers.8 Only one elder answered the question, saying that the United States had &abandoned8 Afghanistan after the conclusion of the Soviet occupation of the country and allowed dangerous elements to take refuge in the country. The elder told COMISAF that unfortunately the result of this policy was the tragedy of September 11. Despite this history, the elder assured COMISAF that most Afghans understand that coalition forces are now in Afghanistan to support the Afghan people. The session closed with the elders telling COMISAF that every coalition soldier killed in a combat was also a tragedy for the Afghan people, and asked COMISAF relay their deep condolences to the families of the fallen. ¶7. (C) Comment: COMISAF,s meeting with the tribal elders proved to be a positive and honest exchange with influential leaders in Ghazni. Several elders told us as they departed the session that they were pleased with COMISAF,s initiative to speak with them and felt that the session had been beneficial to both sides. Despite the fact that the tribal elders were hand-picked by the governor, they appeared willing to openly express their views on the security situation and the role of coalition forces in Ghazni. The meeting also served to reinforce our efforts on the Provincial Reconstruction Team to significantly extend outreach to the informal government structures in the province such as the elders and local shuras. ¶8. (C) On a less positive note, Governor Usmani,s comments on the conduct of the presidential elections in Ghazni reflect what appears to a hardening of his position. Aside from being a strong Karzai partisan, Usmani has a deep personal connection to the president, whom he has affectionately referred to as his &father.8 Usmani seems to have taken the line, at least in public, that challenges to the integrity of the elections in Ghazni as a personal affront and a challenge to the honor of the president. However, his assertion that there was no malfeasance on the part of Karzai supporters while pro-Abdullah forces have been conspiring before and after the elections rings hollow. ECC representatives confirmed our suspicions that some vote totals, almost uniformly in support of President Karzai, from Pashtun-areas of Ghazni are implausible. We also have significant doubts about Usmani,s assertions that Abdullah supporters, who appear limited in Ghazni, are planning daily demonstrations against the government. We speak several times a day with the governor, and have urged him to remain above the fray and express his support for a non-partisan adjudication of election challenges by the responsible governmental institutions. His remark to COMISAF that further challenges to Ghazni,s vote totals would &upset the people8 indicates he may attempt to pursue a different path, organizing popular pressure for the Karzai votes in the province to be counted in the national tally. End Comment. EIKENBERRY