POST-ELECTION DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS GAIN MOMENTUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002919 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM AF SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS GAIN MOMENTUM REF: KABUL 2832 Classified By: D/PolCouns Victoria Alvarado for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: Some Afghan analysts and officials are forecasting potentially dire scenarios that could unfold following the announcement of the final election results. A former Afghan diplomat and political analyst, who currently works for UNAMA, predicts "a gathering storm in the north," warning that key former Northern Alliance officials are considering a defection of the northern provinces. He claims that the Iranian Embassy has been working overtime to incite anti-American fervor among key Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) officials. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) Chief of Protocol asserts that the Pakistanis will never accept a Tajik president, and that Pakistan is "mobilizing" against that potentiality. He also claims the Iranians donated 50 million Euros to the Abdullah campaign. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - Meddlesome Neighbors - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) Ahmad Saeedi, a former Afghan diplomat, who is currently working as UNAMA SRSG Kai Eide's adviser, reported that Iran is exploiting the tensions and disagreements between President Karzai and the United States over the elections process to their advantage by trying to drive a wider wedge between the two countries. According to Saeedi, the Iranian Embassy has held several meetings over the past weeks with key Karzai officials to incite anti-American feelings and to seek ways to remove the future Afghan government from America's shadow. These efforts appear to be paying dividends, said the analyst. For example, the pro-Karzai faction is becoming visibly more anti-American, and Karzai supporters have taken to comparing the United States to Russia, claiming that we are scheming to install a "puppet" Karzai regime. Saeedi added that on the other side of the border, Pakistan is attempting to exploit the election by supporting Karzai against a burgeoning Northern Alliance, which has been re-energized by Abdullah's candidacy. - - - - - - - - - - Northern Defection? - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (C) Saeedi warned that if residents in Afghanistan's north consider the election outcome to be fraudulent, they could possibly decide to secede from the rest of Afghanistan. He believed that Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia would support such a move. Saeedi criticized both the Karzai and Abdullah camps for stirring up trouble, noting that the governors of Balkh and Paktia have been gathering in Mazar to decide how to "mobilize" against the central government, while Karzai supporters have been sending weapons to Mazar, attempting to spark unrest that could provide Karzai cover if he decides to remove the Balkh governor. ¶4. (C) Even if the northern provinces do not break off, Saeedi still envisioned significant protests and violence following the announcement of the election results. He had heard talk of plans to loot embassies and other international organizations. While Saeedi did not believe Abdullah was involved in plotting this violence, he feared "enemies" would infiltrate Abdullah's supporters and incite violence. He also said there could be an uprising in the army, sharing that he had heard that the military could be supplying weapons to people who are interested in inciting post-election violence. - - - - - - - - - - - - "Delinquent" Democracy - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) "Everyone knows there was fraud!" Saeedi exclaimed, adding that the Afghan people felt the August presidential elections completely lacked credibility and that America was now intimately associated with the electoral fraud. He warned that if the United States does not stand up to Karzai, America will be seen as supporting a government of criminals, and the Afghan people will no longer believe that America is a champion of democracy. While Saeedi acknowledged that Ambassador Eikenberry has frequently stated that we wouldn't endorse any particular candidate, he argued that the Afghan people believe that we must be supporting Karzai because the United States has not sufficiently condemned the blatant electoral fraud. He robustly criticized the IEC for completely lacking in credibility, claiming that Karzai had KABUL 00002919 002 OF 002 offered IEC President Lodin the honorary title of Chief Justice four months ago. Saeedi urged the international community to issue a statement decrying the electoral fraud and stating that we will not support a government created through a fraudulent election. ¶6. (C) Recognizing that a second round was unlikely, Saeedi offered three scenarios for a new government that he thought could be acceptable to the Afghan people: --Creation of a coalition government that includes Ghani and Abdullah. --Formation of a new Karzai administration devoid of warlords, who greatly undermine his credibility. --The creation of a two-year interim government with Gailani, Ghani and Khalilzad. - - - - - - - - Friend or Foe? - - - - - - - - ¶7. (C) One senior GIRoA official recently offered another gloomy perspective. Visibly distraught by what he perceives to be a low point in U.S.-Afghan relations, MFA Chief of Protocol Ambassador Sidig expressed great dismay that the ongoing vote counting and allegations of fraud have damaged President Karzai's relationship with America. He said that IEC Chairman Ludin had confirmed to him that media reports alleging fraud in the election were excessive. Offering his own impression of the Iranian influence on Afghanistan's presidential election, Sidig alleged that the Iranians had spent 50 million Euros backing Abdullah's campaign. Further, the Pakistanis would never accept a government run by someone associated with the Northern Alliance. If Abdullah were to come to power, Sidig warned that the Pakistanis would substantially increase their support of the Taliban. Only Karzai could keep the country together. After laying out these dire scenarios, Sidig calmed down and expressed his desire that America and Afghanistan find a way to work together once the new Karzai Administration takes office. - - - - Comment - - - - ¶8. (C) These doomsday scenarios are increasing in frequency, but must be considered within the contexts of our interlocutors' respective political views and personal interests. Notwithstanding this caveat, the concern for potential violence and disarray is palpable. During the Ambassador's September 16 meeting with presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani (reftel),the Karzai rival shared concerns very much in line with Saeedi's. EIKENBERRY