GHANI SEES BAD AND WORSE POST-ELECTION OPTIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002832 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEMAF AF SUBJECT: GHANI SEES BAD AND WORSE POST-ELECTION OPTIONS Classified By: D/Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Presidential candidate Ashraf Ghani is convinced that without a national framework, Afghanistan will face a political implosion. Without a new national political architecture, Dr. Ghani's prognosis for the country is glum. He warns that the North is on the verge of implosion, Kabul gangs are poised to loot the capital, and the South has lost faith in the Karzai government. In a September 16 meeting, Ghani told us that Karzai continues his efforts to co-opt him to recover legitimacy. He also shared four possible scenarios, that while imperfect and risk-laden, could mitigate the looming crisis. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - - National Framework or Bust - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (S) Ambassador and senior staff met September 16 with Dr. Ashraf Ghani. He argued that a national framework based on consensus and unity is the only means to halt a political implosion. In his customary fondness for enumeration, Dr. Ghani listed four initial subjects to start the discussion: the Karzai administration's disintegration while its members engaged in the "business" of dividing up the spoils; the strengthening of the insurgency; Iran's increasing interest in destabilizing Afghanistan; and, his upcoming meeting that same evening with President Karzai. Ghani lamented that the Karzai administration had increasingly become a business where many of its leaders were dividing up the spoils, including foreign assistance. He claimed Energy Minister Ismael Khan had pocketed USD 25 million and Balkh Governor Atta USD 75 million. Since the election, Afghans had withdrawn USD 400 million from the national bank and thousands of Afghans were leaving the country, some paying USD 1200 for an Iranian visa. The media had ginned up fear that the days of 1991 (Taliban) would soon return. ¶3. (S) Asserting that President Karzai has been governing outside the margins of the Constitution and without national consensus since May 22, Dr. Ghani reminded us of his call before the election for agreement on clearly established rules of the game. He lamented that his plea had been ignored and the consequences were predictable: a fraud-ridden election that had robbed the will of the Afghan people and caused them to doubt Karzai's legitimacy and our credibility. Ghani, who claimed that over one million votes had been stolen from him, painted a glum picture: the northern provinces are on the verge of implosion, 20 Kabul gangs are scheming to exploit the looming political crisis and dividing the city into "looting" districts, while the South has lost faith in the Karzai government. Stepping back only briefly from his position of doom, Dr. Ghani suggested that the next step is to gain clarity through the release of the official electoral results. Fast returning to his pessimism, however, Ghani commented that whether Karzai wins fairly or not on the first or second round (which Ghani believes Karzai will win), Karzai legitimacy has so eroded that his political recovery is unlikely. Further Karzai will have to deliver on all of his promises, which will likely set back potential reforms. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I Will Not Be Co-Opted by Karzai - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (S) Dr. Ghani informed us he would meet with President Karzai in the evening, a follow-on from their 31 August meeting, and expected Karzai would once again press him to join his government in some capacity, perhaps to lead a negotiating team to negotiate with the international community. The team would include up to 10 members, half Karzai loyalists, half independent. Ghani was adamant, however, that he would not serve in a government that was neither legitimate nor had a national framework. Ghani was prepared to offer his services, for the good of the country, to help craft a framework and possibly facilitate relations between our two countries. ¶5. (S) The Ambassador referred to our efforts to discuss with Karzai, which we have also raised with other presidential candidates, the need for the President of Afghanistan to forge a compact with the Afghan people, which would also help us maintain a legitimate military presence here. Despite our robust engagement, Karzai still had not grasped our message. He continues to believe that we are adverse to a Loya Jirga; rather, our position has been that it is not incumbent upon the United States to dictate which form of consultation Afghans desire or need. Similarly, Karzai continued to press for a Status of Forces Agreement KABUL 00002832 002 OF 003 (SOFA),when conditions for such an agreement did not exist in Afghanistan and a less formal arrangement would function better until such time as Afghanistan develops political and legal mechanisms to work on a SOFA. Further, we had been unable to disabuse Karzai of the notion that the United States harbors intentions to retain bases for decades so we can fight Afghanistan's neighbors. ¶6. (S) Dr. Ghani, who was familiar with Karzai's script, observed that Karzai is a tactician, not a strategist, and neither sees nor cares about the abstract or the larger picture. He said Karzai knows that a Loya Jirga is not in his interest because 90 percent of the country is in a "state of tension." In his last conversation with Karzai, Ghani had asked him how long his government would last without the Americans. Karzai responded, "a week." The President also acknowledged that our departure would spark decades more of conflict in the country. Ghani reportedly retorted, "Then why the hell are you doing this?" ¶7. (S) The Ambassador commented that as a tactician, Karzai would do whatever in his power to win on the first round, including recruiting a renowned international figure to lend him a badge of legitimacy. If he accomplishes this, Karzai will claim the United States has conceded his victory and despite our efforts to deny him his victory, we failed. Appreciating our message, Ghani reiterated his intention not to allow Karzai to exploit him, sharing that he would travel to Nepal on September 18 for consulting work and distance himself from the political fray. Regarding a second round, Dr. Ghani opined that it would be problematic and costly for both Karzai and Abdullah; given the poor security situation, they would have to "reward" people for voting. Ghani proffered that Abdullah probably does not really want a second round either, and is dragging out the process to gain a better political position. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The Least Undesirable, and Possibly Riskiest, Option - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (S) Dr. Ghani then proceeded to enumerate four possible scenarios, that while imperfect and risk-laden, could in some part mitigate the looming crisis: --Establish a Karzai-Abdullah coalition government. This would be a "deal" among personalities, involving neither structural nor attitudinal changes. The Northern Alliance would gain a bigger share of government positions and revenues. Ghani agreed with the Ambassador that Abdullah does not really represent the Alliance, quipping that Abdullah was chosen for the reason, so he that when needed he could be "sold" to Karzai. Most of the Alliance leadership could be bought, said Ghani. --Work around Karzai by strengthening local and provincial governments. This approach would demand daunting logistics and patience from the American public at a time when support for U.S. presence here is waning. The security challenges in much of the country would sorely test this approach. --Form a transitional government based on inclusiveness, consensus, trust, peace-building, and security with an eye towards holding truly credible and legitimate elections within three years. Its leaders would not be allowed to run in the election. --Build a national unity government, which would front-load reforms in the first year based on our five-point plan. A Bonn-II scenario setting broad but concrete benchmarks would be the starting point of this effort. Afghanistan's elites would have to bargain on the base of their interests and would need to let go of short-term interests for the sake of longer term benefits. Ghani was inclined toward this fourth option -- a national unity government built around consensus, trust, security, and sovereignty. While acknowledging this option was risky, he predicted that sooner or later, Afghanistan and the international community would probably have to take this route. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Count Me Out of a Status Quo Option - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (S) The Ambassador remarked that our efforts to help build state institutions had not succeeded and that Washington was not in the mood to start over from zero. He ventured that it might be better to improve upon an imperfect and flawed situation and gradually reduce the deficiencies at the regional, sub-national, and provincial levels. Some ministries were under capable leadership and we could improve KABUL 00002832 003 OF 003 our programs to reduce the corruption, partly enabled by our past mismanagement. Afghanistan now has a real army and the police, thought imperfect, are improving. While sympathetic, Ghani rejected this approach, saying he would take no part in it. He cautioned that without major changes, Karzai would last no more than nine months. He cited three risks: the insurgency, public disregard for Karzai and the Americans -- out of popular belief that we had colluded to steal the election from the rightful will of the Afghan people -- and eroding international public support for Afghanistan. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Future Plans: Establish a Party, a Movement, Make Money - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (S) When queried about his future plans, Ghani shared his ambitions to establish a political party, to create a youth movement, and to "make money" to support his first two projects. EIKENBERRY