MOI ATMAR MAKES THE CASE FOR THE AFGHAN PUBLIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000256 SIPDIS KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR JWOOD OSD FOR MCGRAW CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR MASS KDEM AF SUBJECT: MOI ATMAR MAKES THE CASE FOR THE AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION PROGRAM REF: KABUL 44 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for Reasons 1.4(b)(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Since mid-January, Minister of Interior Atmar, with the support of COMUSFOR-A/COMISAF GEN McKiernan (reftel),has launched an energetic outreach initiative on behalf of the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP). Atmar has lauded the program as a way to improve community security in the near term, while enhancing the role played by communities in providing for their own defense. Atmar has also sought to counter widespread concerns that the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a means to arm tribal militias. Having already briefed the international community (IC) on January 12 and addressed IC concerns in follow-up bilateral meetings, Atmar reached out to the Afghan public in a January 31 press conference, again highlighting the need to make daily life safer for the public and reiterating "these (APPF) units are not militias; they are not guards. They are official units of the Interior Ministry..." ¶2. (C) While successfully building public and international support for the APPP, Atmar must still deal with the inevitable challenges of rolling out a new program. President Karzai has yet to voice public support for the APPP and his recent remarks regarding the need for security forces to focus on borders rather than internal security could be construed as critical of the APPP. (It is, however, highly unlikely Atmar would still be publicly promoting the APPP if Karzai genuinely opposed it.) Meanwhile, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and MOI are working together to address the issue of what shape community accountability for APPF will take. END SUMMARY. ATMAR'S PUBLIC OUTREACH -------------- ¶3. (C) In a January 31 press conference, Atmar noted the APPP would have its own uniform and work alongside the Afghan National Police (ANP),using the same weapons (AK-47 Kalashnikovs) as the police. (An AP press report erroneously quoted Atmar as saying the U.S. would provide funding for these arms, which is not the case. The APPP will be armed by the MOI.) Atmar stressed that, while currently funded by the U.S., the APPF would fall strictly under the command of Afghan National Security Forces. "They are part of the security forces of Afghanistan and by no means will they be under the command of anyone else, other than the leadership of the Afghan government." ATMAR ENGAGES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY -------------- ¶4. (C) Atmar first briefed the international community on the APPP January 12 at a Chiefs of Mission meeting hosted by UNAMA SRSG Eide, Atmar thanked GEN McKiernan (in attendance) for his assistance in developing and supporting the APPP. Atmar noted that, in addition to MOI, other GIRoA partners would be MOD, NDS, IDLG and the Ministry for Border and Tribal Affairs. Atmar stressed that the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) would be a regular government force, an instrument of and responsive to the central government. These forces would not, he emphasized, be de facto arbakai (local men traditionally selected by tribal or village elders defend their community). Atmar emphasized he had no doubt of the initiative's success and said his only regret was that APPP would still be in pilot phase when elections are held. WHY CREATE THE APPP? -------------- ¶5. (C) Atmar first identified the three main factors that motivated creation of the APPP: -- Deteriorating community security, especially regarding the safety of highways, schools, clinics. It was, Atmar noted, unacceptable to expect people to live under such conditions. -- The need to free the police to perform traditional law enforcement, community policing and ensure justice/rule of law. The Afghan National Police (ANP) do not have the numbers, capacity, training or equipment to serve a counter-insurgency role in the communities. -- The need to provide communities with direct involvement in security. While the APPP forces would not be arbakai or tribal militias, the patrolmen would be nominated locally so men from the community would be serving in the local APPP KABUL 00000256 002 OF 003 force. WARDAK - PILOT PROGRAM FOR APPF -------------- ¶6. (C) Atmar said APPP would begin as a pilot program in Wardak Province. Wardak was chosen because of its proximity to Kabul, the significant role Wardak plays in the capital's security, and Atmar's view that the Wardak Council would be a strong partner. Initial estimates for APPF force number in pilot phase was 1200 but Atmar noted that, as the APPP grew, the unit numbers would depend on level of threat in the area, population size, and geographic factors. (In his January 31 press conference, Atmar said he couldn't predict future numbers, but eventually APPP numbers could range from 10,000 to 20,000 in one area or 50,000 - 100,000 in another, depending on the need.) STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF THE APPF -------------- ¶7. (C) Atmar outlined the mission and structure of the future APPF. Its role would be to deny insurgents operating space in local communities; it would have no law enforcement role. Additionally, the force would have its own uniform and be equipped, armed, and trained specifically for its COIN mission. Regular MOD forces would train the APPF, with MOI mentors, and a curriculum for a three-week training program had already been created. The U.S. has already begun a "train the trainers" program for APPP. APPF COMMANDERS APPOINTED BY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT -------------- -- ¶8. (C) In terms of command structure, Atmar said the APPF would fall under the District Police Chief. District Police Chiefs currently have one deputy for general back-up, but in the near future, they will have three. The second deputy will coordinate anti-crime/intel support for CN, CT, etc. The third will oversee the local APPF. APPF commanders and officers will be appointed by MOI not by the community. The community will nominate the "patrolmen/footsoldiers." At the central level, some combination of MOI, MOD and NDS will further vet community nominations. Members of the APPF would receive 10-15 percent less pay than police. ¶9. (C) An interagency group would be tasked with regularly inspecting and monitoring the APPF; clear benchmarks would be determined to measure success. Atmar said the group or team would consist of representatives from MOI, MOD, NDS, IDLG, MBTA, and USFOR-A. (Atmar noted the GIRoA would also welcome a UNAMA representative to the group.) Monitoring would look, not just at performance, but also at coordination and cooperation with other security elements - ANP, ANA, etc. The local community would also provide feedback on the performance of the APPF. Atmar said the MOI wanted to conduct monthly monitoring, rather than quarterly to avoid lag time in assessing progress on benchmarks. ¶10. (C) Atmar pointed out that there was no long-term plan on how to sustain the APPP financially. Resources were in place for the next year to 18 months (primarily from the U.S., except for weapons),but Atmar said now was the time to think about providing additional resources for support and expansion of the APPF once it proved successful in Wardak. He expected the program to move past being a U.S.-Afghan bilateral effort to eventually become multilateral. The GIRoA would then seek assistance from other troop contributing countries. SUPPORT FOR APPP WILL NOT DETRACT FROM SUPPORT FOR POLICE -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Atmar stressed that the launch of the APPP would not mean a diminishment of MOI's commitment to police reform and expansion. Atmar remained determined to increase police numbers but the first priority must be establishing accountability and transparency before increasing ANP significantly. Atmar pointed out again that rather than detracting from building police capacity, the APPP was key to establishing a secure environment to allow police to do their job. MOI ATMAR: SHURAS WILL ENFORCE APPF DISCIPLINE -------------- - KABUL 00000256 003 OF 003 ¶12. (C) On January 19, Ambassador Wood revisited the question of community responsibility for the APPP with Atmar. The Ambassador stressed the importance of local communities feeling ownership of the program, taking control, and being self-reliant. Lack of a sense of community ownership probably lay behind the earlier failure of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP),which became dominated by individual strongmen. ¶13. (C) Atmar responded that the APPF was a "hybrid" binding community CONTROL to local representatives of different ministries of the central government. The underlying idea was to address key concerns of the community by giving the District Councils (Shuras) responsibility for vetting the APPF. The Council members would nominate candidates from every village and thus assume responsibility for their cousins, sons, and nephews. If APPF members did something wrong, it was the Shura which would enforce discipline. Atmar added that the ANAP was often unpaid, which would not be the case with the APPF. IDLG DEPUTY: ACCOUNTABILITY MUST ULTIMATELY LIE WITH MOI -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) In a January 19 meeting with the DCM and PRTOff, IDLG Deputy Director Karimi agreed that shuras should play a role in nominating local men for the APPF. And, while he could see communities participating in administering punishment, Karimi believed MOI (through the local police chief) should be held responsible for APPF conduct, not the communities. It would not be right, he maintained, to punish communities for misconduct by APPF members. "The shuras will help MOI get the right people - nothing more." (Atmar has not suggested punishing communities for APPF failures, and IDLG Director Popal and Atmar appear to be working closely on ironing out the details of APPP implementation.) KARZAI AND APPP -------------- ¶15. (C) The APPP comes in direct response to a request from President Karzai to develop a program to engage the grassroots in their own protection. Karzai has long advocated strengthening the community's role in governance and Atmar's continued promotion of the program indicates at least tacit support from the President. However, Karzai's public comments earlier this month indicate he may have concerns regarding some aspects of the APPP. He has not yet publicly endorsed the program and continues to believe that it is too national and institutional, and therefore, not rooted enough in local communities. We have explained that for reasons of operational CONTROL and accountability of funds, oversight by the national government is necessary. WOOD