Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2465
2009-08-22 04:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

CJTF-82 CG SCAPARROTTI,S MEETING WITH NANGARHAR

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM EAID KJUS AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8797
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBUL #2465/01 2340449
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220449Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1016
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002465 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID KJUS AF
SUBJECT: CJTF-82 CG SCAPARROTTI,S MEETING WITH NANGARHAR
GOVERNOR SHIRZAI

KABUL 00002465 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y
ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002465 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID KJUS AF SUBJECT: CJTF-82 CG SCAPARROTTI,S MEETING WITH NANGARHAR GOVERNOR SHIRZAI KABUL 00002465 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. During an animated 90-minute meeting on August 11 with Gen. Scaparrotti and SCR-E Kilner, Governor Shirzai returned repeatedly to two central themes: working with and through Afghanistan,s tribal structure is the key to more effective government; and reforming and strengthening the Interior Ministry is essential to improving the country,s internal security. End Summary. -------------- Use the Tribes -------------- ¶2. (C) Gen. Scaparrotti and SCR-E opened the meeting by complimenting Shirzai for his accomplishments and strong leadership as governor of Nangarhar, and asking what the governor saw as the main ingredients for success. Shirzai replied that it was his willingness to work with and through traditional leaders, tribal and religious, of the community. This was the key to bringing government closer to the people, using shura meetings as the primary forum, he said. ¶3. (C) SCR asked the governor how this approach could be squared with the need to strengthen the structures and capacity of the Afghan state. Shirzai replied that if an individual were suspected of a serious crime, a meeting of elders and/or notables should be convened to decide whether or not the person should be tried. If they agreed he should, the suspect could then be turned over to the state legal system. This sequencing, Shirzai thought, would give state judicial processes greater legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. -------------- Broken State Structures , Improving Security - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) Shirzai did not hide that he thought many state institutions are effectively broken and must be scrapped or radically reformed. As in the past, he was harshly critical of the Independent Directorate for Local Government (IDLG), indicating that he would like to see it abolished. Similarly, he had little but scorn for the Afghan National Police (ANP). &I supposedly have five ANP police chiefs in my province, but I can never find any of them,8 he complained. &I need one chief who is directly accountable to me.8 &#x
000A;¶5. (C) In order to reform and rebuild the ANP, Shirzai said it would be necessary to consolidate and strengthen the Ministry of Interior (MoI) -- &like it was under the King!8 Shirzai declared. Currently, the MoI does not exercise effective control over the ANP, he thought. The governor further advocated the creation of auxiliary police forces in border provinces, which would be community-based, but also linked to the MoI. Again returning to the importance of traditional structures, Shirzai argued that community-based police in border regions would be much less easily intimidated than regular ANPs. ¶6. (C) Shirzai opined that the insurgency is weaker today in Nangarhar than it was one year ago. In addition to the measures noted above, he placed strong emphasis on improving education and economic opportunity, so that young men were not lured to madrassas in Pakistan. Inevitably, reconciliation would have to be part of the process. Without offering specifics, he called for a series of &peace jirgas8 as a mechanism for rapprochement between Afghanistan,s Pashtun community and coalition forces. -------------- PRTs and Economic Development - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Shirzai professed to be very satisfied with his relationship to the U.S. PRT in Jalalabad, which had made important contributions to Nangarhar,s economic development. Nevertheless, his wish-list of additional projects was long. Education, roads, an airport, irrigation, and power are all necessary. Border regions should be given highest priority, since they are the most vulnerable. Shirzai recommended that the United States establish one PRT in each of the &five economic zones8 of Nangarhar. Gen. Scaparrotti and SCR noted that RC-East was reviewing all CERP projects to ensure that the most effective ones are pushed through to completion quickly. We would also give priority to projects that maximized employment of local labor. -------------- Karzai for President - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Legal requirements for impartiality notwithstanding, Shirzai argued repeatedly that President Karzai should be reelected. &He has his faults,8 the governor said, &but he is the best candidate for the international community.8 Karzai also offered the best hope for improved relations KABUL 00002465 002 OF 002 between Pashtuns and the coalition forces. Shirzai said he had held many conversations with Karzai regarding the need for a clear and coherent strategy during a second term in office. Regardless of who is elected, Shirzai added, the next president will need to have strong international partners &or he will achieve nothing.8 The governor predicted a high voter turnout in Nangarhar province, but worried about Russian and Iranian interference in the election. -------------- Comment - - - - ¶9. (C) Shirzai claimed he could more or less have his pick of jobs in a second Karzai administration. He strongly implied that a revitalized MoI needed someone of his caliber to run it, but stopped short of committing himself. EIKENBERRY

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -