PAKTIKA GOVERNOR CONFIRMS HIS DEPARTURE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000246 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR WILKES CG CJTF-101 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: PAKTIKA GOVERNOR CONFIRMS HIS DEPARTURE AND COMMENTS ON THE AFGHAN PUBLIC PROTECTION PROGRAM REF: KABUL 0101 Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) At a meeting with the Ambassador ON January 29, Paktika Governor Mohammad Akram Khpalwak confirmed that he is being replaced, in all likelihood within a few days by current Kandahar NDS chief Abdul Qayum Katawazay. He expressed support for the notion of a carefully organized, government-controlled program to organize local residents in support of community security; but, he suggested such an initiative ) i.e., the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP) -- should be launched initially not in Wardak, as is currently planned, but in the southeast, where tribal structures are still intact. He underscored the urgent need for sustained community engagement in order to convince Pashtuns to stand up to extremism. The governor contended that President Karzai, with whom he has recently met, is so focused ON the upcoming elections and U.S. criticism that he doubts the President has much attention left to devote to future-oriented projects, like community engagement/policing. End Summary. New Governor for Paktika -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Khpalwak told the Ambassador that their meeting was intended as a farewell call, at least in his current capacity as governor. He recounted that current Kandahar NDS Chief Katawazay informed him ON January 28 that President Karzai had assured Katawazy that he would be named as the new governor of Paktika province within the following 1-2 days (this despite Katawazay,s candidacy having been rejected by the Senior Appointments Panel, according to Khpalwak). As for his own future, Khpalwak said he turned down the position of Deputy Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs and believes he still may have a chance at being appointed head of a government commission; but otherwise he plans to return for the time being to private life. He stressed that, whatever happens, he intends to continue working for the good of Afghanistan and its people. Khpalwak: Community Engagement a Critical Need -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Without mentioning the initiative by name, Governor �A;Khpalwak said he has concerns that the Afghan Public Protection Program is being launched first in Wardak, rather than in the southeast (he suspects political motivations lay behind the choice of Wardak). In his view, this kind of program has great potential but needs to START small and prove itself in order to gain traction with other communities. This makes start-up success absolutely critical. He also stressed the need to talk to communities and get their full buy-in to help immunize them against enemy propaganda that contends the U.S. is trying to pit brother against brother through the creation of these forces. ¶4. (C) Elaborating, Khpalwak said he tried in vain last year to gain backing in Kabul for a similar initiative in the southeast. Any such program, he insisted, should entail a contract between the authorities, the local tribe/community/elders and the international community, with responsibilities and expectations clearly laid out. It should be broadly based, in the sense that it involves economic, governance and security elements, with the government remaining fully engaged and ultimately in control. Otherwise, corrupt local strongmen might misuse such local forces for their own purposes. As part of the agreement, local communities should commit to excluding anti-government elements and those out to harm internationals. In exchange for effective self-policing, the authorities might agree to keep their own and international forces at a distance. This in turn would eliminate the incidents of civilian casualties that so alienate the population. Development projects employing local labor would be another important element, as would be a credible reconciliation program. He pointed to the Mangal tribe, straddling the Khost/Paktya border, as an example of a community -- this one tribally based -- that he believes would respond well to this kind of initiative. ¶5. (C) When asked why local tribes and communities are not more supportive of the government and the international KABUL 00000246 002 OF 002 forces who make concerted efforts to win their loyalty, Khpalwak suggested support provided for local shuras to date has been more verbal than real. Small-time Taliban commanders who might want to reconcile or mullahs who might want to speak out against the insurgents fear for their lives ) neither they nor the communities to which they belong have confidence the government will not abandon them. Regarding international forces, many communities have no direct communications with them. What is needed, he argued, is a full-blown strategy that entails active, day-to-day engagement and support. In this context, he bemoaned the lack of power and resources of governors and district administrators. In the absence of such an approach, he recounted, powerful tribal elders today are talking to the Taliban and reaching agreements with them ) you don,t make problems for us and we won,t make problems for you. We cannot fight all the Pashtuns, he warned, but step-by-step we CAN win over Pashtun communities to standing up to extremism. Palace Focused ON Upcoming Elections -------------- ¶6. (C) While not openly critical of the President Karzai, Khpalwak expressed skepticism that the President will devote much attention to devote to programs like community engagement/policing. Instead, he says, his contacts with the President and the Palace suggest they are strongly preoccupied with upcoming national elections and recent criticism coming out of the U.S. To the Ambassador,s suggestion that he might want to find a role for himself in managing the APPP, Khpalwak indicated he would FOLLOW up with Minister of Interior Atmar (MOI is responsible for implementing the program). He noted, though, that ultimate decision-making authority will continue to rest with the President. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Given his obvious talent, intelligence, energy and ambition, Khpalwak is unlikely to disappear entirely from the scene. The fact that the President reportedly offered the governor several other positions suggests the Palace maintains a measure of confidence in him. But two factors ) perhaps alongside others -- may have contributed to his displacement now. First, the Palace may not have been convinced that he would work energetically enough for the President,s re-election. The governor claims not to be affiliated with any political grouping, and in his discussion with the Ambassador he repeatedly stressed his pursuit of what is best for the country. In this vein, he recounted a meeting last year with the President, several top ministers and selected governors where the President pressed the governors to engage communities ON the issue of cross-border relations. Khpalwak said he spoke up, asking what the goal of these engagements should be and where they might fit into a nationally formulated strategy; but he received no coherent response. ¶8. (C) While Khpalwak appears to have been slated for a change for some time, a second factor perhaps contributing to his ousting at this juncture may be simply that the President needed his position. Reports suggest the President, possibly on behalf of his half-brother in Kandahar, has felt obligated to the Katawazay family. WOOD