AFGHAN INTERIOR MINISTER PROMISES POLICE SUPPORT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002404 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019 TAGS: AF MARR MASS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: AFGHAN INTERIOR MINISTER PROMISES POLICE SUPPORT FOR ISAF CONVOYS UNTIL PRIVATE SECURITY ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED Classified By: Pol-Mil Counselor Philip Kosnett for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Against a backdrop of GIRoA desire to expand its authority over Private Security Companies (PSCs),Afghan Minister of Interior (MinInt) Atmar has offered to provide police protection for convoys supporting Regional Command-South (RC-S),until we reach agreement on how to fold the private security function into official status. The Combined Security Transition Assistance Command for Afghanistan (CSTC-A) will provide HMMWVs to the ANP. CSTC-A will continue to facilitate the request of air support through Regional Command-South/National Police Coordination Center (Afghan) to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this mission. The fact that Atmar has offered to deploy ANP on this dangerous mission at a time when the police are already struggling to fill the need for elections security, demonstrates how important the issue of PSC oversight is to the GIRoA. END SUMMARY ¶2. (S) Compass International, a PSC with 2,000 employees, has been seeking an exemption to the Afghan Cabinet,s decision that sets a cap of 500 personnel per PSC. Compass is seeking to add 1,800 employees in order to provide convoy security to Supreme, the company providing food and fuel in support of ISAF and the military surge in RC-S. ISAF uses 3.5 million liters of aviation fuel per day, which arrives in 40,000 liter trucks, nearly all of which are on routes that require protection. (As an example of the scale of its activities, on August 5 Compass used 921 guards and 257 vehicles to guard 8 convoy movements consisting of 234 fuel and cargo vehicles.) Post is seeking details on an agreement that Compass has reportedly negotiated with MOI. In another case, Reed Inc., a PSC that has a contract with CSTC-A to provide security services at Camp Julien in Kabul province for the Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan and the Afghan National Army Training Command, has been unable to renew visas for 24 armed Nepalese guards that it is contractually obligated to provide. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has refused to renew the visas on the grounds that non-expert positions are to be filled by local Afghan nationals. ¶3. (S) MinInt Atmar told us in June that he had convinced the Cabinet to entertain case by case exceptions to this rule, particularly for the U.S. He implied that the exemption process would be relatively pro forma, given the scope of our operations and security needs here. However, in the first test of the exemption offer (following the killing of the Kandahar police chief by a USG-employed group in July; see below),Atmar rejected Compass, request. "Who will take responsibility for these armed individuals? Nobody!" Atmar told Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone and CSTC-A Commanding General Formica on August 2nd. "I can take the responsibility if they,re under my umbrella." ¶4. (S) Atmar,s concern relates to the future of Afghan guards employed by international PSCs, including Compass. Once their contract work ends and they are unemployed with no more international oversight, the former well-paid PSC guards could give rise to a new generation of private militias that the GIRoA would be unable to control. "You can control your private sector, we can,t control ours," Atmar said. A recent case in which Blackwater guards allegedly opened fire on civilians following a traffic accident, and an incident in which DynCorp International allegedly hired a minor to dance at a party (to public outcry when news leaked),have strengthened the Cabinet,s resolve to hold tighter rein over PSCs, Atmar said. He also cited an incident in June in which a U.S.-trained force of uniformed Afghans opened fire on a group of ANP, killing 10 police, including the Kandahar provincial Chief of Police. Atmar acknowledged that the group was not a PSC, but said that the Cabinet viewed it as a PSC incident. "When the Kandahar Chief of Police was killed, the Cabinet said to me: "You were the one pushing for the PSCs when we were trying to get rid of them, " Atmar recounted. -------------- ATMAR,S LONGER-TERM PROPOSAL -------------- ¶5. (S) In the short term, Atmar has offered to provide police protection for convoys supporting RC-S, until we reach agreement on how to fold the private security function into official status. CSTC-A will provide HMMWVs to the ANP. CSTC-A will continue to facilitate the request of air support through Regional Command-South/National KABUL 00002404 002 OF 002 Police Coordination Center (Afghan) to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help support the Afghan National Police (ANP) in this mission. The fact that Atmar has offered to deploy ANP on this dangerous mission at a time when the police are already struggling to fill the need for elections security, demonstrates how important the issue of private security company (PSC) oversight is to the GIRoA. ¶6. (S) Atmar,s goal is to create a public guard force that would be responsible for securing national assets and protecting officials, including judges and prosecutors. The guard force would be listed in the authorized table of organization and staffed with uniformed individuals who are vetted, trained, and under the control of the MOI. Their salaries would be paid by clients via the MOI. In addition to ensuring PSC regulation, Atmar said this approach would also help level out PSC salaries with those of the ANP. International PSCs offer salaries that are about three times what the GIRoA offers to police, creating recruitment challenges for the government, Atmar said. Amb. Ricciardone and Formica both expressed support for Atmar,s overall concept, but emphasized that the mechanics would take time to work out since it would involve creating yet another force when the ANP still has not met its training and recruitment objectives. Another issue is that under current U.S. law and Department of Defense policy, funds from the Commander,s Emergency Response Program (CERP) cannot be paid directly to the Afghan Government. CERP funds can be used to hire PSCs to guard critical infrastructure, but cannot be used to fund the MOI,s security forces. ¶7. (S) COMMENT: Atmar has already deployed his public guard force to protect sites including the Aynak Copper Mine in Logar, dam construction in Samangan and the construction of a portion of the Ring Road in Faryab. These guards are not on the GIRoA,s register of officially sanctioned positions, and we are still trying to ascertain what level of training they have received. Afghanization of PSC management fits into our overall objectives here, but successful transition will depend on developing the GIRoA,s capacity to provide a level of security that matches what our PSCs now provide. Police support of food and fuel convoys in RC-S will provide temporary support, while we work out a solution that meets our security needs without overburdening the ANP. END COMMENT EIKENBERRY