Civ-Mil Efforts Lift Election Prospects in the South

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002403 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: Civ-Mil Efforts Lift Election Prospects in the South ¶1. (SBU) Begin Summary: Voter turnout almost certainly will be more modest than in the elections of 2004 and 2005, in part because of Taliban intimidation tactics. But thanks to military clearance operations, GIRoA actions and assistance from civilians in RC-South, ISAF and Afghan officials estimate eighty-five percent of the population in southern Afghanistan should have an opportunity to cast a vote on August 20. This projection represents an improvement compared to two months ago. Although without a formal role in the election process, PRTs have helped to overcome a variety of election-related problems ranging from mediating conflicts in Zabul to arranging for logistical support to take election materials and personnel into outlying districts in Helmand, Zabul and Uruzgan. While polling may not proceed smoothly in the Pashtun heartland, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ISAF have coordinated closely on security measures. Election officials acknowledge that a number of polling centers, especially in Helmand and Kandahar, will not open because of insecure conditions. PRT Zabul predicts a 30 to 40 percent voter turnout in its province. End Summary. Voter Turn-Out in the Pashtun South will Be Key for Karzai -------------- - ¶2. (SBU) Taliban disruption efforts are likely to dampen voter turnout. PRTs in the region report hearing of many such threats. Afghan security officials told PRT Kandahar officers that they receive daily reports of night letters and direct intimidation of potential voters in Kandahar City and surrounding areas. PRT Zabul observed that even if polling centers are secure many villagers in Taliban-controlled areas will have qualms about returning to their villages with an ink stained finger. As a result, some observers expect the regional voter turnout to be considerably less than in the elections of 2004 and 2005. The PRT is predicting a 30 to 40 percent turnout province-wide, with higher results in the more urban areas. ¶3. (SBU) A low turnout no doubt would be disappointing news for President Karzai, the heavy favorite throughout this Pashtun region. President Karzai's supporters have been active in trying to drive up the vote. Last week, for example, Maywand District Governor Obaidullah Bawari hosted a shura for 300 people at which he urged �00A;tribal leaders to put aside tribal differences and secure a peaceful election. According to PRT Kandahar, Karzai posters were on display at the meeting and a Provincial Council candidate called on shura members to vote for President Karzai. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, perhaps sensing opportunity, has also taken his campaign to Kandahar, most recently on August 12 to conduct shuras and seek out more endorsements. He appears to have made some inroads. The Barakzai tribe in Arghandab district is currently divided between prominent Karzai supporter Gul Agha Sherzai and Abdullah supporter Noorulhaz Olumi and is not likely to support Karzai as strongly as in 2004, according to PRT Kandahar's local staff. In a sign of the increasing tension in Kandahar, the brother of Ashraf Ghani's campaign manager was gunned down August 17 in Kandahar City by three men on a motorcycle. Although there is some speculation the men may have been from the Karzai camp, no one knows who the perpetrators are, and it may just as likely have been insurgents. ¶4. (SBU) There are signs that President Karzai's political fortunes may be at risk in other provinces as well. In Helmand, PRT sources note that voter apathy among Pashtuns is high. In a clear sign of concern about the turnout, the Karzai campaign sent Sher Muhammad Akhundzada (SMA),the influential former governor who was removed from office two years ago, to Lashkar Gah on August 10 to line up support from key local leaders and engage the public on Karzai's behalf. SMA held a large campaign shura at Karzai stadium in Lahkar Gah. He also prepared a campaign visit for Karzai (which was ultimately cancelled because of a suicide bombing the day before) and has spent considerable time with provincial officials and tribal elders to enlist their support for the Karzai campaign. PRT sources believe SMA will continue to employ his political skills in Lashkar Gah through the election period to try to ensure a favorable outcome for President Karzai. Access to Voting Centers Improved With Coalition Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The election outlook in terms of access to voting centers in the south has improved in recent weeks, the region's PRTs and ISAF governance contacts suggest. Military operations, especially in Helmand, have been a major factor, with election workers and voter registration teams able to enter newly cleared areas of Babaji, Spin Masjid, Chah e Anjir, and Khanashin. Security preparations also have progressed, with ISAF units coordinating and rehearsing with Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) deployed in the provinces. The number of polling centers expected to open on election day has grown steadily. The most recent list compiled by the regional IEC indicated plans to open 44 of 47 polling centers in Nimruz; 101 of 222 polling centers in Helmand; 41 or 44 polling centers in Zabul; 229 of 271 polling centers in Kandahar; and 49 of 49 polling centers in Uruzgan. The benefits may be misleading - ten polling centers were added in Zabul, for example, by regrouping centers closer together for security reasons, a decision that may also limit the participation of some voters, PRT Zabul has said. But, since polling centers will be open disproportionately in more densely populated areas, they should make voting feasible for 85 percent of the population, according to regional ISAF and IEC analyses. In Helmand, the PRT estimates that upwards of 70 percent of the electorate now should have reasonable access to a ballot box. ¶6. (SBU) Outwardly, PRTs and ISAF officers in the south have taken care not to intrude unduly in election planning and execution to ensure the process remains legitimately an "Afghan led" approach. Moreover, PRTs have reported that Afghan leadership generally in their respective provinces has come to the fore, providing guidance, instructions, and plans for a credible election. Behind the scenes, PRTs have taken a strong interest in the election planning process and, at times, have lent important assistance. All PRTs have participated in regular election coordination meetings, primarily as observers but occasionally as advisers and advocates to resolve contentious problems. PRT Zabul leaders, for example, have reported speaking on a daily basis with the governor and deputy governor and meeting at least once a week with the Provincial Election Officer (PEO). The PRT leaders, drawn into spats between the PEO and provincial officials, often served as informal mediators. Similarily, in response to requests of the governor and provincial ANSF chiefs, PRT Uruzgan and ISAF representatives have held a number of meetings with Afghan decision makers to review election plans, offer recommendations, and monitor exercises. Civ-Mil Coordination Key to Improved Election Support -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) Given the difficult security environment, PRT Helmand, in particular, has been involved in providing election support virtually on a daily basis for the last two months. PRT officers have held meetings regularly with IEC officials to identify areas requiring support. PRT initiatives have included coordination with IEC and ISAF personnel to develop a helicopter lift program for getting the IEC officials into districts to identify polling centers. Because roads in Helmand are unsafe, all travel has had to be by helicopter, making it an enormous logistics challenge. Immediately after military operations, the PRT worked out the logistics for getting district field coordinators (DFCs) and voter registration teams into newly cleared areas to set the stage for elections. The PRT was also instrumental in persuading the provincial governor and provincial election officials to send the DFCs and voter registration teams into these areas. The PRT also worked closely with UK and U.S. military forces to develop an overall logistics plan for moving election material, ballots, and personnel before and after election day. At times, this has necessitated PRT officers serving as porters, lugging boxes of election material to and from helicopters late at night. ¶8. (SBU) PRT Kandahar is addressing IEC concerns about the distribution of election equipment and materials and the transportation of election officials, particularly females, to polling centers. ISAF has indicated that it will consider providing air assets, if necessary. In Uruzgan, the IEC chief approached the PRT with a request to move election material out to districts where security conditions do not permit safe road transport. Utilizing helicopter support from the Dutch and Task Force Wolfpack, the material will be ferried to U.S. Special Force fire bases, then collected by IEC support staff and distributed to remote locations throughout several districts. In those locations where PRT logistical support is limited due to security constraints, the PRT is working with Afghan security forces and district chiefs to develop "work-arounds," with the goal of enfranchising as many voters as possible. ¶9. (SBU) PRT support will not end on election day. The Dutch, for example, have established a joint operations center in Urzugan where all political and security players can monitor election day events and respond to crises as they arise. From mass-casualty planning to preparing back-up force support for the ANA and ANP, the various elements within the PRT have developed joint plans to help mitigate hazards as they present themselves on election day. If Afghan capacity is reached, the PRT is well prepared to augment Afghan security elements, if requested. ¶10. (SBU) PRTs report key administrative and security preparations for the elections are still ongoing. ANSF and ISAF have coordinated extensively on security issues. One unresolved issue is the extent of the use of civilians with personal arms -sometimes referred to as "community based security" - to provide security in some areas. PRT Zabul also noted this week that provincial election authorities still needed to hire 500 to 600 staff to work at polling places. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In the South, securing the electorate and permitting easy access to polling centers has long been considered a key challenge. The coalition activities of the past weeks in Helmand - particularly in the newly cleared areas of Babaji, Spin Masjid, Chah e Anjir, Khanashin, and Now Zad - in tandem with a coordinated voter registration efforts supported by the civilians working closely with the UK and U.S. forces there has increased the potential for locals to access voting centers on August 20. Still, in addition to continuing security concerns and Taliban intimidation tactics, voter apathy and simple disenchantment with GIRoA leadership in Kabul may be equally important factors on August 20. EIKENBERRY