IEC NIXES QUESTIONABLE GIROA SOLUTION TO ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002384 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINS AF SUBJECT: IEC NIXES QUESTIONABLE GIROA SOLUTION TO ELECTION SECURITY Classified By: PolCouns Annie Pforzheimer, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In recent weeks, the Afghan government initiated two local security measures - Community Based Security and a "pacification" program - intended to safeguard polling places and voters in some of the most at-risk electoral districts. While the measures were billed by the GIRoA as traditional Afghan solutions, the structure, scope, and secrecy of the programs sparked concern that they are a thinly-disguised Karzai tactic designed to influence the vote in Pashtun provinces and could lay the foundation for an increase in militia activity. The Independent Election Commission (IEC),with guidance from the International Community (IC),decided August 13 to reject these security measures as risking the integrity of the electoral process. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (C) Since early July, Afghan and ISAF election security planners recognized that a shortage of Afghan National Police (ANP) could significantly decrease the number of planned voting centers which would open, with the large majority of non-openings occurring in Pashtun districts in the South and East, where fighting is the heaviest. President Karzai has been determined to avoid such an outcome, likely calculating that any de facto disenfranchisement of a number of Pashtuns would be harmful to his reelection prospects. ¶3. (C) In a July 6 Palace meeting with senior U.S. and UN representatives, Karzai offered a solution to the police-scarcity problem: community policing - or, as he put it, "a local people force in insecure provinces who would help provide security for polling stations." The idea - also known as community-based security, tribal solutions or the "arbakai" program - is to form short-term volunteer community guards at the village level who would guard polling places with little or no training and even in the absence of regular ANP detachments. Karzai directed Interior Minister Atmar to find money for the program either from the MOI budget or from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Shortly afterward, a GIRoA "Joint Community Policing Guideline" document was agreed to by the Palace under the signatures of five organizations: Ministry of Defense (MOD),Minister of Interior, National Directorate of Security (NDS),the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) and the Special office of Tribal Liaison to the President. (Note: A detailed report on how this program is being implemented, and its possible implications, is contained below in paragraphs 7-10 with provincial reports paras 11-22. End Note.) ¶4. (C) Simultaneously with commencement of the community based security program, the National Directorate for Security moved forward with a "pacification" program in a number of insecure districts, with the goal of making arrangements with the Taliban/insurgents for a ceasefire on election day to allow polling places to open. (Note: A report on this separate program is contained below in paragraphs 23 to 25. End Note.) ¶5. (C) Late on August 13, the IEC announced that 6,167 polling stations will open on election day. Noting the CBS and "pacification" programs, the IEC stated that only official security forces - defined as the ANP and the ANA - would be accepted as legitimate for securing polling centers. The IEC declined to open polling centers where the presence of official security forces cannot be guaranteed and will not send voting materials to these locations on the grounds that arrangements involving community security or NDS led "pacification" initiatives would undermine the credibility of the election process and especially custody of materials, and safety of voters and IEC staff. In the IEC's plan, 360 additional stations are "TBD" based on whether ANSF security will be in place, if IEC staff can be recruited and whether opening the centers will increase turnout. On August 15, in a meeting attended by UNSRSG Eide and the Ministers of Interior and Defense, IEC repeated their commitment to only send IEC officials and polling materials to polling centers where ANSF are present. ¶6. (C) We will continue to track Community Based Security programs and the "pacification" program to build a clearer picture of both. We will also continue to seek meetings with GIRoA officials in Kabul to try to get answers to the many funding and command questions that still remain unanswered. Presidential candidate Dr. Abdullah's strong opposition to the programs (septel) indicates that, had the IEC not taken steps to limit its reliance on these security measures, he would have used the irregular nature of the custody of ballot materials, or the issue of possible intimidation by armed locals, as the basis for post-election challenges. We will coordinate efforts with the UN and other embassies to urge the IEC to hold its ground and the ANSF to take measures to enhance voter access to polling sites. -------------- Community Based Security (CBS) In Depth -------------- ¶7. (C) The "Joint Community Policing Guidelines" document issued by the GIROA is summarized below. Interestingly, we did not originally obtain this document from the MOI or any GIRoA department in Kabul, despite repeated requests, but from a PRT officer who was given a copy by a friendly local government official. - Under the direction of Arif Noorzai, the chief of the newly created Independent Security and Safety of Public Premises body and the Presidency of the Chief of Tribal Liaison to the President, Asadullah Khalid, MOI, MOD, NDS, and IDLG will develop a plan to use a local people force, through the tribal shura in areas where there are not enough ANA, ANP, and NDS to provide security. - The MOI with IDLG will lead the operations. - MOI will provide the budget which will not exceed USD 1.8 million. The MOF with NDS will review and provide the remaining budget. - For each insecure district, 50-150 volunteers will be recruited by the Independent Tribal Shura and deployed at the direction of the shura for a temporary period until the end of the election. - The management of these volunteers will be under ANP. They will not guard ballot boxes but will provide security for the voters. - In areas where ANA and ANP are not present, these volunteers will be given the responsibility to secure polling centers. - These volunteers will be armed. ¶8. (C) Early efforts by the Embassy, ISAF, and major international donor partners to learn more about the CBS created more questions than answers. We could not ascertain the source of the USD 1.8 million allocated to the program but learned on August 13 that the USD 1.8 million has been transferred from MOI,s budget to the Independent Security and Safety of Public Premises body with control of the money by Arif Noorzai. (NOTE: Arif Noorzai is a member of the Karzai campaign staff. End Note.) The Joint Directive stated the community police will stand down after the election but field reports suggested otherwise. On several occasions, Minister Atmar publicly announced that the community police will not be armed or wear uniforms, but observers have stated otherwise. There is no clarity on who will direct and maintain responsibility for the community police or their rules of engagement, except for loose references to "tribal shuras" or to ANP depending on the location. We also lack an explanation of the vetting practices for these "volunteers." We learned from Atmar during an August 10 UNAMA-led meeting that the community policing program will take place in 14 provinces, and that it will build up to a strength of 13,000 - 30,000 shura leaders to manage the program and 10,000 "community volunteers." Although the guidelines document stated that volunteers will be armed, Atmar claimed the MOI would not arm the volunteers. ¶9. (C) While Pashtun-majority provinces are not the only ones facing significant security challenges, the CBS appears targeted only at such provinces. In Pashtun-minority Nuristan and Dai Kundi, for example, the governors have not obtained CBS funding despite asking for it -- except, in Nuristan, for the pro-Karzai Waum district. ¶10. (C) Kandahar is an especially difficult case. In an August 13 meeting, the Canadian DCM said that Governor Weesa had suddenly changed his view on the CBS program and will implement it in Kandahar, even though a few days earlier At an August 11 meeting with the British and Canadians, the Canadian Political Military Counselor told that Kandahar Governor Weesa opposed the CBS plan because they believe the community policing program is "a boldface attempt by GIROA to get extra tashkil (the numbers allowed per an ANP manning document) without going through the approval system." The Canadians speculated that President Karzai is seeking to buy off the governor to support the program and is chasing votes by putting extra money into tribal hands. In conversations with the Abdullah campaign manager, the Canadians learned that he views these security arrangements for insecure areas as a "central element of an orchestrated effort to defraud the elections." -------------- - Provincial Reports on Community Based Security -------------- - ¶11. (C) Zabul: August 2 meeting between PRT Commander, Governor Naseri, ANSF leadership, and 50-60 tribal elders from 3 communities. Governor Naseri announced that 40-50 local men will be hired from each District for election security. The men would be given uniforms, rifles and be paid one month of police wages ($180) for one week of work. General Sarjan, the provincial ANP Chief, suggested to the PRT Commander that the men would stay on after the elections to continue to provide security. Concerns raised by the PRT include the lack of basic communication and rules of engagement for the groups, as well as the need to vet the participants to mitigate the risk of tribal or political loyalties and the effects of intimidation on polling day. ¶12. (C) Farah: On Aug 3 Governor Amin said that GIROA, through IDLG, will hire 100 villagers in each unsafe district (Bala Baluk, Khaki Safed, Pusht Rud, Baqwa, and Gulistan) with a salary of 8000 Afs for 15 days work. They will be stationed inside their villages at polling stations and will receive licensed weapons which they will be allowed to keep for local village defense. They allegedly will not be subject to the DIAG process once the election is over. There will also be 25 elders hired at a salary of 10,000 Afs a month to control the village community police. The ANP have already been interviewing local men for the program but the elders have run into a problem as the list created by local appointed GIRoA officials has included questionable people including Taliban. There is not enough time to ensure complete vetting. ¶13. (C) Kunar: Haji Gul Aman, who is the new IDLG chief in Kunar, arrived armed with the text of an agreement to hire local tribes for election security, and will travel to six districts to recruit them. Governor Wahidi said he was concerned he didn't know how many to hire but in spite of this he would seek to help hire 400. Wahidi also said that the program is funded by MOI and IDLG. The local IEC Officer said he had not been consulted on the implementation of this program. ¶14. (C) Helmand: At an August 2 elections security shura, district administrators said they would, in concert with community councils, identify "arbakai" or tribal defense volunteers for election security. The "arbakai" will be in Nawa (100),Nad Ali (125) and Garmsir (100). They will be paid by the MOI for one month and will have no training. The election "arbakai" will remain at least 100 meters away from polling centers but it is unclear how this will be enforced. Governor Mangal said that the men will not be armed but the Deputy Governor Sattar said they might be. PRT Lashkar Gah highlights that the militia will have no clear role, no reporting chain, no check on activities, and no plan for demobilization. At a weekly Garmsir Security shura the acting district administrators and ANA, ANP and NDS participants said that the "arbakai" program would not work in that district given the lack of tribal homogeneity and militia history in Garmsir, insufficient time to vet candidates, and skepticism of the GIROA's ability to pay the "arbakai" as the local ANP have not been paid on a consistent basis. ¶15. (C) Faryab: The Provincial Governor is a proponent of using armed militia to secure the Ghormach district of Faryab but the IEC is frowning on it. ¶16. (C) Badghis: The Provincial Chief of Police Sahid, Ahamad Sami told the PRT Officer that he had received authorization from Kabul to hire 500 Auxiliary Police for election Security in Badghis Province, and after consulting with the Provincial Governor and district administrators he had decided to hire 620 auxiliary police in the following districts: Bala Murghab (100),Qadis (110),Jawand (120),Ab Kamari (120),Ab Kamari (70) an Qala-e-Now (100). ¶17. (C) Wardak: On August 8, the PRT Officer reported that 11 provincial chiefs of police met with Dep Min of Interior Mangal and agreed that 17 provinces throughout the country would hire 100 guards per district, with a total of 800 in Wardak. This force will be known as local or "Mahali" police. For the first month including the elections, these men will be paid 8000 Afs. They are chosen by a similar shura process as the Wardak Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) were nominated, which involves vetting by community elders. The problem of weapons for this security force has not been resolved, or how they will be factored into the existing MOD/MOI security plan. GIRoA officials have suggested they may use some of these men as the next step in expanding AP3 after the elections, which would be outside the intent and way ahead for the program. ¶18. (C) Kapisa: On Aug 9 at a Provincial Security Council meeting Governor Abu Bakr announced that he will hire 50-80 armed men to secure polling centers on election day but did not say how much he would pay them, how he would pay them or in which Districts they would operate. ¶19. (C) Khost: On Aug 9 Governor Qalandarzai convened a shura to solicit support from mullahs and tribal elders to provide "arbakai" for the election security. The shura and mullahs are responsible fo recuriting and will be paid Afs 10,000 a month for their service. Up to 1200 "abakia" will be recruited and paid Afs 8,000 a month each. The governor was unclear about the command and control of the "arbakai" and payment mechanism, suggesting that communication with the Ministry of Interior had been unclear. ¶20. (C) Kandahar: One report suggested that the GIROA tried to implement the community policing program but it has not been well received. The Kandahar PRT Officer reported August 4 that Governor Weesa was strongly inclined against the idea. The Kandahar NDS Chief, BG Momin, told the Governor that he is also strongly against using armed groups as "it would create chaos." ¶21. (C) Dai Kundi: The UNDP Election Advisor expressed grave concern over the preparations for the elections reporting that 11 polling centers will not open and that the province is 600 ANP short to cover security. The Provincial Governor has announced that he is considering using local militia. The ANP have said so far they would only send additional military personnel to the Province for one month and have not discussed making funds available for Community Based security. ¶22. (C) Nuristan: The Nuristan Governor has requested that GIRoA provide money for him to form militia. TF Steele is helping to facilitate the flow of money from Kabul but so far no funding is forthcoming. One pro-Karzai district has received funding. -------------- The NDS "Pacification" Program -------------- ¶23. (C) An SRSG chaired meeting of Afghan ministers and senior international representatives on August 10 to discuss opening of polling centers, focused on the NDS led "pacification" program. Atmar described it as the "the intelligence program;" saying the program operates in 47 districts in 11 provinces, and that there are three categories of outcomes in implementing the program: Category One: Locations in which the Taliban/insurgents agree the ANSF can operate in their area. Category Two: Locations in which the Taliban/insurgents do not agreed to ANSF operating in their area and will not allow any Community Based Security arrangements. In effect, this would mean security for the election would be provided by the Taliban/insurgents. Category Three: Locations in which Taliban/insurgents do not agree to ANSF security but do agree to CBS arrangements. ¶24. (C) Atmar pointed out that in all three categories IEC officials, FEFA (the domestic election observer organization) and party or candidate agents could be present if they desired, but strongly advised against the presence of international observers. FEFA subsequently commented that it is highly unlikely they would go to areas where security depends on NDS agreements with local Taliban and without ANSF presence. The Minister asserted that the decision to open polling centers in category two and three areas rested with the IEC and the international community. The SRSG asked IEC Commissioner Ludin to consult his fellow commissioners on whether the IEC could open voting centers in areas with security provided under categories two and three. ¶25. (C) We have received few field reports on the "pacification" program, likely due to its behind-the-scenes nature. PRT Badghis noted much speculation in Badghis with regard to possible payment by the Karzai administration to the insurgents in Bala Murghab in exchange for their promise not to disturb voting on August 20. The majority of the IDLG delegation of elders did not sit down to negotiate with the Taliban. Instead IDLG assigned Mullah Badar, a Pashtun and Senator Rangin Moshqwani a Pashtun running for Provincial Council in Bala Murghab. Information also surface d from NDS contacts that Karzai has authorized the release of several insurgents, the first three of whom were responsible for attacks on PRTs and ISAF convoys, (Sharafadin, Nazar Mohammad, Sahid Hamad Shah, Abdul Wasi, Ayub and Khan Azrat) from Jails in Qala-e-Naw, Herat and Kabul to buy a cease fire for election day. EIKENBERRY