AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH KARZAI:

S E C R E T KABUL 002380


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH KARZAI:
GAINING TRACTION ON THE COMPACT

REF: KABUL 02304

Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: In my August 11 meeting with President
Karzai, I reiterated the importance of moving forward on
post-election goals, including creating a compact with the
international community. I emphasized that a return of
Dostum to Afghanistan would be unacceptable to the United
States and most of the international community, and would
endanger future international support for the new Afghan
government. Although Karzai's re-election remains his
immediate priority, he was more willing than in past weeks to
focus on a compact. He also appears to be assimilating that
our long-term commitment to Afghanistan hinges on the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's (GIRoA)
commitment and ability to combat corruption and that we must
establish sets of mutual responsibilities and agreements to
achieve this objective. Finally, Karzai concurred that the
best measure of a genuine and worthy compact with the
international community would be his ability to forge a
successful compact with the Afghan people. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
Pushing Back on Dostum
- - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (S/NF) During an hour and a half conversation -- the
first half attended by Karzai's Presidential Chief of Staff,
Daudzai and his Deputy National Security Advisor Shaida --
Karzai appeared a bit tired, but confident, and more
analytical than he was in last week's meeting. Karzai raised
two issues in the presence of his two advisers: Dostum's
desire to return to Afghanistan to support Karzai in the
final days of the election campaign and Karzai's interest in
meeting with political rival Ashraf Ghani in a "neutral site"
to discuss the possibility of his joining Karzai's future
cabinet. At the start of the meeting, Karzai told me that
Dostum has been calling him frequently to seek his permission
to return to Afghanistan to allow him to help in the final
stretch of the presidential campaign. Karzai explained that
Dostum could help end problems in Uzbek-dominated areas and
unite the Uzbeks behind Karzai's candidacy. Dostum had
informed him that U.S. officials supported his bid to return
to Afghanistan. However, when I asked for the names of these
officials, Daoud sheepishly replied that "maybe someone from
the CIA" had made the recommendation.


3. (S/NF) I was emphatic that no USG official in a position
of authority would have conveyed this message and unequivocal
that Dostum's return would be a serious mistake that Karzai
would have to live with. I reminded Karzai that Afghans and
foreigners at large believe he has two valuable attributes,
namely that he serves as the symbol of national unity and as
a credible bridge to the international community. Despite
some damage to his reputation over the past year and a half
or so, more recently, there were signs that Karzai was
rebuilding his image. Allowing Dostum to return would
undoubtedly destroy Karzai's reputation and the international
community would reject such a measure. I added that I was
unsure what actions the international community would take on
pending charges against Dostum. Further, Dostum's return
would endanger much of the progress made in Afghanistan over
the past five years, create a source of friction in the
Afghan government's relations with the international
community, and could well cost Karzai's government the
continued support of the United States and most of the
international community.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
. . . And Leaving Ghani to Karzai
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (S/NF) Karzai yet again solicited my views on whether he
should meet with political rival Ashraf Ghani in a "neutral"
venue to discuss the possibility of his joining the next
Karzai government, and if we believed Ghani would be a
valuable political asset. I replied that the decision is
Karzai's to make, clarifying that the United States is
interested in the quality and professional capabilities of
the people that will comprise the new Afghan government, not
the individuals per se.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gaining Traction on the Compact
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (S/NF) Following the departure of Karzai's aides, I
informed him that I would meet with his political rival
Abudllah to discuss the proposed compact with the new
Afghanistan administration later the same day. I then
remarked that, while Karzai's obsession with the August 20
elections was understandable, the United States harbors its
own "obsessions" vis a vis Afghanistan. While among the
American public there is general consensus that we must help
the Afghan people achieve progress, our fundamental concern
is that Afghanistan acquire the attributes of a nation that
can harden itself against the threats of Al Qaeda and its
Taliban allies so that together we may avoid another
September 10 scenario. Specifically, Americans are concerned
about two issues. First, when will our troops no longer lead
the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and instead, will
support, likely for decades to come, Afghan efforts to this
effect? Second, will we see positive returns for our
investment in helping Afghanistan combat widespread
corruption and strengthen rule of law and good governance?



6. (S/NF) Referring to the five essential pillars of an
eventual Afghan government-international community compact --
namely, sovereignty; reintegration/amnesty;
governance/anti-corruption; economic development; and,
Afghanistan's regional status -- I remarked that all are
closely linked, in particular the first three. Specifically,
Afghanistan needs to take the lead in the fighting and in
achieving amnesty and reintegration in accordance with the
Afghan Constitution. A receptive Karzai noted his particular
interest in working the amnesty issue and in increasing
cooperation with Pakistan to achieve regional stability. I
assured Karzai that Washington is engaged in these topics at
senior levels. He suggested Defense Minister Wardak could
take the lead for the Afghans on these issues.


7. (S/NF) Emphasizing the link between security and
governance, I reminded Karzai that our long-term commitment
to Afghanistan hinges on the GIRoA's commitment and ability
to combat corruption and that we need to establish sets of
mutual responsibilities and agreements to achieve this
objective. I suggested establishing an Afghan
anti-corruption commission that would include international
participation. I mentioned that the United States is
interested in investing in additional critical ministries,
possibly the Ministry of Energy and Water. However, any
investments in additional ministries must make good business
sense, which requires capable ministerial leadership. I
clarified that our current concerns about the Ministry of
Energy and Water's leadership are not personal, but from a
business perspective, capable and qualified leadership is
essential. Karzai offered to establish a new "justice and
development" team to address these concerns. He said
Director General of the Independent Directorate for Local
Governance (IDLG) Popal and Minister Wardak will put together
a group and advise us of its proposed composition within the
next few days.


8. (S/NF) Expanding on the importance of a compact, I noted
that, while the Bonn Agreement and other previous accords
were based on general principles, this new compact should
focus on measurable objectives and clear responsibilities. I
emphasized that creating an effective compact will require
bilateral (e.g., detention),NATO (security forces),and
broader international (e.g., corruption) participation and
buy in. Karzai enthusiastically welcomed my suggestion that
after reaching agreement on the compact it could be blessed
in an international Conference of Ministers, perhaps with the
participation of the U.S. Secretary of State and her
counterparts. In closing, I reminded Karzai that the most
important compact of all will be his compact with the Afghan
people; its success would be the best reassurance that
Afghanistan's compact with the international community is
genuine and worthwhile.


EIKENBERRY