AFGHAN MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTER-NARCOTICS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002347 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SRAP, INL/FO, INL/AP, PASS TO ONDCP E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019 TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL AF SUBJECT: AFGHAN MINISTERS DISCUSS COUNTER-NARCOTICS WITH DASD WECHSLER Classified By: Deputy Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats William Wechsler traveled to Afghanistan 28-30 July to meet with U.S., Afghan, and international officials to assess the counter-narcotics (CN) situation in Afghanistan. Meetings with the Afghan Ministers of Counter Narcotics (CN),Defense, and Interior focused on interdiction and the coordination of counternarcotics efforts. Two of the three disagreed with U.S. policy to cease supporting poppy eradication. All three ministers agreed that Afghan and international coordination of civilian efforts to "hold, transfer and build" should be improved in the wake of successful military operations against insurgents. END SUMMARY. Khodaidad: CN Efforts Need Better Coordination -------------- -- ¶2. (SBU) Minister for Counter Narcotics Khodaidad started the conversation on a positive note, pointing out that the upcoming release of the UNODC's 2009 Afghan Poppy Survey could lead to as many as 21 Afghan provinces being declared poppy-free in 2009, three more than in 2008. Khodaidad acknowledged the shift in the USG's CN strategy away from eradication, but argued that eradication remains a necessary threat to poppy cultivators' decision-making cycle and should continue. He agreed with DASD Wechsler that it is important, however, to ensure that eradication targets traffickers and large landowners, not poor farmers. ¶3. (SBU) On arresting high-value narcotics traffickers and high-ranking corrupt government officials, the Minister stated he is certain the International Community has enough evidence to help the Afghan justice system bring credible cases against them, but has not been as forthcoming in presenting this evidence as it could be, probably for political reasons. He recommended that, after the elections the international community should press the new Government of Afghanistan to arrest high profile suspects and bring them to justice in order to demonstrate seriousness regarding the CN effort. According to the Minister, interdiction efforts are not as effective as they should be, because the relatively low number of arrests and seizures to date has not made much of an impact, given the huge scale of the narcotics problem. He acknowledged the arrests of several high value traffickers during the past year, but stated that much more needs to be done before traffickers start taking the threat seriously. ¶4. (SBU) DASD Wechsler and the Minister then discussed coordinating CN efforts between various Afghan Ministries, with the Minister expressing frustration that this is not done more effectively. DASD Wechsler raised Colombia's integrated Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI) approach, noting that it had proved to be an effective mechanism for intra-ministry coordination in fighting narcotics in Colombia. Khodaidad was familiar with the program and agreed that it could provide some useful lessons for Afghanistan. Atmar: CN Shift Welcome, But Also Need Eradication -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Minister of Interior Mohammad Hanif Atmar began by welcoming the U.S. CN policy shift, announced recently by Senior Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, to place greater emphasis on interdiction and agricultural support. Atmar agreed that more agricultural development was critical for long term success in moving Afghanistan away from an illicit agricultural economy. However, he did not agree with SRAP's assessment that eradication efforts had failed and should be eliminated from the CN strategy. According to Atmar, Afghan eradication efforts have made slow but steady progress and overall CN law enforcement efforts have been positive. DASD Wechsler reinforced the policy as announced by SRAP, noting that while Afghans could still conduct some eradication if they found it necessary, the U.S. was de-emphasizing KABUL 00002347 002 OF 003 eradication and would place much more emphasis on interdiction and agricultural support. ¶6. (C) The Minister expressed dissatisfaction with President Karzai's recent decision to release from prison five convicted narcotics traffickers. DASD Wechsler stressed how damaging such actions are to the CN effort, to the development of the rule of law, and to international support. Atmar argued that the release of the five traffickers was related to the reconciliation effort and not to the elections. He stated that the Afghan government would not let such releases happen again and said that several high-ranking GOA officials will resign if it does. ¶7. (SBU) DASD Wechsler and the Minister discussed the need for an integrated campaign plan to coordinate CN efforts. Atmar argued that the international community should empower the Afghans to take control of the broader national development process and cited the National Solidarity Program as a successful Afghan-led process. Unlike the Minister for Counternarcotics, the Minister was not familiar with Colombia's CCAI and asked for more information on Colombia's integrated interagency approach. ¶8. (C) On interdiction, Atmar stated that the Ministry of Interior lacks the ability to conduct Intelligence Led Policing. He said that CSTC-A's focus on developing mainstream police and DEA's focus on specialized units have left a gap in police intelligence capabilities. The Minister proposed better law enforcement intelligence gathering and analysis as key to improving interdiction efforts, and requested additional resources to build such a capability. (Note: The Embassy is working with Atmar's office to help create the intelligence cell that Atmar described, and to provide U.S. expert support.) Daud: Counter Narcotics Police Need Help -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter Narcotics Daud echoed Atmar's call for developing police intelligence capabilities and in particular those of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). He noted that the recent U.S. interagency assessment of CNPA had accurately described many deficiencies in the organization, and suggested that the U.S. and the Afghan government develop jointly a plan for CNPA to ensure unity of effort and efficient use of resources. He advocated a regional approach in developing CNPA provincial capabilities, and requested U.S. assistance for encouraging regional cooperation. He stated that CNPA requires the capability to work with its counterparts in neighboring countries in order to better coordinate investigations international traffickers and illicit finance. DASD Wechsler agreed that developing the capabilities of the CNPA would be a high priority for the USG in the coming year. Wardak: MOD Forces Not Ready for CN Role -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak opened by discussing the Ministry of Defense (MOD)'s role in the CN effort. He said he had initially been reluctant to support CN efforts and the establishment of the Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK) in 2008. Wardak said recent Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) and CNIK efforts in Helmand suffered from command and control issues and poor joint planning. He acknowledged that CNIK was not equipped or trained to execute the job for which it was deployed. In regard to CNIK's future, Wardak said that for MOD to support the interdiction effort it will require a well-trained, well-equipped and mobile army unit. ¶11. (SBU) Wardak stated that improving interdiction efforts will depend on getting more reliable intelligence. He did not believe that the international community and GOA had developed adequate procedures to share and fuse CN intelligence. As a consequence, Wardak said, most interdiction operations are conducted ad hoc rather than as parts of an integrated plan. KABUL 00002347 003 OF 003 ¶12. (SBU) Wardak complained that Afghan government CN strategy was non-comprehensive, disjointed, and too focused on eradication. He recalled the 2008 operation in Musa Qala where the Afghan Army was able to clear the area but civilian government agencies were not immediately able to hold the terrain or deliver aid to the residents. He urged improved coordination and creation of a comprehensive campaign. DASD Wechsler again highlighted Colombia's integrated Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI) as a possible coordination model. Wardak reflected on a recent visit by his generals to Colombia and was interested in learning more about the civilian side of Colombia's approach. ¶13. (SBU) This cable has been reviewQd by DASD Wechsler. EIKENBERRY