Faryab Province Assessment

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002339

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF

SUBJECT: Faryab Province Assessment

REFTEL: Kabul 1735

Summary
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1. (U) This is a bi-annual report from the State PRT representative
in Mazar-e-Sharif on political, economic and security developments
in Faryab Province.


2. (SBU) Security in Faryab province, which forms the western flank
of Regional Command North, has deteriorated over the past year and
does not show signs of improving anytime soon. Insurgent
infiltration continues from Ghormach district up along the western
border areas with Turkmenistan and the eastern borders areas with
Jowzjan and Sar-e-pul provinces. Apprehension about the insurgency
among residents is running high, though some have demonstrated a
willingness to stand up to the Taliban. Norway, which heads the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, has signaled its
intent to be more proactive at disrupting insurgent activities.
Ghormach district, deemed a critical district by the U.N., is a
crucible for UNAMA's Integrated Approach, but intra-Pashtun tribal
disputes and strong Taliban influence impede efforts to improve
local governance, security, and development there. Construction of
the ring road through Ghormach district remains two years behind
schedule, owing to security concerns by Chinese construction
contractors.

SECURITY
--------------


Focus on Ghormach
--------------

3. (SBU) Insecurity in Faryab province mostly stems from unruly
Ghormach district - officially still part of Badghis province in
Regional Command West. Access to Ghormach proved too difficult for
Badghis provincial authorities and Spanish and Italian coalition
forces, thus precipitating the presidential decree last fall that
placed Ghormach under administrative control of Faryab province for
an unspecified period. Much of the overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtun
district remains under the control of Taliban, who are co-mingled
with residents, including security forces and district officials,
making it difficult to separate insurgents from the rest of the
population. (See REFTEL for an explanation of the rise of the
Taliban in Ghormach.) Taliban have capitalized on the divisions
among three Pashtun tribes in Ghormach - Achakzai, Zamand, and
Torqui - and have entrenched themselves there. Hardly a day passes
without reports of an insurgent attack on a police checkpost or
sightings of insurgent gangs on motorbikes. The Norwegian PRT
commander has signaled his intent to initiate joint offensive
operations with the Afghan police and military to disrupt insurgent
pockets rather than to conduct patrols.


4. (SBU) Ghormach is one of two districts nationwide in which UNAMA
has rolled out its pilot Integrated Approach (IA) - a comprehensive,
intensified focus across the three lines of security, governance and
development to help the district's population tip in support of the
Afghan government. Progress is slow, due to continuing weak
governance and poor security in the district, which has kept many
NGOs from wanting to work there. UNAMA has been prodding Faryab
Governor Shafaq to be more proactive at developing the Provincial IA
Working Group into a meaningful body. Shafaq believes the IA is
working in Ghormach, albeit exceedingly slowly.

Collapse of FDD in Ghormach
--------------

5. (SBU) Improving security along the ring road, which runs south
and west through Faryab province before passing through Ghormach,
was a driving factor behind the launch of Focused District
Development (FDD) training of the Ghormach district police (ANP)
last winter. Since completion of FDD training in January, the
Ghormach FDD-trained ANP force has collapsed. Of 46 FDD-trained
ANP, only 4 remain on the force; the rest have either left of their
own accord due to disputes over pay, or have been transferred, or
have defected to the Taliban. Even the FDD-trained ANP district
chief walked off the job. The FDD-trained ANP believe that they
should continue to be paid 2,000 afghanis (USD 40) more than their
actual pay - a situation that had persisted for several months until
U.S. Police Mentoring Team (PMT) members began looking into one
policeman's involvement in skimming money from police salaries.
When the overpayments stopped, the FDD-trained ANP's disgruntlement
seems to have begun.


6. (SBU)On July 11, eight FDD-trained-and-equipped Ghormach ANP
abandoned a checkpost they had been manning and took significant
amounts of ammunition, a police vehicle, and other gear with
themselves. Since then, only two have returned, and they remain in

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police custody. It is unclear whether the other six have defected
to the Taliban or are holding out for more pay. These developments
have undermined the mentoring efforts of the U.S. PMT that has been
working closely with the ANP there. Despite the PMT's best efforts,
Ghormach FDD has largely failed due to the gaps caused by weak
district governance and poor provincial police leadership.


7. (SBU)The 01 Standby Police Force (01 SPF),a special reserve
police unit of the Ministry of Interior, that deployed to Ghormach
to provide security while the regular ANP underwent FDD training has
vexed the district governor, FDD-trained ANP, and U.S. PMT and
Norwegian police mentors alike. (NOTE: For reasons that remain
unclear, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) did not
backfill for the ANP in Ghormach during the FDD training, as it has
done in other FDD districts. END NOTE.) The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
Companies of the 01 SPF have since departed the district, but the
4th Company - led by local strongman Sayed Gul - remains and is
regarded by many, including current district governor Qari Dawlat,
as being partial to former Ghormach district governor Abdullah Jan.
Provincial police chief General Khalilullah Andarabi backs Sayed
Gul's policing role in Ghormach, and has sent him to flush out
Taliban pockets - a dubious move given Gul's own alleged Taliban
ties and rumored involvement in kidnappings.

The "Ring Road 500"
--------------

8. (SBU) Adding another layer of complexity to the policing puzzle
in Ghormach is the hiring in June of 500 un-vetted and hastily
trained policemen - none of whom are from Ghormach and nearly all of
whom are of Uzbek and Tajik descent - to man checkpoints along the
ring road and otherwise provide security for ring road construction
in the area. The Asian Development Bank, which is financing
construction of the ring road in the north, has agreed to pay the
salaries of the 500 new ANP for a one-year period. The specter of
Uzbeks and Tajiks policing a Pashtun district had sparked worries by
UNAMA and the PRT that ethnic tensions would be stoked, but there
have been no such reported incidents. Najibullah, a Pashtun, is
both the commander of the 500 man force and the top police official
in Ghormach since the departure of the FDD-trained ANP chief. He
gets good marks from his U.S. PMT mentors, who view him as an
action-oriented commander whose style has come as something of a
culture shock to some of the FDD-trained ANP who were not accustomed
to doing much policing outside their headquarters. However, a
controversy over police salaries requires urgent attention by the
MoI. Najibullah's men are unhappy that they are being paid only
6,000 afghanis per month and not the 9,000 afghanis per month that
their contracts specify. According to a U.S. Police Mentor, the MoI
has yet to approve the additional pay.

GiROA officials propose alternative to ISAF operation
-------------- --------------

9. (SBU) Operation Tofan ("sandstorm"),a clear-to-hold joint
ISAF/ANA operation launched last May to maintain security along the
ring road to allow construction to resume, continues in Ghormach
(See REFTEL). As part of ramped-up military efforts in Ghormach,
the Norwegian PRT is establishing a permanent forward operating base
there. The ongoing operation has resulted in only about 15
insurgent deaths but has raised the hackles of Provincial Governor
Shafaq, who was not informed of the operation until after it had
begun, and of Provincial Council Chairman Farukh Jenab, who believes
that the massive resources being spent on the operation will not
solve the security problem in the troubled district. Rather, those
resources should be poured into reconstruction projects, he
believes.


10. (SBU)In mid-July, both men pitched their proposal to establish
local defense forces in insecure villages to Minister of Interior
Atmar and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (ILDG)
Director Popal, who reportedly promised to study it more carefully
before looking for funding. With a $2 million annual price tag, it
may prove difficult to find a willing donor. Provincial ANP chief
General Andarabi supports their plan and also thinks mounting a
further iteration of Operation Tofan will not yield significant
results. However, a U.S. Police Mentor said that one effect of the
operation is that Amruddin, a High Value Target Taliban commander,
has been pushed out of Ghormach to Murghab district of Badghis. A
Norwegian intelligence analyst at the PRT holds out cautious
optimism for the operation's outcome, based on indications that
people in the Qala-i-Wali valley in Ghormach - a notoriously
dangerous area for government and coalition forces - are willing to
stand up to the Taliban.

Spillover of insurgency to border areas
--------------

11. (SBU) Insurgent and criminal activity have spilled over from
Ghormach to other districts in Faryab, particularly along the
western border with Turkmenistan (Almar, Shirin Tagab, and

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Dawlatabad districts) and the eastern border with Sar-e-pul and
Jowzjan provinces (Gurziwan and Belcheragh districts). Elements of
the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by Uzbek national
Tahir Yoldash, are also operating in the area, but their numbers and
the extent of their cooperation with Pashtun Taliban remain unclear.
Some of these men are believed to be responsible for the ambush
murder of the Dawlatabad police chief in June. Faryab's Belcheragh
district forms the base of a triangle of instability that includes
Sar-e-pul's Sayyad district and Jowzjan's Darzab and Qush Teppeh
districts. Criminal and insurgent gangs, led by Mullah Nadir, who
has ties to the Taliban, have thus far managed to both elude and
frustrate ANSF units, who have not been able to coordinate
cross-border operations effectively. The Norwegian PRT admits to
not having good situational awareness in the southernmost district
of Kohistan, which abuts Sar-e-pul's remote Kohistinat district.
His forces stretched thin, Provincial ANP chief Andarabi has refused
the MoI's request to send 100 ANP soldiers to Kabul.

GOVERNANCE
--------------

Governor tiring fast of Ghormach woes
--------------

12. (SBU) Governor Shafaq is a well regarded, thoughtful
administrator who, as an ethnic Hazara, has navigated his way deftly
among the largely Uzbek and Pashtun populations that make up Faryab.
He had his hands full dealing with mounting insecurity in the
province even before Ghormach was placed under his administration.
Frustrated by the problems of governance in Ghormach district, he is
not happy that he has had to accept Qari Dawlat (Achakzai tribe) as
the presidentially-appointed district governor because of the
intra-Pashtun tensions that Dawlat's appointment has exacerbated.
Shafaq has not embraced Ghormach as part of Faryab, and did not seem
bothered by the fact that Dawlat and other Ghormach civil servants
had not been receiving their salaries for several months. The
Norwegian PRT and UNAMA believe Governor Shafaq should do more to
support Dawlat, who has also said he wants to resign because of the
lack of support he feels he is getting from provincial authorities.
Shafaq has tired of the job and would like to step down as governor
but told State PRT officer recently that the IDLG has refused to
accept his resignation. Shafaq's naming of former Ghormach district
governor Abdullah Jan (Zamand tribe) as head of the district shura
last January provoked outcries by Pashtun factions opposed to Jan.
In late July, a new shura - also led by a Zamand Pashtun - was
formed, due to the fact that Jan had not convened any shura meetings
in several months. The IDLG and the Badghis Provincial Council have
reportedly approved the move.


13. (SBU) Governor Shafaq has led from the front in reaching out to
communities in insecure areas. He frequently invites elders for
consultations and is cognizant of the fact that making residents
feel that the government cares about them is an important part of
his job. When residents of a village in Gurziwan district
complained that food assistance to their village had not reached
intended beneficiaries, Shafaq investigated the matter, which
resulted in the arrests of six people - including one from his
office.

Strong Council chairman seeks greater role for itself
-------------- --------------

14. (SBU) The Provincial Council (PC),led by Farukh Jenab, enjoys
a good working relationship with Governor Shafaq. All but one of
the 9 candidates is seeking reelection to the council. Jenab is an
activist PC chairman who has expressed frustration that the ANSF and
ISAF do not make more use of the PC in their outreach to
communities. He has personally intervened in security matters
affecting his home district of Qaysar, where Uzbeks form the
majority. In early July, when Taliban kidnapped twelve people,
including Jenab's brother and nephew, from Singetak village on the
border with Ghormach, Jenab rallied residents to take up arms and
prepare for an attack on Ghormach border villages. The threat of
imminent attack reverberated among Pashtun villages in Ghormach, who
sent a delegation of elders to meet Singetak elders. The threat
worked: all twelve people were released unharmed without any ransoms
paid. Jenab continues to provide food for 30 armed residents of
Singetak - which he calls the frontline of the Taliban advance - to
maintain their defensive positions, but accepts that he will not be
able to continue doing this for much longer.

Still falling short of poppy-free status
--------------

15. (SBU) Poppy eradication is a contentious issue for Governor
Shafaq, who insists his province is poppy-free. Previous findings
by the U.N. Office of Drug Control (UNODC) indicate that Faryab is
not poppy free, and its 2009 assessment is no different. Shafaq
accepts that Ghormach is not poppy-free, but believes that it is an
outlier that should not be counted as part of his province's overall

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poppy eradication efforts. In May, Shafaq led a campaign that
eradicated 261 hectares under Governor-Led Eradication (GLE),thus
qualifying them to receive $35,235 for their GLE award.

DIAG progress made
--------------

16. (SBU) The Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process
has been completed in Andkhoy, Gurziwan, Qaramqul, Dawlatabad and
Shirin Tagab districts. Khan Char Bagh district is currently
undergoing the DIAG process but is not yet DIAG compliant. The
remaining five districts of Faryab (not including Ghormach) have not
yet been targeted for DIAG.

DEVELOPMENT
--------------

PDP almost complete; NSP in all but two districts
-------------- --------------

17. (SBU) In mid-July, Faryab's provincial development committee
(PDC) finalized its current-year provincial development plan (PDP),
and expects to finalize its five-year PDP in early August. However,
like most PDP's, Faryab's remain long wish lists. National
Solidarity Program (NSP) projects have been carried out successfully
in all districts except Kohistan and Ghormach, where they have yet
to be introduced due to difficulties in forming community
development councils there to propose projects. Germany has pledged
$10 million euros for National Solidarity Program programs for those
two districts.

USAID's efforts in Faryab
--------------

18. (SBU) Governor Shafaq has expressed impatience with USAID over
the delay in starting construction of a teachers training center and
a Faculty of Education building. USAID's new agriculture program -
IDEA NEW - is still in the rollout stage in Faryab. It will involve
training farmers in melon fly management, initiating five
micro-hydro power projects in the southern part of the province,
organizing a provincial agriculture retailers' association, and
planning for a milk collection center in Meymaneh.

Norwegian development assistance to Afghanistan
-------------- --

19. (SBU) Norway provides approximately USD 115 million in
development and humanitarian assistance annually to Afghanistan.
Two-thirds (about USD 77 million) of that is used to support
development activities and is managed by the Norwegian embassy in
Kabul. Eighty percent of its development money is funneled to
national level projects, while twenty percent flows to projects in
Faryab. In 2008, Norway spent approximately USD 20 million in
Faryab alone. Norway believes that it is important to pay attention
to stable areas when making decisions about development assistance.
Its PRT generally does not fund projects, believing that all
humanitarian and development activities should be carried out by
civilian actors. In Ghormach, Norway is funding latrine, well,
water catchment, and shelter projects through ACTED and CHA
(Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) - the only two NGOs
working in that district.

Water projects launched
--------------

20. (SBU) There has been some good news regarding badly needed
water projects in Faryab. In June, President Karzai inaugurated a
USD 11 million, 90-kilometer-long pipe scheme that will carry
potable water from deep wells in Khamiab district, Jowzan province,
to the arid districts of Andkhoy, Khan Char Bagh, Dawlatabad, and
Qaramqul. According to the Faryab Director of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development, a large scale potable water project that will
benefit residents of provincial center Meymaneh is in the early
stages of implementation. Because of the scarcity of water in much
of the province, the Norwegian PRT's development advisor sees a
great need to promote water conservation schemes and
drought-resistant crops like pistachios and almonds.

Road projects - one old, one new
--------------

21. (SBU)Construction of the ring road - already two years behind
schedule - continues to proceed slowly. The China Railways
construction firm, which is under contract to pave the road from
Qaysar to the border of Ghormach and Murghab district, Badghis,
cites poor security for the delays. The Provincial Governor and
Asian Development Bank representatives have complained to the
Chinese firm about the low quality of its work and the need for it
to accelerate the pace by adding more workers. The longer it takes
to complete the project, the longer it will take for the government
to reap a security dividend, when residents and merchants are
finally able to realize its benefits. In a promising development
that will facilitate cross-border commerce, a road construction

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project to asphalt the corridor connecting Andkhoy district center
with Aqina village on the border with Turkmenistan was inaugurated
in June.

COMMENT
--------------

22. (SBU) If Faryab falls, so will the rest of the north, contend
both the Faryab and Jowzjan Provincial Council chairmen, who recall
the Taliban's successful advance on the north through Ghormach in

1998. Although the parallels to today's security situation are not
the same, the same cannot be said about the level of apprehension
among many residents of Faryab regarding the insurgency bubbling up
from Ghormach. Provincial Police Chief Andarabi feels like the
security situation in his province is spinning out of control, and
he is likely to feel that way until the policing puzzle in Ghormach
can be solved. The ANA will have to succeed at pushing up
northwards from Murghab to Ghormach, while expanding their area of
control within both districts. COIN efforts will have to be stepped
up in Ghormach - completion of the ring road is critical in this
regard - but they will not be successful without a rebuilt ANP
force. FDD in Ghormach has been a painful learning experience that
we must not rush to recreate without ensuring that there is in place
first a nucleus of experienced ANP officers, not from Ghormach,
around whom to build a multi-ethnic force. Some members of that
force may be drawn from the Ring Road 500, subject to their
performance.


23. (SBU) FDD is slated to begin in Qaysar district later this year,
and U.S. Army police mentors hold out greater hope for success
there. Still, it may not be enough to assuage the fears of the
population that the ANP will be able to protect them against
insurgent and criminal attacks. The "Ring Road 500" are an example
of an idea spreading across Afghanistan at present-the revival of
unofficial, tribal-based security forces for urgent security
operations. Several provinces are arming militia for election
security. The relationships between these groups, official security
forces, and Kabul Ministries are unclear. So too are their chains of
command and prospects for de-mobilization or integration into ANSF
after their ostensible purpose has been filled. Much of the
international community strongly opposes the creation of unofficial
security forces. However, in the absence of successful police
development at the district level, Afghan communities will continue
to turn to the time honored-though treacherous-practice of arming
"reliable" local allies to meet their most pressing security needs.


EIKENBERRY