Faryab Province Assessment

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002339 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF SUBJECT: Faryab Province Assessment REFTEL: Kabul 1735 Summary -------------- ¶1. (U) This is a bi-annual report from the State PRT representative in Mazar-e-Sharif on political, economic and security developments in Faryab Province. ¶2. (SBU) Security in Faryab province, which forms the western flank of Regional Command North, has deteriorated over the past year and does not show signs of improving anytime soon. Insurgent infiltration continues from Ghormach district up along the western border areas with Turkmenistan and the eastern borders areas with Jowzjan and Sar-e-pul provinces. Apprehension about the insurgency among residents is running high, though some have demonstrated a willingness to stand up to the Taliban. Norway, which heads the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, has signaled its intent to be more proactive at disrupting insurgent activities. Ghormach district, deemed a critical district by the U.N., is a crucible for UNAMA's Integrated Approach, but intra-Pashtun tribal disputes and strong Taliban influence impede efforts to improve local governance, security, and development there. Construction of the ring road through Ghormach district remains two years behind schedule, owing to security concerns by Chinese construction contractors. SECURITY -------------- Focus on Ghormach -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Insecurity in Faryab province mostly stems from unruly Ghormach district - officially still part of Badghis province in Regional Command West. Access to Ghormach proved too difficult for Badghis provincial authorities and Spanish and Italian coalition forces, thus precipitating the presidential decree last fall that placed Ghormach under administrative control of Faryab province for an unspecified period. Much of the overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtun district remains under the control of Taliban, who are co-mingled with residents, including security forces and district officials, making it difficult to separate insurgents from the rest of the population. (See REFTEL for an explanation of the rise of the Taliban in Ghormach.) Taliban have capitalized on the divisions among three Pashtun tribes in Ghormach - Achakzai, Zamand, and Torqui - and have entrenched themselves there. Hardly a day passes without reports of an insurgent attack on a police checkpost or sightings of insurgent gangs on motorbikes. The Norwegian PRT commander has signaled his intent to initiate joint offensive operations with the Afghan police and military to disrupt insurgent pockets rather than to conduct patrols. ¶4. (SBU) Ghormach is one of two districts nationwide in which UNAMA has rolled out its pilot Integrated Approach (IA) - a comprehensive, intensified focus across the three lines of security, governance and development to help the district's population tip in support of the Afghan government. Progress is slow, due to continuing weak governance and poor security in the district, which has kept many NGOs from wanting to work there. UNAMA has been prodding Faryab Governor Shafaq to be more proactive at developing the Provincial IA Working Group into a meaningful body. Shafaq believes the IA is working in Ghormach, albeit exceedingly slowly. Collapse of FDD in Ghormach -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Improving security along the ring road, which runs south and west through Faryab province before passing through Ghormach, was a driving factor behind the launch of Focused District Development (FDD) training of the Ghormach district police (ANP) last winter. Since completion of FDD training in January, the Ghormach FDD-trained ANP force has collapsed. Of 46 FDD-trained ANP, only 4 remain on the force; the rest have either left of their own accord due to disputes over pay, or have been transferred, or have defected to the Taliban. Even the FDD-trained ANP district chief walked off the job. The FDD-trained ANP believe that they should continue to be paid 2,000 afghanis (USD 40) more than their actual pay - a situation that had persisted for several months until U.S. Police Mentoring Team (PMT) members began looking into one policeman's involvement in skimming money from police salaries. When the overpayments stopped, the FDD-trained ANP's disgruntlement seems to have begun. ¶6. (SBU)On July 11, eight FDD-trained-and-equipped Ghormach ANP abandoned a checkpost they had been manning and took significant amounts of ammunition, a police vehicle, and other gear with themselves. Since then, only two have returned, and they remain in KABUL 00002339 002 OF 005 police custody. It is unclear whether the other six have defected to the Taliban or are holding out for more pay. These developments have undermined the mentoring efforts of the U.S. PMT that has been working closely with the ANP there. Despite the PMT's best efforts, Ghormach FDD has largely failed due to the gaps caused by weak district governance and poor provincial police leadership. ¶7. (SBU)The 01 Standby Police Force (01 SPF),a special reserve police unit of the Ministry of Interior, that deployed to Ghormach to provide security while the regular ANP underwent FDD training has vexed the district governor, FDD-trained ANP, and U.S. PMT and Norwegian police mentors alike. (NOTE: For reasons that remain unclear, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) did not backfill for the ANP in Ghormach during the FDD training, as it has done in other FDD districts. END NOTE.) The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies of the 01 SPF have since departed the district, but the 4th Company - led by local strongman Sayed Gul - remains and is regarded by many, including current district governor Qari Dawlat, as being partial to former Ghormach district governor Abdullah Jan. Provincial police chief General Khalilullah Andarabi backs Sayed Gul's policing role in Ghormach, and has sent him to flush out Taliban pockets - a dubious move given Gul's own alleged Taliban ties and rumored involvement in kidnappings. The "Ring Road 500" -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Adding another layer of complexity to the policing puzzle in Ghormach is the hiring in June of 500 un-vetted and hastily trained policemen - none of whom are from Ghormach and nearly all of whom are of Uzbek and Tajik descent - to man checkpoints along the ring road and otherwise provide security for ring road construction in the area. The Asian Development Bank, which is financing construction of the ring road in the north, has agreed to pay the salaries of the 500 new ANP for a one-year period. The specter of Uzbeks and Tajiks policing a Pashtun district had sparked worries by UNAMA and the PRT that ethnic tensions would be stoked, but there have been no such reported incidents. Najibullah, a Pashtun, is both the commander of the 500 man force and the top police official in Ghormach since the departure of the FDD-trained ANP chief. He gets good marks from his U.S. PMT mentors, who view him as an action-oriented commander whose style has come as something of a culture shock to some of the FDD-trained ANP who were not accustomed to doing much policing outside their headquarters. However, a controversy over police salaries requires urgent attention by the MoI. Najibullah's men are unhappy that they are being paid only 6,000 afghanis per month and not the 9,000 afghanis per month that their contracts specify. According to a U.S. Police Mentor, the MoI has yet to approve the additional pay. GiROA officials propose alternative to ISAF operation -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Operation Tofan ("sandstorm"),a clear-to-hold joint ISAF/ANA operation launched last May to maintain security along the ring road to allow construction to resume, continues in Ghormach (See REFTEL). As part of ramped-up military efforts in Ghormach, the Norwegian PRT is establishing a permanent forward operating base there. The ongoing operation has resulted in only about 15 insurgent deaths but has raised the hackles of Provincial Governor Shafaq, who was not informed of the operation until after it had begun, and of Provincial Council Chairman Farukh Jenab, who believes that the massive resources being spent on the operation will not solve the security problem in the troubled district. Rather, those resources should be poured into reconstruction projects, he believes. ¶10. (SBU)In mid-July, both men pitched their proposal to establish local defense forces in insecure villages to Minister of Interior Atmar and Independent Directorate of Local Governance (ILDG) Director Popal, who reportedly promised to study it more carefully before looking for funding. With a $2 million annual price tag, it may prove difficult to find a willing donor. Provincial ANP chief General Andarabi supports their plan and also thinks mounting a further iteration of Operation Tofan will not yield significant results. However, a U.S. Police Mentor said that one effect of the operation is that Amruddin, a High Value Target Taliban commander, has been pushed out of Ghormach to Murghab district of Badghis. A Norwegian intelligence analyst at the PRT holds out cautious optimism for the operation's outcome, based on indications that people in the Qala-i-Wali valley in Ghormach - a notoriously dangerous area for government and coalition forces - are willing to stand up to the Taliban. Spillover of insurgency to border areas -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Insurgent and criminal activity have spilled over from Ghormach to other districts in Faryab, particularly along the western border with Turkmenistan (Almar, Shirin Tagab, and KABUL 00002339 003 OF 005 Dawlatabad districts) and the eastern border with Sar-e-pul and Jowzjan provinces (Gurziwan and Belcheragh districts). Elements of the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by Uzbek national Tahir Yoldash, are also operating in the area, but their numbers and the extent of their cooperation with Pashtun Taliban remain unclear. Some of these men are believed to be responsible for the ambush murder of the Dawlatabad police chief in June. Faryab's Belcheragh district forms the base of a triangle of instability that includes Sar-e-pul's Sayyad district and Jowzjan's Darzab and Qush Teppeh districts. Criminal and insurgent gangs, led by Mullah Nadir, who has ties to the Taliban, have thus far managed to both elude and frustrate ANSF units, who have not been able to coordinate cross-border operations effectively. The Norwegian PRT admits to not having good situational awareness in the southernmost district of Kohistan, which abuts Sar-e-pul's remote Kohistinat district. His forces stretched thin, Provincial ANP chief Andarabi has refused the MoI's request to send 100 ANP soldiers to Kabul. GOVERNANCE -------------- Governor tiring fast of Ghormach woes -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Governor Shafaq is a well regarded, thoughtful administrator who, as an ethnic Hazara, has navigated his way deftly among the largely Uzbek and Pashtun populations that make up Faryab. He had his hands full dealing with mounting insecurity in the province even before Ghormach was placed under his administration. Frustrated by the problems of governance in Ghormach district, he is not happy that he has had to accept Qari Dawlat (Achakzai tribe) as the presidentially-appointed district governor because of the intra-Pashtun tensions that Dawlat's appointment has exacerbated. Shafaq has not embraced Ghormach as part of Faryab, and did not seem bothered by the fact that Dawlat and other Ghormach civil servants had not been receiving their salaries for several months. The Norwegian PRT and UNAMA believe Governor Shafaq should do more to support Dawlat, who has also said he wants to resign because of the lack of support he feels he is getting from provincial authorities. Shafaq has tired of the job and would like to step down as governor but told State PRT officer recently that the IDLG has refused to accept his resignation. Shafaq's naming of former Ghormach district governor Abdullah Jan (Zamand tribe) as head of the district shura last January provoked outcries by Pashtun factions opposed to Jan. In late July, a new shura - also led by a Zamand Pashtun - was formed, due to the fact that Jan had not convened any shura meetings in several months. The IDLG and the Badghis Provincial Council have reportedly approved the move. ¶13. (SBU) Governor Shafaq has led from the front in reaching out to communities in insecure areas. He frequently invites elders for consultations and is cognizant of the fact that making residents feel that the government cares about them is an important part of his job. When residents of a village in Gurziwan district complained that food assistance to their village had not reached intended beneficiaries, Shafaq investigated the matter, which resulted in the arrests of six people - including one from his office. Strong Council chairman seeks greater role for itself -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The Provincial Council (PC),led by Farukh Jenab, enjoys a good working relationship with Governor Shafaq. All but one of the 9 candidates is seeking reelection to the council. Jenab is an activist PC chairman who has expressed frustration that the ANSF and ISAF do not make more use of the PC in their outreach to communities. He has personally intervened in security matters affecting his home district of Qaysar, where Uzbeks form the majority. In early July, when Taliban kidnapped twelve people, including Jenab's brother and nephew, from Singetak village on the border with Ghormach, Jenab rallied residents to take up arms and prepare for an attack on Ghormach border villages. The threat of imminent attack reverberated among Pashtun villages in Ghormach, who sent a delegation of elders to meet Singetak elders. The threat worked: all twelve people were released unharmed without any ransoms paid. Jenab continues to provide food for 30 armed residents of Singetak - which he calls the frontline of the Taliban advance - to maintain their defensive positions, but accepts that he will not be able to continue doing this for much longer. Still falling short of poppy-free status -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Poppy eradication is a contentious issue for Governor Shafaq, who insists his province is poppy-free. Previous findings by the U.N. Office of Drug Control (UNODC) indicate that Faryab is not poppy free, and its 2009 assessment is no different. Shafaq accepts that Ghormach is not poppy-free, but believes that it is an outlier that should not be counted as part of his province's overall KABUL 00002339 004 OF 005 poppy eradication efforts. In May, Shafaq led a campaign that eradicated 261 hectares under Governor-Led Eradication (GLE),thus qualifying them to receive $35,235 for their GLE award. DIAG progress made -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process has been completed in Andkhoy, Gurziwan, Qaramqul, Dawlatabad and Shirin Tagab districts. Khan Char Bagh district is currently undergoing the DIAG process but is not yet DIAG compliant. The remaining five districts of Faryab (not including Ghormach) have not yet been targeted for DIAG. DEVELOPMENT -------------- PDP almost complete; NSP in all but two districts -------------- -------------- ¶17. (SBU) In mid-July, Faryab's provincial development committee (PDC) finalized its current-year provincial development plan (PDP), and expects to finalize its five-year PDP in early August. However, like most PDP's, Faryab's remain long wish lists. National Solidarity Program (NSP) projects have been carried out successfully in all districts except Kohistan and Ghormach, where they have yet to be introduced due to difficulties in forming community development councils there to propose projects. Germany has pledged $10 million euros for National Solidarity Program programs for those two districts. USAID's efforts in Faryab -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Governor Shafaq has expressed impatience with USAID over the delay in starting construction of a teachers training center and a Faculty of Education building. USAID's new agriculture program - IDEA NEW - is still in the rollout stage in Faryab. It will involve training farmers in melon fly management, initiating five micro-hydro power projects in the southern part of the province, organizing a provincial agriculture retailers' association, and planning for a milk collection center in Meymaneh. Norwegian development assistance to Afghanistan -------------- -- ¶19. (SBU) Norway provides approximately USD 115 million in development and humanitarian assistance annually to Afghanistan. Two-thirds (about USD 77 million) of that is used to support development activities and is managed by the Norwegian embassy in Kabul. Eighty percent of its development money is funneled to national level projects, while twenty percent flows to projects in Faryab. In 2008, Norway spent approximately USD 20 million in Faryab alone. Norway believes that it is important to pay attention to stable areas when making decisions about development assistance. Its PRT generally does not fund projects, believing that all humanitarian and development activities should be carried out by civilian actors. In Ghormach, Norway is funding latrine, well, water catchment, and shelter projects through ACTED and CHA (Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance) - the only two NGOs working in that district. Water projects launched -------------- ¶20. (SBU) There has been some good news regarding badly needed water projects in Faryab. In June, President Karzai inaugurated a USD 11 million, 90-kilometer-long pipe scheme that will carry potable water from deep wells in Khamiab district, Jowzan province, to the arid districts of Andkhoy, Khan Char Bagh, Dawlatabad, and Qaramqul. According to the Faryab Director of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, a large scale potable water project that will benefit residents of provincial center Meymaneh is in the early stages of implementation. Because of the scarcity of water in much of the province, the Norwegian PRT's development advisor sees a great need to promote water conservation schemes and drought-resistant crops like pistachios and almonds. Road projects - one old, one new -------------- ¶21. (SBU)Construction of the ring road - already two years behind schedule - continues to proceed slowly. The China Railways construction firm, which is under contract to pave the road from Qaysar to the border of Ghormach and Murghab district, Badghis, cites poor security for the delays. The Provincial Governor and Asian Development Bank representatives have complained to the Chinese firm about the low quality of its work and the need for it to accelerate the pace by adding more workers. The longer it takes to complete the project, the longer it will take for the government to reap a security dividend, when residents and merchants are finally able to realize its benefits. In a promising development that will facilitate cross-border commerce, a road construction KABUL 00002339 005 OF 005 project to asphalt the corridor connecting Andkhoy district center with Aqina village on the border with Turkmenistan was inaugurated in June. COMMENT -------------- ¶22. (SBU) If Faryab falls, so will the rest of the north, contend both the Faryab and Jowzjan Provincial Council chairmen, who recall the Taliban's successful advance on the north through Ghormach in ¶1998. Although the parallels to today's security situation are not the same, the same cannot be said about the level of apprehension among many residents of Faryab regarding the insurgency bubbling up from Ghormach. Provincial Police Chief Andarabi feels like the security situation in his province is spinning out of control, and he is likely to feel that way until the policing puzzle in Ghormach can be solved. The ANA will have to succeed at pushing up northwards from Murghab to Ghormach, while expanding their area of control within both districts. COIN efforts will have to be stepped up in Ghormach - completion of the ring road is critical in this regard - but they will not be successful without a rebuilt ANP force. FDD in Ghormach has been a painful learning experience that we must not rush to recreate without ensuring that there is in place first a nucleus of experienced ANP officers, not from Ghormach, around whom to build a multi-ethnic force. Some members of that force may be drawn from the Ring Road 500, subject to their performance. ¶23. (SBU) FDD is slated to begin in Qaysar district later this year, and U.S. Army police mentors hold out greater hope for success there. Still, it may not be enough to assuage the fears of the population that the ANP will be able to protect them against insurgent and criminal attacks. The "Ring Road 500" are an example of an idea spreading across Afghanistan at present-the revival of unofficial, tribal-based security forces for urgent security operations. Several provinces are arming militia for election security. The relationships between these groups, official security forces, and Kabul Ministries are unclear. So too are their chains of command and prospects for de-mobilization or integration into ANSF after their ostensible purpose has been filled. Much of the international community strongly opposes the creation of unofficial security forces. However, in the absence of successful police development at the district level, Afghan communities will continue to turn to the time honored-though treacherous-practice of arming "reliable" local allies to meet their most pressing security needs. EIKENBERRY