CANADA,S REVISED COIN STRATEGY IN KANDAHAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002335 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2019 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL AF CA SUBJECT: CANADA,S REVISED COIN STRATEGY IN KANDAHAR REF: KABUL 2292 Classified By: Interagency Provincial Affairs Deputy Coordinator Hoyt Y ee for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Begin Summary. Representative of Canada in Kandahar Ken Lewis outlined Canada's revised COIN strategy for Kandahar, which is designed to bring greater focus of effort in a smaller, more targeted geographic area. This "Key Village Approaches" strategy has captured the attention of COMISAF and the new NATO Secretary General as a potential model for stabilization efforts in Kandahar and beyond. The positive attention from NATO and ISAF leadership has helped the Canadian leadership in Kandahar sell this approach in Ottawa. As a result, Lewis noted that Ottawa had overcome its reluctance to support the operations and that Canada would launch between 12 and 20 stabilization efforts in key villages between now and March. While the new strategy is a welcome development, it will be undermined if overall governance, development and security in Kandahar City are not improved. State and USAID PRT officers are working with the Canadians to complement this updated approach, possibly through increased development work in Kandahar City. End Summary. Canada Announces New COIN Strategy -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with Kandahar PRT (KPRT) DFAIT, CIDA, and USG Civilian staff on August 8, Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) Ken Lewis announced that, effective immediately, the Government of Canada (GoC) has officially abandoned the operations order under which it has been operating in Kandahar ("OP KANTOLO") in favor of a new COIN strategy to be implemented in a new Area of Operation (AO). The new strategy is centered on the "Key Village Approaches" (KVA) -- village-level stabilization operations that will be referred to as "OP KALAYs." The operations will be more geographically focused in a new AO that is limited to Kandahar City (KC),Dand District, and the eastern parts of Zhari and Panjwayi Districts. (Note: Dand is not an official district, but the GIRoA treats it as a district in all respects. It comprises the southern suburbs of KC and borders Daman District to the south and east and Panjwayi district to the south and west.) ¶3. (C) OP KALAY 1, which began approximately 90 days ago in the Deh-e-Bagh village cluster in Dand District (a cluster that includes the District Center compound),has received attention from ISAF leadership, including COMISAF, as well as RC-South leadership. This Canadian model for village-level stabilization aims within a 90-day cycle to stabilize key villages on the approaches to KC, which have traditionally been used by the enemy to infiltrate the city. The cycle includes a one-week clear phase, with the rest of the 90 days devoted to intensive reconstruction programs, especially cash-for-work projects to rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure, and intensive GIRoA and ISAF engagement with community and district shuras. After 90 days, the stabilized communities, in partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),are supposed to have developed the motivation and resolve to defend themselves against anti-government incursion. Lewis also cited the anticipated 2000-man increase in ANP numbers in Kandahar, which is a key element of the planned KALAY operations. Longer-term development projects led by NGOs are subsequently phased in, with the aim of helping locals generate income through more productive agricultural livelihoods. ¶4. (C) The KVA, as tested thus far by OP KALAY 1, does not represent a new COIN approach to stabilization, but rather builds on lessons learned in the UK's Musa Qala operation and the Netherlands' Deh-Rawood operation in 2008. The Canadian model has captured the attention of NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, said RoCK Lewis, who accompanied the SG on his August 5 visit to the Deh-e-Bagh village in Dand District. Reportedly the NATO SG endorsed the approach and said that NATO would adopt the KVA strategy as a keystone of its COIN doctrine. The NATO SG's endorsement of the GoC's KVA obviously pleased Lewis, who, with Task Force Kandahar (TFK) commanding officer BG Jonathon Vance, has pushed hard on Ottawa for permission to implement OP KALAY 1. State PRT officer said that Lewis told PRT staff on August 8: "We've been playing whack-a-mole for years; now we're finally going to make sustainable progress." Canadians on the Ground Delighted with New Approach -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Lewis emphasized that the drastically reduced Canadian KABUL 00002335 002 OF 002 AO will allow a much more favorable force ratio for the Canadian battle group. In an apparent total victory over Ottawa's reluctance fully to back the KVA, Lewis announced to KPRT staff that, "Between now and March, we will not just have OP KALAY 2 and 3 as we'd planned before; we'll have OP KALAY 2 through 20." He went on to say that the target of 20 operations was BG Vance's idea, and that 12 operations would be a more realistic expectation. Fielding Enough Civilians -------------- ¶6. (C) GoC civilians at the KPRT have worried from the beginning of OP KALAY 1 about how their agencies would field enough "stabilization officers" (analogous to USG civilians at DSTs) to support the future KALAY operations, given that the original version of the KVA called for a civilian stabilization officer to be left behind to look after the build phase following the initial 90 days. Lewis stated that the KVA specifies only three stabilization officers: one supervisor at the KPRT, one at Dand District Center, and one at Panjwayi District Center. This revision of the previous approach takes into account both the available staffing and the ever-sensitive issue of potential GoC civilian casualties. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The GoC leadership in Kandahar believes that Canada has at last found a successful strategy that will allow them to demonstrate progress against the insurgency before their planned withdrawal from the Afghanistan mission in 2011. The uplift of U.S. military and civilian assets in Kandahar has allowed the GoC to retool its COIN strategy, and the new KVA is the result of this effort. The challenge now as these new KALAY operations are launched will be to make sure that the stabilized areas remain stable, that sufficient personnel are assigned to the effort, and that their efforts break out of the "whack-a-mole" pattern that has plagued Canadian efforts. ¶8. (C) An additional challenge will be maintaining Canada's "focus of effort8 on KC. GIRoA and ISAF leaders agree that the enemy would score a huge IO victory should KC be seriously threatened. Although the KVA aims to enhance KC's security by establishing a buffer zone of stabilized, AGE-resistant villages around the city, the GoC has not made progress on a comprehensive reconstruction and governance strategy for KC itself. Lack of clean water, lack of electricity, increasing overcrowding, and persistent enemy IED-making activity within the city, threaten to undermine the basically pro-GIRoA tendency of the KC population. To address this issue, GoC civilians at KPRT have begun discussions with State and USAID officers about augmenting their efforts with U.S. funding and programming for KC. EIKENBERRY