KARZAI THE CANDIDATE GIVES KARZAI THE PRESIDENT A

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002304 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: KARZAI THE CANDIDATE GIVES KARZAI THE PRESIDENT A BETTER PERSECTIVE Classified By: Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: President Karzai's recent success in energizing political support appears to have put him in a better frame of mind about the future, making our most recent discussion of post-election strategic goals more coherent and useful. That said, he is still spending more time working on deals with allies and rivals to get elected, versus imagining his future compact with the international community and the Afghan people. End summary. -------------- Out of the Palace ... -------------- ¶2. (S) During an hour and a half conversation on August 6, attended only by Karzai's National Security Advisor Zalmay Rasul, Karzai appeared more calm, rested and coherent -- and less paranoid -- than in the past. He has held a few large rallies in the past week, and evidently this activity has energized his base and other voters formerly unexcited by his campaign to date. I told him that his general exhortation to the electorate to vote helps the process and is much appreciated by the international community. As he gets the word out to mobilize voters, he can positively influence the voters' perception of insecurity. 3.(S) Karzai told me that he questions those who attend his rallies about Afghanistan's relationship to the United States and asks if they want the U.S. to stay; they are positive in their response. He noted that the "problems of several weeks ago" i.e., friction with the U.S., are improved. (Comment: He is making an effort to close the gap with the United States; a problem that was mostly of his own creation. End Comment.) ¶4. (S) Karzai has significant political skills and he now displays fresh confidence in his candidacy. He assessed his current support as "maybe" over 50 percent, with Abdullah next and Bashardost third; Ghani he views as a very distant fourth. He thinks that Ghani is trying to join him and noted that his currentMinisters are unhappy at the prospect of having to work with someone as acerbic as Ghani in the future. He admitted to putting out feelers to the Abdullah campaign but said, as of August 6, that this effort had been unsuccessful. -------------- ... And Worried About Wrong Outcomes -------------- ¶5. (S) Karzai was most interested in my view of the security and feasibility issues a second round would raise. I said that it would no doubt be difficult, but that I was confident security could be provided although at the cost of some of the anti-Taliban campaign efforts underway; what would be harder to deliver might be suficient Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) capacity and international monitors. Karzai repeated his previous statements that he feared the "inevitable" ethnic divisions that a second round would engender, that there is an overwhelming public desire for national unity, and that he is still respected as a unifying force. ¶6. (S) Pressing further, Karzai asked me if we should try to "avoid" a second round. I repeated that he should run the best campaign he could; that his mobilization would help change circumstances on the ground; and that it is possible he would be able to win in the first round -- but I also emphasized that we would work within the Afghan Constitution. I said that his opponents were looking at their own political futures and reputations with the international community and in that light, would likely be amenable to finding an acceptable outcome through talks and compromise to issues that arise from the election. ¶7. (S) Karzai flagged intemperate remarks by Abdullah's campaign manager that a second round could see a version of Iranian protests -- but with weapons. I replied that we had taken swift action with Deputy Ambassador Ricciardone warning Abdullah of the consequences of such rhetoric and he had immediately, and publicly, distanced himself from it. Furthermore, in a recent Afghan television interview, I had underscored our position that we denounced all violent rhetoric and actions related to the elections. On security, Karzai later noted that he had been able to make an election-related trip to Gardez province without Taliban disruption. I noted that his security is excellent but that KABUL 00002304 002 OF 003 he should take heed of specific threats. -------------- Post-Election: A "Jirga" or a Real Plan? -------------- ¶8. (S) Karzai raised next the idea of a Jirga after his possible first-round or second-round victory as a method of unifying the country. I stated that, frankly, Americans could not pass judgement on the cultural impact and message of such an event. His next comment, however, gave a specific reason: using the Jirga to "restart" the relationship between the Afghans and the international community, to accept their longtime presence. I said that this statement underscores a certain lack of understanding of the message I have conveyed previously: the Obama Administration's goal, and that of the American people and Congress, is not to be in Afghanistan indefinitely. We need a plan for how the Afghan National Security Forces can, with our assistance, take up their full responsibilities. (Note: The day before, Karzai told a visiting CODEL that Afghanistan would only take the lead in its own security operations after receiving advanced military weapons, and then only after "five years or ten years... we want you here forever"; he offered Bagram and Kandahar as permanent bases. End Note.) ¶9. (S) As I restated the point that a dialogue on security and sovereignty had to include a serious discussion of when and how Afghanistan would take the lead in security operations, I also stressed that our intent was to preclude Afghanistan reverting to the conditions that existed on September 10, 2001. I elaborated that the way forward on security includes a new arrangement for detentions, provided that there is judicial and corrections system reform; new rules for private security companies; and training support for the ANSF. On development, governance and regional arrangements, we remain committed to a long-term role. At the same time, the U.S. government and international community will be insistent on improvements in government accountability and measures taken to address corruption. American support will wane if no such steps are agreed to. ¶10. (S) On peace talks with the Taliban, I stressed that we remain clear that it will be Afghan-led, with opportunities for those who renounce terrorism and the use of force, and adhere to the Constitution. Karzai remains sensitive to the idea of legitimizing the Taliban as a "pan-Afghan movement" and I reassured him that the Secretary of State had framed our policy in unmistakeable terms as an Afghan initiative which we support. We agreed with Karzai that there were several tiers of activity: -- foot soldiers, who could be dealt with through military operations, government influence, and financial assistance; -- mid-level operatives, where the approach best described as integration should vary by province - we should be opportunistic and flexible; -- strategic level - the ideological leaders, where U.S. diplomatic suport could be useful with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Karzai said that "de-listing" (UNSCR 1267) Mullah Omar would take away Omar's prestige. -------------- Governance: The Right People In Charge ... -------------- ¶11. (S) We then returned to the discussion about governance issues and specifically corruption. The U.S. and international community are providing substantial aid and may give more, I said, but need benchmarks. We want to make our aid delivery more effective and are doing so by making more of it go through Afghan institutions. However, corruption and accountability are at the top of our agenda and must be addressed, I went on. The U.S. is insistent on this, and we have the right to be. ¶12. (S) I specified that we have seen an improvement in the cabinet but it is necessary for all critical ministries to be led by ministers who are not just honest, but also competent. For example, the Ministries of Water and Energy, and Mining needs a better minister; Karzai called Water and Energy Minister Khan a "patriot" but I countered that this was not good enough in areas that we are about to fund significantly. We insist on capable leadership or we are wasting both money and opportunities. Karzai promised that he will not remove any good ministers without telling us, and said that while he has made political promises to his backers they will not be able to specify individuals to fill the promised ministries; they will instead give him a list of qualified candidates for him to choose. KABUL 00002304 003 OF 003 -------------- ... But Not A CEO -------------- ¶13. (S) Karzai once again raised his "CEO" plan, specifically related, we believe, to the deal he will shortly strike with Ashraf Ghani. He asked point-blank if the U.S. wants him to establish a CEO position, and if so do we want him to offer it to Abdullah or Ghani? I responded that a CEO to him apparently represents one of three things: a means of establishing a better-functioning executive, a government of national unity, or finding someone that the United States likes to work with. I emphasized to him that the U.S. government is interested in improved executive administration, not names. EIKENBERRY