POST-ELECTION COMPACT: CONSULTING KARZAI ADVISORS

S E C R E T KABUL 002161 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: POST-ELECTION COMPACT: CONSULTING KARZAI ADVISORS Classified By: Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Previous message (notal) laid out our action plan to develop a compact with the next Afghan administration for post-election progress in five key areas of strategic interest to the United States and Afghanistan. The first structural engagement occured July 28, with President Karzai's most senior advisors: National Security Advisor Rasul, Minister of Defense Wardak and Miniser of Interior Atmar, Director of National Intelligence Saleh and the Director of the Independent Directorate of Local Government Popal. End Summary. ¶2. (S) At the outset of our meeting we proposed to Karzai's advisors an extended, structured conversation towards developing a compact on shared U.S.-Afghan strategic interests in five areas: sovereignty, reconciliation and amnesty, governance/justice, economic development and regional status. We listened to their responses and their preliminary suggestions (see paras 3-7) and then proposed we meet again within a week to have further explorations. They agreed. We are working to ensure that this process reflects Afghan buy-in and their own method of ensuring results; we have seen many a formal agreement come and go without implementation. ¶3. (S) On sovereignty, the team categorically agreed that this is key for the political future of the next government and for the eventual stability of the nation. There were some conflicting views between the desire to take on leadership of security issues and the need to "assure" that the U.S. will not desert Afghanistan too soon and leave it to the depredations of its neighbors. One suggested action item: reconfirmation of the "Strategic Partnership" that walks the fine line between 'permanent bases' which would set off other countries, and too abrupt a withdrawal. They suggest a "permanent alliance" formulation. ¶4. (S) On reconciliation and amnesty, given the close tracking of the U.S. policy with this group's line, there was little variance in their response. They warned of the risk of Afghanistan,s fragmentation and the need for "nation building as well as statebuilding." They held that extremists would fill a power vacuum in the south in the event of an Abdullah victory. Wardak opined that reconciliation had a "big potential to end the war quickly and cheaply." According to Saleh, Taliban members are simple but their masters are sophisticated ) they are counting most on the U.S. leaving. ¶5. (S) On governance and justice they accepted that it would be hard to convince us that a second Karzai government would be different in its approach. They admitted candidly that Karzai is simply "the least bad of the candidates" in his ability to govern, even if he has made sordid deals. MOI Atmar defended Karzai,s governance, saying there were both good and bad officials in the administration, and the trend was positive. Wardak admitted that "we,ve made lots of mistakes" in this area; Saleh and others said that progress on governance and real anti-corruption measures would have "massive appeal" to Afghans who are sick of the lack of accountability. IDLG wants more tangible power over local administrators. All agreed that benchmarks and audits would be useful. ¶6. (S) On economic reconstruction, IDLG Director Popal emphasized that ministries need more line authority, decision-making powers and direct access to funding ) for example, IDLG cannot spend money on what it sees as priorities at the same time that millions of dollars of aid money is channeled directly by foreign donors. Our emphasis on "Afghanization" of development assistance was much applauded; the warning about misuse was well understood. Atmar pointed out that despite failures under Karzai's leadership there also have been significant successes in education, health and building the military. Speaking outside his area of expertise, Atmar also strongly advocated a focus on irrigation over all other agriculture projects. ¶7. (S) On the status of Afghanistan in the region, Minister Wardak and others want the U.S. to express a permanent strategic interest in Afghanistan in order to warn off predatory neighbors, and to this end they want a re-definition of the Bush Administration,s articulation of a "Strategic Partnership." Saleh warned that the Taliban,s war is a total one and we have to stay to defeat them on ideological grounds (democracy vs. totalitarian/religious extremism) or Muslim extremists will be emboldened throughout the Middle East and elsewhere. The ministers also demanded to know more about the US strategy in Pakistan. ¶8. (S) From this team, as could be expected, one of the over-arching themes we heard was the need to keep competent ministers in place vs. replace them through political patronage deals ) which applies equally to a second Karzai term or a new President. The ministers noted that Karzai could make political deals that took them from their current positions and that they have no personal political power base or group that would oppose that outcome, except the United States. One said - rightly - that "we can deliver the fastest, most efficient service in any of these areas" of bilateral concern. ¶9. (S) We agreed to meet again in the near future, with Karzai's team responding to our proposed framework and for us to discuss in detail a compact outline for the "sovereignty" pillar, with the others to follow. Meanwhile, my weekly one-on-one meeting with President Karzai will continue, as will meetings with the Abdullah and Ghani camps. EIKENBERRY