Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL2143
2009-08-01 13:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

HELMAND'S NOW ZAD CHALLENGE: WHAT'S NEXT?

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2143/01 2131359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011359Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0473
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002143 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: HELMAND'S NOW ZAD CHALLENGE: WHAT'S NEXT?

Classified By: PRT and Sub-National Governance Director Valerie C. Fowl
er for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002143

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: HELMAND'S NOW ZAD CHALLENGE: WHAT'S NEXT?

Classified By: PRT and Sub-National Governance Director Valerie C. Fowl
er for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: State Rep to the Second Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (2d MEB) visited Now Zad district over a three-day
period in mid-July. The area was once home to Helmand's
second largest city and famous for its pomegranates and lush
orchards. British units saw past heavy fighting in Now Zad
city; more recently, Marines have faced-off in the
now-abandoned town center against Taliban fighters, including
a stretch referred to as "Pakistan Alley." Plans are
underway to interdict Taliban routes into the city and an
adjacent mountain pass, with an eye toward creating a stable
enough environment for introduction of government and
eventual return of residents. Local elders cautioned that
lasting security could only be brought by Afghan forces. Now
Zad is emblematic of our challenge in pursuing tactical
operations in Helmand alongside current strategic limitations
-- principally, the lack of Afghan security forces, stretched
government capacity, and time. END SUMMARY.

--------------
SETTING: IEDs IN "SHERWOOD FOREST"
--------------


2. (C) Now Zad city has largely been abandoned since Taliban
forces and subsequent fighting drove away most residents over
the past several years. Its central bazaar, located next to
a remote Marine Forward Operating Base (FOB),is almost
Fallujah-like in appearance: packs of dogs (an aggressive
breed native to Now Zad) roam the streets, dead trees dot the
fields and structures stand abandoned amid piles of rubble.
The city is now filled with IEDs, including in now-dead
orchards called "Sherwood Forest" and across other locales
like "Pakistan alley" (an area infiltrated by at least some
Taliban fighters of Pakistani origin). COMMENT: The sheer
number of IEDs would require a significant effort to remove
them prior to any sizable return of civilians. END COMMENT.

--------------
CHALLENGE: MORE THAN A BLOOD FEUD?
--------------


3. (C) An estimated 100-200 Taliban insurgents have taken

root in parts of the city's outlying areas -- a number
matched by a Marine company being tested by Now Zad's
signature casualty: double amputations of lower limbs from
IEDs placed throughout foot patrol areas, with units led by
Marine engineers holding hand-held mine sweepers in single
file. Since 2d MEB's arrival, several Marines have been
killed and more wounded. The Marine presence has kept the
Taliban from expanding their zone of influence; however, the
absence of ANSF units has limited the Marine company's
ability to interdict Taliban routes more widely. Recently,
Taliban have fired upon Marine helicopters landing near the
FOB.

--------------
DISPLACED RESIDENTS: SECURITY FIRST
--------------


4. (C) In a series of conversations in an outlying area next
to Now Zad's city center, displaced residents told State Rep
that a quick introduction of Afghan forces into the area
would be essential to bring security. Some criticized
outright the presence of U.S. Marines, fearing increased
fighting; others, however, said Marine units needed to act as
a security bridge until ANSF arrived )- and stayed.


5. (U) Key comments include the following (verbatim) points
made by about a dozen elders and one mullah. (NOTE: Notably,
they invited State Rep and some Marines inside a mosque
compound to discuss their security and other concerns, but it
was clear that their comments were constrained due to visible
anxiety about Taliban influence and the likely presence of
informants within the larger group. One teenager pointed to
a person in the crowd and said he was there "to listen to
what we say"; another youth (unsuccessfully) tried to grab an
interpreter's pistol at the end of the conversation --
unclear as to his intent. END NOTE):

Elders and mullah (gathered near a water well and inside a
mosque compound):

-- "We will be very happy if our Afghan forces come here.
Too many of you will not be good. We need security here
before anything else. We will talk to our forces; it is
easier to cooperate with them."

-- "Why are you destroying us, bringing so many Marines in?"

KABUL 00002143 002 OF 002



-- "There will not be much voting because no one is in charge
here; no ANP or ANA -- and it will be hard for us to travel
to vote."

-- "The Taliban will get even stricter if more of you come
and there is more fighting."

-- "The Taliban hurt us; you don't."

-- "We have heard about your President Obama from the radio.
We see him differently. He spoke in Cairo." (NOTE: the
residents said several families had radios, with people
listening to programs for news. Radios remain the item most
requested from civilians and Marines.)

-- "We are like rocks here; you kick us, the Taliban kick us,
no one listens to us; no one will give us our freedom."

-- "Where is the government? There is no government."

-- "We need to see Afghan security forces, but Marines should
not leave until they are here."

-- "I remember as a child when Americans visited Now Zad to
eat our pomegranates."

-- "Now our children are illiterate. No schools are open."

-- "There are not a lot of Taliban here, but they are
active." (NOTE: when asked, one elder estimated the number
of Taliban to be between 100-200 individuals.)

--------------
WHAT'S NEXT?
--------------


6. (C) 2d MEB has begun planning for the insertion of
additional U.S. and some Afghan forces into the Now Zad area,
with the principal aim to interdict a mountain pass adjacent
to Now Zad city. Closing the route should inhibit movement
of Taliban. Initial plans for providing support to polling
sites for displaced residents was originally opposed by the
IEC head in Lashkar Gah, who told our PRT officers recently
that there is "no district governor, no ANSF and no people in
Now Zad." Afghan counter-narcotics police have been
identified for Now Zad, but the duration of their stay there
remains unclear.


7. (C) Governor Mangal has recently taken a more active role
in guiding how the operation should unfold, and he has
likened the potential in Now Zad to the effort in Kanashin,
the southernmost point of government and U.S. Marine presence
in Helmand.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) Now Zad is perhaps Helmand's most symbolic city, the
scene of a disproportionately high casualty rate for Marines.
That said, the city does not presently measure up to other
areas in terms of inherent strategic importance (for example,
Nawa or Garmsir and, eventually, Marjah). The reintroduction
of Now Zad's dislocated population to the IED-filled city
would require significant follow-on resources after any
successful additional Marine-ANSF interdiction operation.


9. (C) Now Zad highlights how smaller Marine "anchors"
(outside the central Helmand River Valley's "green zone"
population centers) will continue to compete for Afghan
government attention in any sustained way. Overcoming Now
Zad's long-term challenges should realistically be based on a
timeline measured in years, not months )- and only if Afghan
officials prioritize their own efforts in the area. Governor
Mangal's recent willingness to direct provincial officials'
eyes toward Now Zad is a good first step. The key indicator
of counter-insurgency traction in the area, however, will
heavily depend on whether ANSF are kept in place (and
increasingly take the lead) so that a lasting local
government interface can be established.
EIKENBERRY