CORRECTED: JULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002077 DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: CORRECTED: JULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1 AS DEADLINE FOR PARING VOTING CENTER LIST ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At a July 25 ministerial on election issues, the Ministry of Defense (MOD),the Ministry of Interior (MOI),ISAF, the UN, and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) agreed that August 1 would be the final date to determine which of the nearly 7,000 voting centers would not open. The IEC has agreed to adjust its delivery schedule for ballots and other sensitive materials to accommodate the August 1 date. Participants also agreed to step-up joint security planning to maximize the number of centers that could be opened; discussed the need to recruit more female searchers; and agreed on a media and messaging plan. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) On July 25, SRSG Kai Eide hosted a short-notice meeting to identify a way ahead on the vexing issue of determining which of the nearly 7,000 intended voting centers will not be opened due to security concerns. Ministers Wardak (MOD) and Atmar (MOI) were in attendance, as were NDS Director Saleh, ISAF commander Gen. McChrystal, IEC Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Barakzai, and major donor country ambassadors, including Ambassador Ricciardone. Voting Centers -------------- ¶3. (SBU) As a prelude to the ministerial meeting, the working-level Security Operations Group (SOG) took place earlier the same day, which focused on the how many of the nearly 7,000 voting centers could be opened. At that meeting, Afghan National Army Ops Chief MG Karimi reported: -- 5898 polling centers confirmed will open; -- 514 polling centers are still being surveyed/security assessed by ISAF and ANSF; -- 283 polling centers have been co-located with other polling centers; -- 211 polling centers will not open because they are in black districts -- 61 polling centers were scheduled to be in locations non-feasible and unrealistic locations (such as unreachable mountainsides.) ¶4. (SBU) The afternoon ministerial meeting illustrated both the ministers' determination to come to grips with the voting center issue and the frequent disconnects within GIROA on fundamentals such as using consistent data. Wardak and Atmar agreed on 548 as the number of centers that was feasible to open, rather than the 514 noted at the earlier meeting. Depending on military operations and security preparations for election day, that number could still change in either direction. At Eide's suggestion, all agreed on August 1 as the deadline for a final report from MOD on how many polling centers could not be secured and would have to be co-located or merged with other centers in farther-away, safer locations. ¶5. (SBU) A key consideration in this discussion was the IEC's schedule for transporting ballots and other sensitive materials to the centers, an operation that is underway since July 21. The participants, including Barakzai, agreed that delivering these materials, for now, to the IEC's provincial centers and holding them there would provide the ministries until August 1 to make a final determination on how many centers would open, after which the materials would be transported to their final locations. The participants will meet again on August 1 to review the list. ¶6. (SBU) Gen. McChrystal asked how late the security forces could stage operations which might result in adding additional secured, held areas, thus enabling more centers to open by August 20. The answer, all agreed, was August 10; after this date, there would not be enough time to ensure ballots could be delivered to such newly-opened centers. McChrystal got agreement for an augmented group of MOD, MOI, and ISAF planners to begin meeting immediately and report by July 30 on the prospects for adding more centers as the result of operations. Community Policing -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Atmar noted that raising locally-recruited short-term community defense volunteers could be a significant factor in election security, in areas where the threat was not huge. He said MOI and local governors were working with local tribal leaders and had already started recruiting such volunteers throughout the south and in Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Kunar, Nuristan, Wardak, Khost, and Paktika. (Note: At the SOG earlier in the day, MG Karimi said that there were still many questions on local volunteer community defense solutions: a determination on authority underwhich the force would operate, if they would be paid and by whom, if they would be armed, KABUL 00002077 002 OF 002 when they would demobilize, if they would be trained and if the MOI directive on ANP impartiality for the elections extends to this group.) Female Issues -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Ricciardone raised the need to recruit, train, and deploy female searchers, noting another attack was underway at that time by male terrorists disguised with burqas. Atmar agreed there is a pressing need for more female searches at polling stations and urged the ministries represented to make a maximum effort to recruit more of them. He promised that MOI could train them, but asked that IEC identify recruits over the next week. (Note: Last week Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) Zia agreed MRRD would take a leading role in this effort. MRRD and IEC officials met today to work out details. The Ministry Of Women's Affairs is also expected to support this). ¶9. (SBU) NDS Director Saleh said his agency has received many reports indicating that in numerous villages, male heads of households and extended families intend to vote on behalf of the women in their group. Barakzai flatly rejected such plans, noting proxy voting is expressly forbidden by the IEC and illegal under Afghan law. The UNDP representative asked that NDS identify the locations of such reports, so UNDP could alert FEFA, the largest domestic observer organization, to lookout for such attempts in those areas. Media and Messaging -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Participants agreed on the desirability of a phased media strategy. From now until August 10, security forces and responsible ministries would lead with the message that they will do everything possible to ensure as many registered voters as possible could vote. After that date, local communities where voting centers would not open would be informed; still later, a nationwide message would explain the number of polling centers that could not be opened and why. Eide stressed that in conveying that message, it should be noted that security was not the only reason for not opening all of the planned centers; there were technical reasons as well, ranging from movements of nomadic people to geographic obstacles. Above all, no voting center should be described as "closed," but rather "not opening". Ambassador Ricciardone noted that GIROA, IEC, UNAMA, and various countries naturally might have different perspectives on the issues, but urged that senior press officers should meet soon and frequently to identify and address discrepancies together, before the inevitable media dissection. He also stressed that MOI and the IEC should quickly gain a grasp of the number and percentage of registered voters likely to be affected by the centers that would not open - if the percentage was as low as many believed it would be this should be an important feature of public messaging. EIKENBERRY