CORRECTED: JULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002077

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: CORRECTED: JULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1
AS DEADLINE FOR PARING VOTING CENTER LIST


1. (SBU) Summary: At a July 25 ministerial on election issues, the
Ministry of Defense (MOD),the Ministry of Interior (MOI),ISAF, the
UN, and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) agreed that August
1 would be the final date to determine which of the nearly 7,000
voting centers would not open. The IEC has agreed to adjust its
delivery schedule for ballots and other sensitive materials to
accommodate the August 1 date. Participants also agreed to step-up
joint security planning to maximize the number of centers that could
be opened; discussed the need to recruit more female searchers; and
agreed on a media and messaging plan. End summary.


2. (SBU) On July 25, SRSG Kai Eide hosted a short-notice meeting to
identify a way ahead on the vexing issue of determining which of the
nearly 7,000 intended voting centers will not be opened due to
security concerns. Ministers Wardak (MOD) and Atmar (MOI) were in
attendance, as were NDS Director Saleh, ISAF commander Gen.
McChrystal, IEC Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Barakzai, and major
donor country ambassadors, including Ambassador Ricciardone.

Voting Centers
--------------


3. (SBU) As a prelude to the ministerial meeting, the working-level
Security Operations Group (SOG) took place earlier the same day,
which focused on the how many of the nearly 7,000 voting centers
could be opened. At that meeting, Afghan National Army Ops Chief MG
Karimi reported:

-- 5898 polling centers confirmed will open;

-- 514 polling centers are still being surveyed/security assessed by
ISAF and ANSF;

-- 283 polling centers have been co-located with other polling
centers;

-- 211 polling centers will not open because they are in black
districts

-- 61 polling centers were scheduled to be in locations non-feasible
and unrealistic locations (such as unreachable mountainsides.)


4. (SBU) The afternoon ministerial meeting illustrated both the
ministers' determination to come to grips with the voting center
issue and the frequent disconnects within GIROA on fundamentals such
as using consistent data. Wardak and Atmar agreed on 548 as the
number of centers that was feasible to open, rather than the 514
noted at the earlier meeting. Depending on military operations and
security preparations for election day, that number could still
change in either direction. At Eide's suggestion, all agreed on
August 1 as the deadline for a final report from MOD on how many
polling centers could not be secured and would have to be co-located
or merged with other centers in farther-away, safer locations.


5. (SBU) A key consideration in this discussion was the IEC's
schedule for transporting ballots and other sensitive materials to
the centers, an operation that is underway since July 21. The
participants, including Barakzai, agreed that delivering these
materials, for now, to the IEC's provincial centers and holding them
there would provide the ministries until August 1 to make a final
determination on how many centers would open, after which the
materials would be transported to their final locations. The
participants will meet again on August 1 to review the list.


6. (SBU) Gen. McChrystal asked how late the security forces could
stage operations which might result in adding additional secured,
held areas, thus enabling more centers to open by August 20. The
answer, all agreed, was August 10; after this date, there would not
be enough time to ensure ballots could be delivered to such
newly-opened centers. McChrystal got agreement for an augmented
group of MOD, MOI, and ISAF planners to begin meeting immediately
and report by July 30 on the prospects for adding more centers as
the result of operations.

Community Policing
--------------


7. (SBU) Atmar noted that raising locally-recruited short-term
community defense volunteers could be a significant factor in
election security, in areas where the threat was not huge. He said
MOI and local governors were working with local tribal leaders and
had already started recruiting such volunteers throughout the south
and in Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Kunar, Nuristan, Wardak, Khost, and
Paktika. (Note: At the SOG earlier in the day, MG Karimi said that
there were still many questions on local volunteer community defense
solutions: a determination on authority underwhich the force would
operate, if they would be paid and by whom, if they would be armed,

KABUL 00002077 002 OF 002


when they would demobilize, if they would be trained and if the MOI
directive on ANP impartiality for the elections extends to this
group.)

Female Issues
--------------


8. (SBU) Ricciardone raised the need to recruit, train, and deploy
female searchers, noting another attack was underway at that time by
male terrorists disguised with burqas. Atmar agreed there is a
pressing need for more female searches at polling stations and urged
the ministries represented to make a maximum effort to recruit more
of them. He promised that MOI could train them, but asked that IEC
identify recruits over the next week. (Note: Last week Minister of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) Zia agreed MRRD would
take a leading role in this effort. MRRD and IEC officials met
today to work out details. The Ministry Of Women's Affairs is also
expected to support this).


9. (SBU) NDS Director Saleh said his agency has received many
reports indicating that in numerous villages, male heads of
households and extended families intend to vote on behalf of the
women in their group. Barakzai flatly rejected such plans, noting
proxy voting is expressly forbidden by the IEC and illegal under
Afghan law. The UNDP representative asked that NDS identify the
locations of such reports, so UNDP could alert FEFA, the largest
domestic observer organization, to lookout for such attempts in
those areas.

Media and Messaging
--------------


10. (SBU) Participants agreed on the desirability of a phased media
strategy. From now until August 10, security forces and responsible
ministries would lead with the message that they will do everything
possible to ensure as many registered voters as possible could vote.
After that date, local communities where voting centers would not
open would be informed; still later, a nationwide message would
explain the number of polling centers that could not be opened and
why. Eide stressed that in conveying that message, it should be
noted that security was not the only reason for not opening all of
the planned centers; there were technical reasons as well, ranging
from movements of nomadic people to geographic obstacles. Above
all, no voting center should be described as "closed," but rather
"not opening". Ambassador Ricciardone noted that GIROA, IEC, UNAMA,
and various countries naturally might have different perspectives on
the issues, but urged that senior press officers should meet soon
and frequently to identify and address discrepancies together,
before the inevitable media dissection. He also stressed that MOI
and the IEC should quickly gain a grasp of the number and percentage
of registered voters likely to be affected by the centers that would
not open - if the percentage was as low as many believed it would be
this should be an important feature of public messaging.

EIKENBERRY