ELECTIONS: ULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002074

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS: ULY 25 MINISTERIAL AGREES ON AUGUST 1
AS DEADLINE FOR PARING VOTING CENTER LIST


1. Summary: At a July 25 ministerial on election issues, MOD, MOI,
ISAF, the UN, and the IEC agreed that August 1 would be the final
date to determine which of the nearly 7,000 voting centers would not
open. The IEC agreed to adjust its delivery schedule for ballots
and other sensitive materials to accommodate the August 1 date.
Participants also agreed to step up joint security planning to
maximize the number of centers that could be opened; discussed the
need to recruit more female searchers; and agreed on a media and
messaging plan. End summary.


2. On July 25, SYSRG Kai Eide hosted a short-notice meeting to
identify a way ahead on the vexing issue of determining which of the
nearly 7,000 intended voting centers will not be opened due to
security concerns. Ministers Wardak (MOD) and Atmar (MOI) were in
attendance, as were NDS Director Saleh, ISAF commander Gen.
McChrystal, IEC Deputy Chief Electoral Officer Barakzai, and major
donor country ambassadors. Amb. Ricciardone represented the U.S.

Voting Centers
--------------


3. As a prelude to the ministerial meeting, earlier in the day
occurred the regular weekly meeting of the working-level Security
Operations Group (SOG),which focused on the how many of the nearly
7,000 voting centers could be opened. At that meeting, ANA Ops
Chief MG Karimi gave the following report:

--5898 polling centers confirmed will open;

-- 514 polling centers are still being surveyed/security assessed by
ISAF and ANSF;

-- 283 polling centers have been collocated with other polling
centers;

-- 211 polling centers will not open because they are in enemy
controlled territory;

-- 61 polling centers were scheduled to be in locations that were in
ravines, on the sides of mountains etc and are just not feasible.


4. The ministerial meeting that afternoon illustrated both the
determination of ministers to come to grips with the voting center
issue and the frequent disconnects within the GIROA on such
fundamentals as using consistent data. Rather than the figure of
514 centers which remained to be determined if it was feasible to
open, Wardak and Atmar agreed the number was 548. Depending on the
ebb and flow of military operations and security preparations for
election day, that number could shrink further, or it could
increase. At Eide's suggestion, all agreed that August 1 would be
the deadline for a final report from MOD on how many polling centers
could not be secured and would have to be co-located or merged with
other centers in farther-away, safer locations.


5. A key consideration in this discussion was the IEC's schedule
for transporting ballots and other sensitive materials to the
centers, an operation that is now underway. The participants,
including IEC's Barakzai, agreed that delivering these materials,
for now, to the IEC's provincial centers and holding them there
would enable the ministries to have until August 1 to make a final
determination on how many centers would open, after which the
materials would be transported to their final locations. The
participants will meet again on August 1 to review the list.


6. Gen. McChrystal asked how late the security forces could stage
operations which might result in adding additional secured, held
areas, thus enabling more centers to open and be equipped with
ballots by August 20. The answer, all agreed, was August 10; after
this date, there would not be enough time to ensure ballots could be
delivered to such newly-opened centers. McChrystal got the group's
agreement for an augmented group of MOD, MOI, and ISAF planners to
begin meeting immediately and report by July 30 on the prospects for
adding more centers as the result of operations.

Community Policing
--------------


7. Atmar noted that raising locally-recruited short-term community
defense volunteers could be a significant factor in election
security, in areas where the threat was not huge. He said MOI and
local governors were working with local tribal leaders and had
already started recruiting such volunteers throughout the south and
in Herat, Farah, Nimruz, Kunar, Nuristan, Wardak, Khost, and
Paktika. (Note: At the staff-level Security Operations Group
earlier in the day, MG Karimi said that there were still a lot of
unanswered questions on local volunteer community defense solutions:
Under whose authority would a community defense force operate?

KABUL 00002074 002 OF 002


Would they be paid? And by whom? Would they be armed? When would
they demobilize? Would they receive training? Would the MOI
directive on ANP impartiality for the elections extend to this
group?).

Female Issues
--------------


8. Ricciardone raised the need to recruit, train, and deploy female
searchers, noting another attack was then underway by male
terrorists disguised with burqas. Atmar agreed there is a pressing
need for more female searches at polling stations and urged the
ministries represented to make a maximum effort to recruit more of
them. He promised that MOI could train them, but asked that IEC
identify recruits over the next week. (Note: Last week Ministry of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development Minister Zia agreed MRRD would
take a leading role in this effort. MRRD officials and IEC
officials met today to work out details. Ministry Of Womens Affairs
is also expected to support this).


9. NDS Director Saleh said his agency has received many reports
indicating that at many villages, male heads of households and
extended families intend to vote on behalf of the women in their
group. IEC's Barakzai flatly rejected such plans, noting proxy
voting is expressly forbidden. The UNDP representative asked that
the NDS identify the locations of such reports, so UNDP could alert
FEFA, the largest domestic observer organization, to be on the
lookout for such attempts in those areas.

Media and Messaging
--------------


10. Participants agreed on the desirability of a phased media
strategy. From now until August 10, the message would be that
security forces and responsible ministries would be doing everything
they could to ensure as many registered voters as possible could
vote. After that date, local communities where voting centers would
not open would be informed; still later, a nationwide message would
explain the number of polling centers that could not be opened and
why. Eide stressed that in conveying that message, it should be
noted that security was not the only reason for not opening all of
the planned centers; there were technical reasons as well, ranging
from movements of nomadic people to geographic obstacles. Above
all, no voting center should be described as "closed," but rather
"not opening". Amb. Ricciardone noted that GIROA, IEC, UNAMA, and
various countries naturally might have different perspectives on the
issues, but urged that senior press officers should meet soon and
frequently to identify and address discrepancies together, before
the inevitable media dissection. He also stressed that MOI and the
IEC should quickly gain a grasp of the number and percentage of
registered voters likely to be affected by the centers that would
not open - if the percentage was as low as many believed it would be
this should be an important feature of public messaging.

EIKENBERRY