Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL1754
2009-07-06 08:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

KARZAI'S JULY 5 ELECTION MEETING

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6474
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #1754/01 1870846
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 060846Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9957
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001754 

SIPDIS

COS USFOR-A
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A. EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/6/2019
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: KARZAI'S JULY 5 ELECTION MEETING

Classified By: Ambassador Carney by reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001754 SIPDIS COS USFOR-A DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A. EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA USFOR-A FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/6/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: KARZAI'S JULY 5 ELECTION MEETING Classified By: Ambassador Carney by reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. President Karzai's tightly-conducted 5 July meeting on election security included senior foreign, security and intelligence members of his cabinet and the Chairman of the Independent Election Commission. The SRSG, COMISAF, Ambs. Mussomeli and Carney attended. The President decided to make elections and election security the topic of a weekly meeting every Sunday. Following detailed presentations and discussion by the Defense and Interior Ministers and the IEC Chairman, the President set four items for the 12 July agenda: a) the need for joint army, police, ISAF and IEC teams to visit the forty percent of polling centers as yet unvisited; b) an Afghan meeting to discuss how to engage community leaders to protect the polls; c)regarding the 119 districts controlled by, or under insurgent influence,an Afghan interagency assessment of each must be made in detail with a view to deciding whether elections can take place in a given district and, if not, what must be done to conduct elections. Part of the assessment must include a reading of whether the populace will vote if the district is cleared and held; d) how to provide more voter registration so as to enhance participation in the elections. COMMENT: The elections now have focused and inclusive highest-level Afghan government attention, a necessary condition for the process to succeed. We will be monitoring on delivery, and will be preparing contingencies should that effort fall short. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. ¶2. (SBU) President Hamid Karzai held a 5 July meeting at the Palace to discuss preparations for the forthcoming elections and security around them. He noted that two Afghan meetings in the past few days had discussed the matter, and that the concerns raised by his Army Chief of Staff caused him to convene this larger meeting. Those present included Foreign Minister Spanta, Defense Minister Wardak, Interior Minister Atmar, IEC Chairman Lodin, NDS Chief Saleh, Vice Chairman for DIAG Stanekzai, Presidential Chief of Staff Daudzai. Foreigners numbered SRSG Kai Eide, Amb. Mussomeli, COMISAF Gen. McChrystal, Amb. (Ret.) Carney. ¶3. (C) Defense Minister Wardak began an extensive review of ele
ctoral security that began with reference to Presidential Order 161 to prepare for the security of elections. He noted close coordination with ISAF and a goal of a peaceful environment without intimidation, preventing enemy nterference. He described a three phase process of preparing and issuing guideline to involved departments, and of preparing operations to neutralize enemy capability. The operations began 18 June and would run until 12 August. He noted two districts in Helmand province have been liberated and that preparations for operations in the nine districts remaining under the enemy might see liberation of "a few" of those. He noted that additional ops would begin 13 August and continue until 7 October, through the possible runoff period. He elaborated the well-known concept of security protection into four tiers, with ANP at Tier 1, the polling place; ANA at Tier 2 and ISAF at Tier 3 and 4, the last of which is aerial surveillance. He stated that coordination for command and control would be at the Regional Coordination Center, and that, for the elections, Provincial Coordination Centers would include all election security and operational stakeholders. The Minister noted that such provincial coordination centers exist at all province capitals with the exception of four or five. COMMENT: Our information is that many centers are not running 24 hours a day and lack, especially, the ANP component. END COMMENT. ¶4. (SBU) As the Minister detailed the challenges to the elections: suicide attacks on polling centers and IEC offices, IEDs on the roads, assassination and kidnapping of candidates and began to list threatened districts, the President cut him off and moved on, seeking clarification on numbers of polling centers, polling stations within them and other such statistics. After an elaboration on the number of polling centers (nearly 7,000) and the number of polling stations at each (4) and the number of voting booths in total (128K),the NDS head turned to security/intelligence matters. He stated that three percent of districts have parallel Taliban Administrations; 24% of populated areas are contested and do not have effective government presence. Ten percent of the country is a battleground; 63% is peaceful. ¶5. (SBU) President Karzai wondered if enough police exist to "protect what needs to be protected: election sites, government sites" and the rest. The Interior Minister raised five issues, beginning by stating that two of the six regions KABUL 00001754 002 OF 003 do not have enough police: Paktia, where 10,400 police are needed and only 5,000 exist; and, second, the Western region that needs 6,500 and only has 5,000. The total shortfall is 6,000 police. The second aspect is that in districts in Ghazni and Paktika while a polling center might need 10 policemen for security, people who would come from villages and villages themselves are not secure. Thus,in some areas a second belt of security exists that ANA and ISAF staff. These areas cannot use simply a QRF; they rather need a force to hold. The key, Atmar maintained, is the need to prioritize on the facts that NDS Saleh had laid out. Holding operations would be needed in 119 or 120 districts; then the existing police would be enough. The second issue is that an interagency team of ANSF, IEC, and ISAF has not yet visited all 7K sites: roughly 40% of the polling center locations countrywide have not been visited. Thus, it is not yet clear how many police will be needed and where the ANA is better used. Atmar strongly urged that this reconnaissance be completed within the next ten days. His third issues was to intensify clearing operations in uncontrolled districts, especially four districts in Ghazni. The fourth issue is the need for ISAF airlift; some electoral items need to be protected and IEC cannot transport them. Atmar cited one rural area that will use donkeys to move in empty ballot boxes, but full boxes on their way to the province capital after having been counted at the polling centers are too sensitive to confide to donkeys. The fifth issue is the need to establish provincial coordinating centers in three provinces and to ensure the compatibility of ANA and ANP communications gear. ¶6. (C) Minister Atmar also cited what he called two strategic issues. First is that in high threat areas, the way forward is to go to community leadership to help with security, as in previous elections. The decision needed is whether to appeal to local community leadership. "They know how to do it," the Minister concluded. The second strategic issue is getting the neighboring countries to secure the borders. On Pakistan and electoral security, Minister Wardak noted a 24 June report from a meeting of the Quetta Shura, at a celebration because authorities had freed five "colleagues.: The Shura instructed all to interfere in the elections by attacking convoys of IEC goods, polling stations, laying IEDs. He noted his belief that Pakistan had helped at the time of the last elections and that the Pakistan General then head of ISI(Kayani)had admitted as much to Wardak. ¶7. (C) At the President's invitation to comment, Gen. McChrystal said that ISAF would help as it can because success of the elections are ISAF,s No. 1 priority. All force necessary will be brought to bear within capabilities. Backbriefs from the regions he has just visited have resulted in identifying matters to work through. ISAF understands the (President's) intent that it maintain low visibility in the tier structure, operating QRF by helicopter where needed. He agrees on the need for a visit to the remaining 40% of polling centers. On clearing black districts, the General opposed clearing operations if ISAF/ANSF cannot hold the areas. Concerning threats, he generally sees the same as previous speakers have stated, but the worry right now is more about the aspect of intimidation. On Pakistan, COMISAF noted he had spoken to Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Kayani about security regarding ongoing operations in the south in general terms. No specifics regarding elections were discussed. The General noted that a forthcoming Tripartite meeting in July might provide the opportunity to follow-up. ¶8. (SBU) Called on to explain why 40 % of polling centers remain unvisited,IEC Chairman Dr. Lodin said that the key problem is security. Consultation on the issue takes place every 15 days. He made eleven points that noted the allotment of police to threatened polling centers (11-high threat),(6-medium threat); (4-calm). He discussed security of warehouses, noting U.S. willingness to province funds for private security to guard such sites. He said that school students, male and female would be given and incentive of $10 each to act as body searchers for votes. Non-sensitive electoral material is almost all out to the provinces and, he explained to the SRSG would be completed in 10 days. He agreed that an IEC delegation must visit the 7,000 polling centers. The UN and international community will provide 3 helicopters/planes for IEC use; this is not enough, but will do. Voters are still asking for mobile voter registration teams. This is promising and encouraging. Thus, Dr. Lodin expects a greater turnout than is generally believed at this point. He concluded that foreign observers will need security,too. KABUL 00001754 003 OF 003 ¶9. (SBU) Dr. Lodin's reference to possible private security for IEC warehouses sparked an animated discussion. President Karzai rejected the notion, arguing private security firms are problematical, and some are even associated with the Taliban. NDS Saleh referred to a report he has on the situation in Farah that he has shared with SRAP adviser Barney Rubin and with his U.S. counterparts. Minister Atmar explained that a new facility now exists at the Interior Ministry. It is a public protection service. Clients can have access to this service if the pay and thereby get police and not just private security. He noted that these police elements are not for crime-fighting, but just for security. He noted that the UN uses them; private banks use them; the INAC copper mine uses them. Atmar concluded that the issue needs serious discussion, but funding or not, Interior will get security to IEC warehouses. On international observers, he described a unit of 500 new graduates, half trained by France and with U.S. support for weapons and vehicles that can be used to protect international observers. ¶10. (SBU) Deputy Minister for DIAG Stanekzai suggested that military efforts to enable people in the 3% under Taliban administration to go to neighboring districts would be useful. He suggested the need to build confidence among people in the 24% of contested areas. Finally he urged using candidates themselves to help get communities to engage in protection of the vote and in getting out the vote itself. ¶11. (SBU) The President concluded that the need exists to begin weekly meetings on elections and election security. He set every Sunday for the event. He then summarized the elements of the discussion that would be briefed at the next meeting, 12 July: a) report on the effort for joint army, police, ISAF and IEC teams to visit the forty percent of polling centers as yet unvisited; b) an Afghan meeting to discuss how to engage community leaders to protect the polls; c) regarding the 119 districts controlled by, or under insurgent influence, an interagency assessment of each must be made in detail with a view to deciding whether elections can take place in a given district and, if not, what must be done to conduct elections. Part of the assessment must include a reading of whether the populace will vote if the district is cleared and held; d) how to provide more voter registration so as to enhance participation in the elections. EIKENBERRY

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -