AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: KHODAIDAD DEFENDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001743 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SRAP, INL, SCA/A E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER SNAR AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: KHODAIDAD DEFENDS AFGHAN CN STRATEGY Classified By: Ambassador Eikenberry for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a July 1 meeting with Minister for Counternarcotics Khodaidad, Ambassador Wayne, Director for Development, Assistance, and Economic Affairs, assured the Minister that the U.S. remains committed to the fight against narcotics and the change in strategy would most likely result in more resources for GIRoA to use in countering narcotics through a broad range of efforts. While Khodaidad appears now to get the message, he reiterated that some level of eradication - or the threat of eradication - should remain a part of the Afghan strategy as a deterrent. Khodaidad expressed concern about the lack of commitment to CN goals in many parts of the GIRoA, and argued for restructuring the Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA) along non-ethnic lines. Khodaidad requested the meeting after President Karzai ordered him to hold a press conference with the Minister of Finance to refute charges that most money provided for CN efforts had been wasted; Khodaidad defended his ministry's record, but said he hoped to avoid challenging the U.S. charges in public. He subsequently hosted a July 03 luncheon at his residence for representatives of the U.S. CN team, underscoring his commitment to the US-Afghan partnership. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On 01 July, Ambassador Wayne visited the Minister of Counternarcotics Khodaidad at his office, at his request. Khodaidad said that the recent announcement of a "new" CN strategy had been discussed at the previous cabinet meeting, and that President Karzai was concerned about the charge that hundreds of millions of dollars had been "wasted" on counternarcotics efforts. Khodaidad assured Ambassador Wayne that, as far as the Ministry of Counternarcotics was concerned, the money had not been wasted- in fact, the reduction in poppy cultivation and the increase in "poppy-free" provinces showed that the Afghan strategy was having a positive effect. He stressed that the ministry also kept tight oversight on the spending of international donor funds. For example, he said that he was aware that some governors receiving funds for eradication efforts had not met their targets, and he would make every effort to recover the money owed. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Wayne congratulated Khodaidad on the progress made in countering poppy cultivation, and stressed that the new U.S. strategy did not imply a reduction in support for Afghan Counternarcotics efforts. While the U.S. focus would shift away from promoting eradication, the U.S. intended to strengthen support for the other 7 pillars of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, in the form of increased agriculture assistance, public information, and interdiction assets. The Minister thanked Wayne for this clarification, and said he appreciated all the support the U.S. had provided to his ministry in the past. He looked forward to continuing the very positive relationship between the MCN and the U.S. Embassy in combating narcotics, using a wide range of tools. The Minister reiterated his view that some level of eradication - or at least the threat of eradication - remained necessary as a deterrent against poppy cultivation, but agreed that the other pillars were just as important to the overall strategy. ¶4. (C) Khodaidad noted that President Karzai had asked him to hold a press conference, along with the Minister of Finance, to contest publicly the charges that GIRoA had "wasted" hundreds of millions of dollars on counternarcotics. Khodaidad was clearly uncomfortable with this instruction, and said that he hoped instead to put out a simple press release explaining how the funds in his ministry had been allocated and accounted for. Ambassador Wayne agreed that a low-key approach was probably more productive in this case. ¶5. (C) Asked about this year's plan, Khodaidad detailed the current public information campaign that is starting, the pre-planting campaign. The campaign involves provincial and district level shuras in 25 key provinces, as well as media messaging and Governor's workshops in Kabul. He also touched on other U.S. - backed initiatives- the Good Performer's Initiative (GPI) and Counter Narcotics Advisory Teams; as well as the British backed CARD-F program. The Minister expressed a degree of dissatisfaction with the CARD-F program, stating that it was a long term development program that had little immediate impact on farmer's planting decisions. He stated that the linkage between development and KABUL 00001743 002 OF 002 assistance for not growing poppy was not as strong as with the Helmand Food Zone Initiative or GPI. ¶6. (C) Finally, Khodaidad complained about the lack of commitment to counternarcotics goals in many parts of the GIRoA. He specifically cited the Governors of Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimroz, and Farah as weak on this issue and not committed to the CN effort. Aside from Governor Mangal in Helmand, none of the governor's from the largest poppy producing provinces engaged local leaders and tribal elders during last year's pre-planting campaign. For example, even though they took advance funds for Governor-Led eradication programs, they did not then conduct effective eradication operations in their provinces. He also commented that the Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police needed to be reformed by better integrating ethnic groups into the ranks. He pointed out that the Poppy Eradication Force was made up almost entirely of Tajiks from Takhar and Badakhshan, and thus carried little credibility when deployed to Pashtun areas such as Helmand. He stressed that the CNPA (and ANA and ANP units as well) should carry a better ethnic mix as to increase credibility as well as periodic rotation of commanders to prevent corruption. ¶7. (U) COMMENT: Although initially concerned about the implications of the new U.S. counternarcotics strategy, Khodaidad now appears to recognize that the shift will most likely lead to additional resources in a number of key areas but a decrease in only one. He invited Ambassador Wayne and the leaders of the U.S. CN team to his private residence along with other ministers and key members of his staff on July 3 in an apparent effort to underscore his commitment to deepening our CN partnership. Post will continue to engage with MCN and other key Afghan actors in the CN area to explain the policy and reiterate the continuing U.S. commitment to Afghan CN efforts. EIKENBERRY