KHOST: DIFFERING REACTIONS TO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001741

C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA MARKINGS)

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SRAP HOLBROOKE, SCA/FO, SCA/A
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID AF
SUBJECT: KHOST: DIFFERING REACTIONS TO CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
OFFER ROOM FOR MANEUVER

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Classified By: PRT-Sub NATIONAL Governance Counselor Valerie C. Fowler
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Khosties' vastly different reactions to
civilian casualty incidents caused by Coalition Forces (CF)
versus those caused by insurgents suggest fear and
intimidation by insurgents are profoundly impacting the
population. Team Khost (PRT and maneuver battalion),at the
direction of Task Force Yukon, is implementing measures to
increase SECURITY presence and operations and refine
Information Operations (IO) by both CF and Afghan NATIONAL
Security Forces (ANSF) in an effort to shift the population
to more proactively embrace the government and reject the
insurgency. END SUMMARY.

Background
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2. (C) Two recent high profile civilian casualty incidents in
Khost province provoked markedly different reactions among
Khosties. An April 9 night operation conducted by CF in
Gorbuz district resulted in the accidental death of four
members of an Afghan NATIONAL Army (ANA) lieutenant colonel's
family. In response, the Provincial COUNCIL (PC) suspended
operations, upper and lower house members of the Khost
parliamentary delegations walked out of sessions in Kabul,
and public condemnation from all levels--the average Khostie
to President Karzai--was harsh. On May 12, insurgent suicide
bombers, armed with grenades and AK-47s, staged a dramatic
two-pronged attack on the office of Khost Governor Hamidullah
Qalandarzai and the Khost municipality building, resulting in
nine Afghans dead and 25 wounded. The reaction to this
event, in contrast, was minimal public protest or outcry and
only muted official condemnation.

CF vs. Insurgent Civilian Casualties: What's the Difference?
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3. (C) In discussions with dozens of Khosties in seven
districts over the past month, Afghan laborers, PC members,
district administrators, elders, and academics provided
notably consistent views on why the reactions to civilian
casualties caused by CF were much stronger than those caused
by insurgents, citing three main differences.


4. (C) Khosties expect CF to live up to high standards and
are critical when we fail to do so, while they expect
insurgents to observe no standards. Khosties noted that CF
are a defined presence with relationships to the local
community whereas insurgents have no "fixed address" at which
to direct protest.
Finally, Khosties cited fear and intimidation by insurgents
as their strongest reasons for not reacting strongly to the
killing of innocent civilians by the enemy. Night letters,
the blasting of gates of peoples' compounds, and threats of
beheading and other brutalities generate real fear that
insurgents will carry out harsh reprisals against anyone who
speaks out publicly against their activities.

Implications for CF and GIRoA
--------------


5. (C) These views are useful indicators of where the USG can
influence public opinion on the difficult civilian casualties
issue. When asked what would reduce their fear, Khosties
uniformly stressed the need for more prominent and continual
presence by CF and ANSF. They noted that short-term
operations often had only temporary effects.


6. (C) Information Operations (IO) efforts which focus
predominantly on negative enemy actions may be
counterproductive. Emphasizing what insurgents consider
success stories often reinforces the fear they seek to
instill and highlights the GIRoA's inability to protect the
people. Condemnation of enemy actions by GIRoA officials,
religious leaders, elders, and ordinary Afghans should remain
a part of our efforts, with effective initiatives such as TF
Yukon's Voices of Victims radio interviews expanding in
reach. PRT Khost works to develop GIRoA officials' media
skills and responsiveness through mentoring and media
training to ensure constructive Afghan messages quickly reach
the public. Increased ANSF SECURITY success stories, as well
as stories emphasizing positive developments in ANSF
professional enhancement, construction, development, and
economic opportunity, also are needed. TF Yukon recently
began creating a monthly video illustrating successful ANSF
efforts to protect the population.


7. (C) To meet Khosties' call for more visible SECURITY

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forces, Afghan NATIONAL Police (ANP) and ANA forces must
commit to sustained presence throughout the province, with
increased patrols and fewer missions spent staffing
checkpoints, protecting GIRoA officials, and key buildings.
ANA Khost Commander General Esrar has made a concerted effort
recently to move his soldiers off their bases and into the
populace, with more regular patrols and increased night
missions. CF and ANSF are working together to close isolated
outposts and relocate those forces to protect the population
centers. ANP mentors are developing beat-cop tactics in
Khost police to improve public perceptions of their presence
and effectiveness. This more community-based policing model
allows ANP to develop the relationships which build trust and
confidence in ANP reliability and which fosters an
environment in which citizens cooperate with police to share
information on enemy activity, making villages inhospitable
to insurgents. ANSF leadership is shifting from a top-down
command structure to one that allows commanders in the field
more flexibility and authority to make decisions.


8. (C) A sustained, visible SECURITY effort, combined with a
more coherent, positive information campaign, may create the
space for Khosties, many of whom remain on the fence, to
openly embrace the government and begin to turn the tide
against the insurgency.


9. (U) This cable has been reviewed by PRT Khost CDR John
Barrett, maneuver battalion commander LTC Stephen Smith,
Department of State representative to TF Yukon, Kelly Degnan,
PRT Khost USAID representative Teresa Miller, PRT Khost
Information Officer Chief Warrant Officer Michael Lester, and
TF Yukon commander, COL Michael Howard.
EIKENBERRY