AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: REACTION TO NEW CN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001701 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SRAP, INL, SCA/A E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER SNAR AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN/COUNTERNARCOTICS: REACTION TO NEW CN STRATEGY Classified By: Ambassador Eikenberry for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Counter Narcotics Khodaidad and Deputy Minister of Interior for Narcotics Daud both reacted cautiously on June 28 to the announcement of a new U.S. counternarcotics strategy deemphasizing eradication and increasing support for interdiction and agricultural development. Both expressed concern that a diminished threat of eradication could encourage farmers to re-cultivate poppy, but made clear they would work closely with the U.S. in administering the new strategy. In response to a press question, Khodaidad denied that the current Afghan strategy was deficient, but stressed that he welcomed "any strategy that benefits Afghanistan." In a meeting with NAS Director, Daud said he was already looking at ways to reorganize his counter narcotics units, including the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF),to coincide with the new strategic direction. NAS Director assured Khodaidad and Daud that the new U.S. strategy did not represent a reduction in commitment to counternarcotics objectives, and in fact, signaled an increase in U.S. support for Afghan counternarcotics efforts by increasing resources for agricultural development and interdiction. END SUMMARY. KHODAIDAD: AFGHAN POLICY IS WORKING -------------- ¶2. (C) On the morning of June 28, NAS Director spoke briefly with Minister of Counter Narcotics Khodaidad prior to a previously scheduled press conference to kick off the start of the 2009 pre-planting campaign. Khodaidad said that he was surprised by the announcement of a new U.S. CN Campaign Strategy, and said he looked forward to seeing the details. He applauded the intensified focus on agricultural development -- which he clearly expected to include additional resources -- but said he was worried about the message sent on eradication. He agreed that eradication should not be the major focus of CN efforts in Afghanistan, but argued that some limited eradication should be retained as a deterrent to farmers who might otherwise be tempted to grow poppy. That said, Khodaidad emphasized that he would make every effort to work with the U.S. in implementing the new strategy, and hoped that the positive trends of the last two years (declining cultivation, more poppy free provinces) would continue. ¶3. (C) NAS Director assured Khodaidad that the U.S. decision to deemphasize eradication did not represent a reduction in support for counternarcotics objectives. On the contrary, U.S. resources for other key components of the Afghan strategy, such as the Good Performer's Initiative, Public Information, and Drug Demand Reduction efforts - all programs administered by Khodaidad's ministry - were likely to increase as a result. Khodaidad said that he appreciated this assurance and looked forward to working with the U.S. in these areas. ¶4. (U) At a subsequent press conference, Khodaidad started by discussing the achievements of the past year which resulted in a 19% reduction in poppy cultivation and 18 poppy free provinces. He announced that 4 more provinces would be poppy free in 2009, including Herat, Badekhshan, Farayab, and Baghlan. (Note: Actual determination of "poppy free" status by UNODC will not take place until August; Khodaidad may be overly optimistic.) The Minister then outlined this year's pre-planting campaign, which will focus on 13 key provinces and 12 secondary provinces. The campaign will target local leaders and decision makers at the district level through workshops, shuras, and media messaging. ¶5. (U) Despite Khodaidad's efforts to keep the press conference focused on the upcoming pre-planting season, questions quickly turned to S/SRAP's remarks at the recent G-8 conference, which were described as being at odds with GIRoA's comprehensive CN policy. Minister Khodaidad denied that this was the case, and took issue with one questioner's description of Afghan CN efforts to date as a "dismal failure." Khodaidad reiterated that a new U.S. strategy was expected with the change of administration, and stressed GIRoA's willingness to work with the new initiatives. In his view, this did not diminish the positive results of recent years or indicate that the GIRoA strategy was seriously deficient, but defended it awkwardly: - "There is nothing wrong with the strategy; it is good - perfect." He pointed to KABUL 00001701 002 OF 003 the rise in poppy free provinces, reduction in poppy cultivation, and decrease in the number of people involved in the heroin industry as positive trends arising from the current policy. He acknowledged that there were many difficulties such as lack of resources, but that there would be no change in Afghan CN policy, which he argued, was consistent with the "new" U.S. direction. ¶6. (U) The last few questions shifted the topic to corruption and the Afghan Government's poor record with regard to arresting major drug traffickers. The Minister responded by assuring the press that drug traffickers were being arrested and jailed and that it is a long term fight. The Minister concluded the press conference by reiterating that there had been successes over the past three years and that GIRoA was determined to stay the course in coordination with its U.S. and UK allies. DAUD: REORGANIZING PEF TOP PRIORITY -------------- ¶7. (C) In a meeting with NAS Director and CN Advisor, Deputy Minister of Interior for CN Daud also expressed surprise at the timing of the U.S. announcement, but said that he understood the rational of shifting focus away from high-profile eradication towards interdiction and agricultural development. Like Khodaidad, however, Daud expressed concern that Afghanistan could see a boom in poppy recultivation, especially in now poppy-free provinces, if the threat of eradication were to disappear completely. He noted that the treat of eradication was an especially useful tool for governors' public information campaigns, and was grateful to learn that the U.S. intended to continue to provide support for Governor-led efforts in this area. ¶8. (C) NAS Director reiterated that the U.S. commitment to counternarcotics objectives remained strong, and stressed that resources were likely to increase for interdiction and agricultural development - key parts of the Afghan strategy. In addition, the new deemphasis on eradication did not mean that we would oppose Afghan government decisions to use its forces to perform eradication; it is up to GIRoA to determine if and when some limited eradication operations might be necessary. U.S. resources, however, would be more focused on interdiction and providing real alternatives for farmers to wean them away from poppy cultivation. ¶9. (C) With regard to the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF),Daud recognized that it would be very difficult to maintain such a high-profile eradication force, particularly conducting large-scale operations like that in Helmand this year, without significant U.S. support. While intending to deploy the PEF as a unit to support election security operations this summer, he said, after that he would look for ways to reorganize PEF' personnel and resources within the Counter Narcotics Police (CNPA) in synch with the new strategy. Some PEF elements, for example, could be incorporated into interdiction forces like the National Interdiction Unit (NIU). Other elements could be used to bolster regional CNPA units conducting governor led eradication efforts, public information campaigns, provide secure food distribution, and other special operations. Daud said he would shortly convene a meeting with key MoI personnel and international advisors to develop a plan for transitioning PEF resources to support these new roles. NAS Director welcomed Daud's willingness to consider creative alternatives to the PEF, and said he looked forward to working with MoI and other interested parties in developing a transition plan over the next few weeks. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) Khodaidad and Daud are the two most senior Afghan officials responsible for implementing Afghanistan's comprehensive CN plan. Not surprisingly, they are sensitive to any implied criticism of their efforts given Afghanistan's recent limited successes in reducing cultivation. That said, eradication/elimination is only one of the plan's eight pillars (as are interdiction and promoting agricultural development),and shifting emphasis from one pillar to another should in no way be seen as a reduction in U.S. support for the plan's overall objectives. We will continue to work closely with GIRoA to support broad CN goals in line KABUL 00001701 003 OF 003 with the new strategic focus. We are also developing ideas for how best to implement the transition to the new CN focus which we will provide soonest. EIKENBERRY