SUBJECT: Afghanistan National Program of Peace and

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001568

DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA
USFOR-A FOR POLAD

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Afghanistan National Program of Peace and
Reconciliation (AMPPR)


1. (SBU) Summary: At a May 30 meeting with Emboffs, Special
President Advisor on Internal Security and Vice Chairman of the
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission Mohammed Masoon
Stanekzai outlined the main points of a proposal he has presented to
President Karzai on reconciliation. The proposal suggests
appointment by the President of a central coordinator, backed by a
small secretariat, to orchestrate the activities of various
government entities able to contribute to the reconciliation
process. Stanekzai places considerable importance both on the
Independent Directorate of Local Governance's governor-led
reconciliation program (endorsed in our own new strategic approach)
as well as on the mechanisms of the existing Disbandment of Illegal
Armed Groups (DIAG) program. He hopes his paper will be ready for
sharing generally with international stakeholders within the next
few weeks. Importantly, he calls for holding firm on loyalty to the
existing constitution by reconcilees and strict avoidance of Swat
Valley-type arrangements. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Background: To date there have been various strands to
the reconciliation discussion but little coordination among these
initiatives. At the highest, political level, Deputy National
Security Advisor Spinzada has watched over the issue of outreach to
top-level insurgent leaders and has ostensible oversight of the
other efforts. That oversight appears to be loosely taken. The
Peace Through Strength (PTS) program, headed by Upper House Speaker
Mojaddedi, claims to have "reconciled" 7000 former lower-level
insurgents, but few credit those numbers. The program has also had
serious administrative problems (resulting in the withdrawal of U.S.
funding) and its impact has been limited. Separately, Stanekzai's
own Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process has had some
success (though likely not as much as is sometimes claimed) but has
not been focused on insurgents. Early last year, reconciliation
came in for discussion in several Policy Action Group (PAG)
meetings, but National Security Advisor Rassoul ultimately
terminated the PAG's involvement, indicating he preferred to see the
issue handled internally, with a view to finding a way to coordinate
all of the Afghan government elements potentially involved in
reconciliation. Finally, late last year the Independent Directorate
of Local Governance (IDLG) began work on its own proposal for
governor-led reconciliation at the provincial level. That program
was specifically endorsed in our new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.


3. (SBU) During a four-month stint last year with the U.S.
Institute for Peace, Minister Stanekzai had time to give some
thought to the problem and for the last two months has worked on a
"framework" for an Afghan-led reconciliation process. At a May 30
meeting with Emboffs, Minister Stanekzai outlined the paper he has
now presented to the President. He hopes to see his suggested
approach approved soon. He believes it may be ripe for general
consultation with international partners within about two weeks. He
stresses that such an overall framework with broad buy-in from
partners is essential if the Afghan government is to be able
eventually to deal with the issue from a position of strength.
Having everyone on the same sheet of music is also critical to
improving Afghan and international strategic communications, where,
Stanekzai believes, we have all been decidedly outmaneuvered by the
enemy.


4. (SBU) Stanekzai calls for the creation of a small unit
answerable to the Palace, with an equally small Secretariat, to
provide authoritative direction. A handful of internationals would
also be involved to guarantee proper coordination regarding such
issues as military targeting, intelligence agency seizures and 1267
blacklisting. Otherwise, his plan calls for using or retooling
existing programs and mechanisms to do the actual work. He welcomes
the IDLG's draft program, which envisions governors playing a major
role in pursuing reconciliation. At the same time, Stanekzai
believes the Afghanistan Public Protection Program (AP3) could be
expanded to help provide greater community-level security for
reconcilees; the mapping of opposition elements done by the DIAG
process could be utilized and its regional offices and provincial
committees possibly enlisted to act as the eyes and ears in the
field of those coordinating reconciliation efforts from Kabul; and
even MRRD's Community Development Councils and/or District
Development Assemblies might be given a broader mandate to play a
part.


5. (SBU) Stanekzai sees three general elements as essential for any
viable reconciliation process. First, there must be true
reintegration, meaning genuine post-reconciliation engagement with
former fighters to give them the necessary support to provide them a
genuine new start. Second, with the help of moderate mullahs,
reconcilees must be put through a process of de-radicalization to
overcome their entrenched mindset. Finally, there must be proper
monitoring, something that has been markedly absent to date from the
PTS process. For the International Community, the Minister foresees
four contributions. First, we should work to align our messaging so
as to speak with one voice on the reconciliation. Second, we should

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put pressure on insurgent sanctuaries, both diplomatically and
militarily. Third, we should increase intelligence-sharing so
Afghan and international forces have a common understanding of the
insurgency. And fourth, we should provide Afghan authorities with
material and technical help to provide the reintegration needed of
the former insurgents.


6. (SBU) It is important to note that Stanekzai insists that our
common red lines must remain intact as a guarantee against entering
into Swat- or Musa Qala-like compromises that pose a threat to
Afghanistan's nascent democracy. This includes loyalty to the
existing constitution.


7. (SBU) Comment: We will continue to pursue our dialogue with
Special Advisor Stanekzai and await with interest the eventual
reaction of other international stakeholders to his full proposal,
when it is distributed. Inasmuch as he calls largely for
incorporating and adapting existing initiatives and mechanisms
rather than creating something totally new, we judge his chance of
success as fairly good inside the Palace and bureaucracy. Although
Stanekzai himself appears intent on forging ahead as quickly as
possible, launching a major new program - even one made up of
existing elements - would likely be seen as politically motivated if
done before the elections. For this reason, the proposal could well
be on hold for the next couple of months.
EIKENBERRY