CHALLENGING THE ELECTION PROCESS TO DELIVER:

UNCLAS KABUL 001557

DEPT FOR S/CRS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: CHALLENGING THE ELECTION PROCESS TO DELIVER:
KABUL RESPONSE

Ref: (A) State 62422; (B) Kabul 1493; (C) Kabul 1424;
(D) Kabul 1140;(E) Kabul 1148; (F) Kabul 1519


Introduction
--------------

1. (SBU) Post appreciates Department's efforts to offer us collegial
advice on how to improve our handling of the upcoming Afghan
election campaign. As will be clear from the specific responses
below, much of what has been recommended is already well underway
and has been for some time. We would caution, however, that our
role is to ensure that no candidate should be able to credibly view
our stance as favoring or opposing any candidate(s). Even as we
promote a free and equitable election campaign, we must guard
against opposition candidates perceiving us as biased toward Karzai,
and also ensuring that Karzai does not conclude that we are biased
against him. A difficult challenge, but one that we can achieve if
we do not allow ourselves to be pressured by any interest groups.

Access to Transport for Candidates
--------------


2. (SBU) We have been indentifying several lines of effort to
provide transportation to candidates:

-- Purchase commercial air tickets for candidates. There are
commercial flights to Mazar, Herat, and Kandahar, the major
population (and vote) centers outside of Kabul. We will follow up
with a cost estimate for Washington funding.

-- Expand dedicated aircraft for candidates, under USAID-leased
aircraft: estimated $2.5 million, would take about 3 weeks to begin
from the time a contract is signed.

-- Space-A travel on ISAF/Chief of Mission aircraft, and UN
aircraft. We expect this resource to be limited, for both ongoing
operational requirements, as well as some current use in support of
moving election materials to provinces.


3. (SBU) We recommend making this service available only to those
candidates conducting serious campaigns. We would identify those
individuals on the following basis: those candidates who have
developed a clearly articulated, issues-based policy platform, and
have displayed their commitment to a serious campaign by
establishing a political apparatus, with campaign workers, offices,
and a national campaign strategy. We expect the majority of
candidates would not qualify on this basis.


4. (SBU) Regarding Karzai travel - we recognize the need to make a
distinction between official and campaign travel. We have been
devising a formula.


5. (SBU) Ambassador Carney met with ISAF DCOS Staff Stability
Admiral Borsboom today (June 17) to request ISAF airlift support to
presidential candidates. From a public perception stance, high
visibility ISAF airlift for opposition candidates would demonstrate
the international community's impartiality. Admiral Borsboom noted
it will be a tough sell, and will brief COMISAF on the
recommendation. Note: Decisions for ISAF to be engaged with
providing transportation support to Presidential candidates will
likely be made at HQ NATO and not in theater.


6. (SBU) Our plan would be to provide one trip/week to each of the
individuals deemed viable. That would come to eight trips total per
candidate over the campaign period. The transportation would also
cover travel of staff and security.

Adequate Security for Candidates
--------------


7. (SBU) As already explained in reftel B, MOI has offered to
provide personal security details (PSD) to candidates. Minister
Atmar has also asked France to undertake a training program to
produce 500 MOI police PSD members. The idea is to produce as many
PSDs as quickly as possible for the election period this summer,
then form them into a VIP-protection unit after the election.
Reftel B also explains Atmar's offer to allow candidates to maintain
their own private security. MOI would provide additional PSD
training and deputize them as ANP officers. We expect most
candidates will choose their own trusted personal security. No
candidate has asked us for PSD protection. We will continue to
query candidates on this issue. MOI Atmar told us on June 9, having
earlier raised the matter with the UK, that he needs 7 to 11 armored
vehicles, which he would distribute to the top candidates for a
period of three months. Instead we are looking to provide these
vehicles and drivers directly to viable candidates through a
contract with Global Security, and are querying them for costs to do
so.

Media and Public Debates
--------------


8. (SBU) To ensure media fairness, we will continue to use all
avenues to push for gazetting of the media law. Again, as noted in
Reftel B paragraph 5, we will continue to report on the Media
Commission and UNDP-Elect's media monitoring activities. These two
give both a domestic and international dimension to media
monitoring. We will maintain close dialogue with Afghan and
international journalists. Also, on Jun 10, Chief Media
Commissioner, Mr. Towhidi, emphasized that the IEC Media Commission
was capable of supporting media law issues regardless of the status
of the new media law. He said that both existing and pending media
laws are adequate for the elections. Consequently, gazetting the new
law is not an issue for the IEC Media Commission.


9. (SBU) As described also in ref B, we will proceed to support with
additional funding the existing UNDP candidate media access budget,
which would buy additional airtime for candidates.


10. (SBU) The Media Commission will sponsor 16 roundtables: 8 TV
media roundtables to be held and rebroadcasted on 5 stations; also 8
radio media roundtables to be held and rebroadcast on 10 radio
stations. Private companies, such as Moby Media, are also planning
public debates. The Media Commission members and UNDP -ELECT
advisors also advised on Jun 10 that the issue for roundtables was
not money. Process and time will restrict adding additional
roundtables. The campaign period is approximately 60 days. Sixteen
roundtables is approximately one every four days.


11. (SBU) We have repeatedly requested funding or budgetary guidance
to support communications and outreach planning. The first unfunded
requests were included in the elections strategic communications
plan forwarded to S/SRAP and SCA/A in early May in Washington.
Funding support for elections outreach and media has been sought for
outreach efforts by Kabul since 25 May.

Polling
--------------


12. (SBU) We agree that additional polling would be very useful (see
again ref B). IRI recently proposed to USAID to conduct two
additional polls before the election. USAID will review
expeditiously, and has money for these polls. We need additional
funding ($400,000) to leverage other existing USG contracts to
conduct two additional nationwide polls using different polling
organizations and up to four targeted focus groups on regional
issues related to elections. Polling requires approximately two
weeks before and after the poll for preparation and analysis. Help
from SRAP to identify a funding source will facilitate this
additional polling.

Minimizing Fraud
--------------


13. (SBU) The Elections Team has proposed, and IEC Chief Electoral
Officer Najafi has enthusiastically endorsed, a comprehensive audit
process aimed at limiting potential fraud, from bogus registration
cards and polling staff collusion. On election day, ECC/IEC
auditors would proactively sample and check ballot boxes once they
arrive at provincial centers, especially in areas deemed highly
vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the ability to void
results of these locations if the evidence warrants it. Election
Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit idea with the
head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department and with
UNDP-ELECT.


14. (SBU) In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process
would dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC
develop a public information campaign targeted at political elites
and polling station workers that would begin one month before
elections. This process was used with some success in Iraq. Refs D
and E list a number of other safeguards in place designed to reduce
fraud.

International Observers
--------------


15. (SBU) A cable on the EU observer mission will arrive septel. We
expect a total of 150-200 international observers in theatre, and we
have created an Observer Secretariat to share information among the
missions. In an effort to coordinate all civilian movement and
logistic support, the Embassy is proposing a joint visitors bureau
made up of elements of existing JVBs at USFOR-A, ISAF, and Embassy
Kabul.

Implementation of Presidential
Decree on Non-Interference
--------------


16. (SBU) Ref F includes comments by President Karzai's chief of
staff on implementing the decree. We are urging Karzai at every
opportunity to publicize his decree. Paragraphs 7-9 of ref B list
ways post is working to enhance reporting on electoral
irregularities.

PRT Guidance
--------------


17. (SBU) On May 10 the Deputy Ambassador signed civ-mil guidance
for election support. Between May 20 and June 4 the guidance went
out: From the Embassy to US elements in the field (to PRT State
reps); USAID out to USAID elements in the field; USFOR-A to regional
US elements. ISAF took an abridged version and sent out as a FRAGO
to Regional Commands. Before we issue further civ-mil guidance,
elements in the field need ISAF guidance on what support they should
extend to civilians arriving in theater for the elections. Amb.
Carney addressed this with ISAF on June 17. We will work to get the
next round of guidance distributed soonest. Post is separately
drafting instructions from Amb. Eikenberry to U.S. elements in
theatre as well as FAQs on what to do when election irregularities
are encountered.

Indelible Ink
--------------


18. (SBU) Indelible ink will be used throughout the country on
election day. UNDP is currently testing the ink for quality. The
notion of using invisible, UV fluorescent ink is based on a
misunderstanding of militant Taliban practice. The Taliban are very
unlikely to target individuals -- or their offending, ink-stained
appendages -- even if the Taliban decide to oppose the election.
Rather, they would target international forces, polling centers,
electoral officials, or candidates rather than see a popular
reaction stemming from deliberate attacks on the population itself.
Nor is there enough lead time to identify a truly fluorescent
durable, invisible ink, purchase it and the hardware to use it with,
and train a fraction of the polling station officials in its use.
We raised the idea with the British Embassy (without leading the
witness),and got the very same analysis.

EIKENBERY