CHALLENGING THE ELECTION PROCESS TO DELIVER:

UNCLAS KABUL 001557 DEPT FOR S/CRS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: CHALLENGING THE ELECTION PROCESS TO DELIVER: KABUL RESPONSE Ref: (A) State 62422; (B) Kabul 1493; (C) Kabul 1424; (D) Kabul 1140;(E) Kabul 1148; (F) Kabul 1519 Introduction -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Post appreciates Department's efforts to offer us collegial advice on how to improve our handling of the upcoming Afghan election campaign. As will be clear from the specific responses below, much of what has been recommended is already well underway and has been for some time. We would caution, however, that our role is to ensure that no candidate should be able to credibly view our stance as favoring or opposing any candidate(s). Even as we promote a free and equitable election campaign, we must guard against opposition candidates perceiving us as biased toward Karzai, and also ensuring that Karzai does not conclude that we are biased against him. A difficult challenge, but one that we can achieve if we do not allow ourselves to be pressured by any interest groups. Access to Transport for Candidates -------------- ¶2. (SBU) We have been indentifying several lines of effort to provide transportation to candidates: -- Purchase commercial air tickets for candidates. There are commercial flights to Mazar, Herat, and Kandahar, the major population (and vote) centers outside of Kabul. We will follow up with a cost estimate for Washington funding. -- Expand dedicated aircraft for candidates, under USAID-leased aircraft: estimated $2.5 million, would take about 3 weeks to begin from the time a contract is signed. -- Space-A travel on ISAF/Chief of Mission aircraft, and UN aircraft. We expect this resource to be limited, for both ongoing operational requirements, as well as some current use in support of moving election materials to provinces. ¶3. (SBU) We recommend making this service available only to those candidates conducting serious campaigns. We would identify those individuals on the following basis: those candidates who have developed a clearly articulated, issues-based policy platform, and have displayed their commitment to a serious campaign by establishing a political apparatus, with campaign workers, offices, and a national campaign strategy. We expect the majority of candidates would not qualify on this basis. ¶4. (SBU) Regarding Karzai travel - we recognize the need to make a distinction between official and campaign travel. We have been 
devising a formula. ¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Carney met with ISAF DCOS Staff Stability Admiral Borsboom today (June 17) to request ISAF airlift support to presidential candidates. From a public perception stance, high visibility ISAF airlift for opposition candidates would demonstrate the international community's impartiality. Admiral Borsboom noted it will be a tough sell, and will brief COMISAF on the recommendation. Note: Decisions for ISAF to be engaged with providing transportation support to Presidential candidates will likely be made at HQ NATO and not in theater. ¶6. (SBU) Our plan would be to provide one trip/week to each of the individuals deemed viable. That would come to eight trips total per candidate over the campaign period. The transportation would also cover travel of staff and security. Adequate Security for Candidates -------------- ¶7. (SBU) As already explained in reftel B, MOI has offered to provide personal security details (PSD) to candidates. Minister Atmar has also asked France to undertake a training program to produce 500 MOI police PSD members. The idea is to produce as many PSDs as quickly as possible for the election period this summer, then form them into a VIP-protection unit after the election. Reftel B also explains Atmar's offer to allow candidates to maintain their own private security. MOI would provide additional PSD training and deputize them as ANP officers. We expect most candidates will choose their own trusted personal security. No candidate has asked us for PSD protection. We will continue to query candidates on this issue. MOI Atmar told us on June 9, having earlier raised the matter with the UK, that he needs 7 to 11 armored vehicles, which he would distribute to the top candidates for a period of three months. Instead we are looking to provide these vehicles and drivers directly to viable candidates through a contract with Global Security, and are querying them for costs to do so. Media and Public Debates -------------- ¶8. (SBU) To ensure media fairness, we will continue to use all avenues to push for gazetting of the media law. Again, as noted in Reftel B paragraph 5, we will continue to report on the Media Commission and UNDP-Elect's media monitoring activities. These two give both a domestic and international dimension to media monitoring. We will maintain close dialogue with Afghan and international journalists. Also, on Jun 10, Chief Media Commissioner, Mr. Towhidi, emphasized that the IEC Media Commission was capable of supporting media law issues regardless of the status of the new media law. He said that both existing and pending media laws are adequate for the elections. Consequently, gazetting the new law is not an issue for the IEC Media Commission. ¶9. (SBU) As described also in ref B, we will proceed to support with additional funding the existing UNDP candidate media access budget, which would buy additional airtime for candidates. ¶10. (SBU) The Media Commission will sponsor 16 roundtables: 8 TV media roundtables to be held and rebroadcasted on 5 stations; also 8 radio media roundtables to be held and rebroadcast on 10 radio stations. Private companies, such as Moby Media, are also planning public debates. The Media Commission members and UNDP -ELECT advisors also advised on Jun 10 that the issue for roundtables was not money. Process and time will restrict adding additional roundtables. The campaign period is approximately 60 days. Sixteen roundtables is approximately one every four days. ¶11. (SBU) We have repeatedly requested funding or budgetary guidance to support communications and outreach planning. The first unfunded requests were included in the elections strategic communications plan forwarded to S/SRAP and SCA/A in early May in Washington. Funding support for elections outreach and media has been sought for outreach efforts by Kabul since 25 May. Polling -------------- ¶12. (SBU) We agree that additional polling would be very useful (see again ref B). IRI recently proposed to USAID to conduct two additional polls before the election. USAID will review expeditiously, and has money for these polls. We need additional funding ($400,000) to leverage other existing USG contracts to conduct two additional nationwide polls using different polling organizations and up to four targeted focus groups on regional issues related to elections. Polling requires approximately two weeks before and after the poll for preparation and analysis. Help from SRAP to identify a funding source will facilitate this additional polling. Minimizing Fraud -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The Elections Team has proposed, and IEC Chief Electoral Officer Najafi has enthusiastically endorsed, a comprehensive audit process aimed at limiting potential fraud, from bogus registration cards and polling staff collusion. On election day, ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample and check ballot boxes once they arrive at provincial centers, especially in areas deemed highly vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants it. Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department and with UNDP-ELECT. ¶14. (SBU) In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling station workers that would begin one month before elections. This process was used with some success in Iraq. Refs D and E list a number of other safeguards in place designed to reduce fraud. International Observers -------------- ¶15. (SBU) A cable on the EU observer mission will arrive septel. We expect a total of 150-200 international observers in theatre, and we have created an Observer Secretariat to share information among the missions. In an effort to coordinate all civilian movement and logistic support, the Embassy is proposing a joint visitors bureau made up of elements of existing JVBs at USFOR-A, ISAF, and Embassy Kabul. Implementation of Presidential Decree on Non-Interference -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Ref F includes comments by President Karzai's chief of staff on implementing the decree. We are urging Karzai at every opportunity to publicize his decree. Paragraphs 7-9 of ref B list ways post is working to enhance reporting on electoral irregularities. PRT Guidance -------------- ¶17. (SBU) On May 10 the Deputy Ambassador signed civ-mil guidance for election support. Between May 20 and June 4 the guidance went out: From the Embassy to US elements in the field (to PRT State reps); USAID out to USAID elements in the field; USFOR-A to regional US elements. ISAF took an abridged version and sent out as a FRAGO to Regional Commands. Before we issue further civ-mil guidance, elements in the field need ISAF guidance on what support they should extend to civilians arriving in theater for the elections. Amb. Carney addressed this with ISAF on June 17. We will work to get the next round of guidance distributed soonest. Post is separately drafting instructions from Amb. Eikenberry to U.S. elements in theatre as well as FAQs on what to do when election irregularities are encountered. Indelible Ink -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Indelible ink will be used throughout the country on election day. UNDP is currently testing the ink for quality. The notion of using invisible, UV fluorescent ink is based on a misunderstanding of militant Taliban practice. The Taliban are very unlikely to target individuals -- or their offending, ink-stained appendages -- even if the Taliban decide to oppose the election. Rather, they would target international forces, polling centers, electoral officials, or candidates rather than see a popular reaction stemming from deliberate attacks on the population itself. Nor is there enough lead time to identify a truly fluorescent durable, invisible ink, purchase it and the hardware to use it with, and train a fraction of the polling station officials in its use. We raised the idea with the British Embassy (without leading the witness),and got the very same analysis. EIKENBERY