EU, U.S. AMBASSADORS DISCUSS STRATEGY, DEVELOPMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001522 DEPT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A DEPT PASS FOR AID/ANE DEPT PASS USTR FOR DELANEY AND DEANGELIS DEPT PASS OPIC DEPT PASS FOR TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A NSC FOR JWOOD TREASURY FOR MHIRSON, ABAUKOL, AWELLER, AND MNUGENT COMMERCE FOR HAMROCK-MANN, DEES, AND FONOVICH SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL EAID ECON AF SUBJECT: EU, U.S. AMBASSADORS DISCUSS STRATEGY, DEVELOPMENT CIV-MIL SURGE TOPS LIST OF TOPICS ¶1. (SBU) During a brief June 7 courtesy call, Ambassador Eikenberry briefed European Commission Ambassador Hansjoerg Kretschmer on the US strategy in Afghanistan. The Ambassador told Kretschmer that strategy focuses on the most insecure areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and that the civilian aspect would be highlighting work on both governance and reconstruction. The Ambassador said that there would be a more balanced civ-mil approach to operations. ¶2. (SBU) At the same time, the Ambassador acknowledged that the lack of a secure environment for implementation of civilian programs was going to require a military effort. He said the objective of military operations would be to improve the security of the population and create an environment in which civilian efforts could engage effectively. The Ambassador added that the concept of Clear, Hold, Shape, Build was not linear, with each step in order; rather, he emphasized that some of these steps would be simultaneous and that the civilian and military activities would need to be well integrated to exploit this. District Support Teams would be crucial in this effort, he said. INTEGRATION OF CIV-MIL EFFORTS CRUCIAL ¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador told Kretschmer that civ-mil activities needed to be better coordinated at the regional level and below. He said that often military commanders cannot identify real civilian counterparts. The Ambassador said that measures were being taken to address this problem. Kretschmer noted that the strategy depended on numerous variables, and he asked the Ambassador if some relatively peaceful areas would see a benefit to being "bad boys" in order to get attention and economic aid. Kretschmer also asked what the strategy would mean for cooperation with the international community. He specifically asked if the USG still found ANDS relevant. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that SRAP Holbrooke had created an international network to address just such issues. He added that the United States was not pulling back from ANDS, and remained very much committed to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The Ambassador did note, however, that some funding for security may be applied in ways perhaps not envisioned by the JCMB. Kretschmer expressed concern about the military's role in Rule of Law issues. He also asked why the United States believed that an increase in military force would address security concerns, when an increase in troop levels has coincided with an increase in insurgent activity. ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the increase in military forces will provide troops to secure at-risk populations and help accelerate the training of the Afghan National Army and Police. He said that much depends on how we define progress. While NATO-ISAF and the Afghan National Security Forces will not be able to gain control over all areas in the East and South, there will be evident gains. Still, the Ambassador emphasized that we will still be fighting there a year from now, and perhaps as we squeeze the insurgency in some areas, there will be additional violence in other areas. He added that having control over significant population centers in Helmand and Kandahar is also an attainable goal. The Ambassador added that Pakistan remains a crucial variable in all this and that the Pakistani Army's actions in Swat are important and possible action in Waziristan could yield significant gains. At present, however, there was no indication that the Pakistanis would be taking on the Afghan Taliban. WHAT CONSTITUTES "A WIN"? ¶6. (SBU) Kretschmer asked how we would define victory in Afghanistan. Are defeating the Taliban and eliminating the source of international terror the same thing, or are they different objectives? He asked further if indeed international terror could be defeated. Does defeat of international terror mean an end to Al Qaeda operations worldwide? Kretschmer noted British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's recent comment that the coalition was in Afghanistan "to create a living democracy." Kretschmer bluntly said that if KABUL 00001522 002 OF 002 that were the real reason, "we wouldn't be here now." ¶7. (SBU) The Ambassador said that "modern jihad" began with the fight against the USSR and not 9/11. He added that if AQ were to be driven out of Pakistan and its top leadership eliminated, then the movement would lose credibility. As to Afghanistan, our efforts here were to ensure that the country never again becomes a safe haven, and to do that we must transform conditions on the ground. Kretschmer said that the country can only be transformed to the extent that it wanted to be. He noted the National Solidarity Program (NSP) as being perhaps a good model of success, empowering the local village leadership and giving them a stake in providing security. Kretschmer opined that currently, the choice for many Afghans was to suffer the Taliban reluctantly or fight them, risking death on behalf of what he called a corrupt and unresponsive government. EIKENBERRY