Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09KABUL1520
2009-06-14 11:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

UN 1267 AL QAEDA/TALIBAN SANCTIONS TEAM BRIEFS

Tags:  PINR PREL PTER UN AF 
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VZCZCXRO8247
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1520/01 1651152
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141152Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9415
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001520 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2019
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER UN AF
SUBJECT: UN 1267 AL QAEDA/TALIBAN SANCTIONS TEAM BRIEFS
EMBASSY ON DELISTING STRATEGY

Classified By: Political Counselor Alan K. Yu for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001520 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2019 TAGS: PINR PREL PTER UN AF SUBJECT: UN 1267 AL QAEDA/TALIBAN SANCTIONS TEAM BRIEFS EMBASSY ON DELISTING STRATEGY Classified By: Political Counselor Alan K. Yu for reasons 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: UN 1267 Sanctions Team Coordinator Richard Barrett told D/AMB Ricciardone on June 8 the UN 1267 sanctions program for al-Qaeda and the Taliban was in need of repair and reinvigoration. He outlined a two-step approach to establish the criteria by which sanctioning countries on the Security Council could be satisfied that candidates for delisting had in fact reconciled. He added that the definition of those who could be listed has been expanded to include Taliban "associates", e.g. financiers and business entities. -------------- Sanctions Program in a Critical Phase -------------- ¶2. (C) Barrett, the Coordinator of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council's Committee for al-Qaeda and Taliban, said the sanctions program was in a critical phase because some countries were failing to enforce sanctions, while the Afghans were failing to add new names to the list. The problem lay in the lack of a structured mechanism for removing reconciled or former Taliban from the sanctions list. Sanctioning countries were then hesitant to apply the sanctions, and Afghans resisted adding current Taliban field commanders, businesses, and associates to the list. ¶3. (C) Barrett said the key problem the committee faced on delisting was the hesitation of some nations, most notably Russia, to remove Taliban, reportedly reconciled or not. Those on the list had been placed on it for having done very bad things, and the Russians wanted demonstrable proof that these people had reconciled. Barrett acknowledged that while it was important to support the reconciliation process, he advised that the reviewing states also had to be careful not to weaken the committee's charter and the sanctions regime. He argued the focus of the sanctions regime should be on preventing future behavior, not on punishing past misdeeds. ¶4. (C) Barrett said National Security Advisor Rassoul, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the other Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would each have a role to play in gathering the information necessary to make the case for delisting. The international community needed to reassure the Afghans that a delisting mechanism would work, and urge t
hem to help prepare the information needed to demonstrate reconciliation. ¶5. (C) Barrett proposed a two-step approach to address Afghan and international concerns: 1) France would meet with Russia and the United Kingdom to discuss proposed criteria to delist reconciled Taliban; and 2) the Afghans should then submit two or three names of people who met those criteria for consideration for delisting. Barrett felt once the submitted Taliban were reviewed and delisted, the existence of a delisting program with demonstrable effect would satisfy the concerns of sanctions-implementing countries. This confidence-building step, in turn, could encourage the Afghans to submit the names of current Taliban. Barrett's team was to meet that day with NSC and NDS personnel to discuss ways forward. -------------- Expanded Pool of Potential Listees -------------- ¶6. (C) There are currently 509 names on the UN 1267 sanctions list - 142 Taliban members, and 367 al Qaeda members, associates or business entities. The Sanctions Committee has expanded the categories of those who could be listed under UN 1267 to include "associates" of known Taliban. Associates would include narco-traffickers, business fronts, and others that provide direct financial assistance to the Taliban. Those same categories of direct supporters of al Qaeda are already listed. ¶7. (C) There are a number of prominent current Taliban that have not yet been listed, including Baitullah Mehsud. Barrett attributed their absence from the list to concerns over the listing and delisting mechanisms. On the other hand, Barrett is concerned the list has become so large as to be meaningless. He believed the sanctions list should be only 2/3 of its current size, contending the sanctions would be much more effective when applied to a smaller pool of listees. A smaller pool would also make it easier for sanctioning countries to review and implement. -------------- KABUL 00001520 002 OF 002 Way Ahead -------------- ¶8. (C) The Sanctions Committee has proposed a review of the entire Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions list by June 2010. The committee would require each country to review its submissions, and to update its rationale for the listing, if necessary. Barrett asked that the U.S. share with the Committee any developed information on Taliban associates outside of Afghanistan, for possible listing. He encouraged the Embassy to keep working closely with the various GIRoA entities on the issues of illicit financing, registration of hawaladars, and development of Afghanistan's financial intelligence unit as means of further damaging financial support for the Taliban. EIKENBERRY

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