UN 1267 AL QAEDA/TALIBAN SANCTIONS TEAM BRIEFS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001520

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2019
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER UN AF
SUBJECT: UN 1267 AL QAEDA/TALIBAN SANCTIONS TEAM BRIEFS
EMBASSY ON DELISTING STRATEGY

Classified By: Political Counselor Alan K. Yu for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: UN 1267 Sanctions Team Coordinator Richard
Barrett told D/AMB Ricciardone on June 8 the UN 1267
sanctions program for al-Qaeda and the Taliban was in need of
repair and reinvigoration. He outlined a two-step approach to
establish the criteria by which sanctioning countries on the
Security Council could be satisfied that candidates for
delisting had in fact reconciled. He added that the
definition of those who could be listed has been expanded to
include Taliban "associates", e.g. financiers and business
entities.

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Sanctions Program in a Critical Phase
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2. (C) Barrett, the Coordinator of the Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council's
Committee for al-Qaeda and Taliban, said the sanctions
program was in a critical phase because some countries were
failing to enforce sanctions, while the Afghans were failing
to add new names to the list. The problem lay in the lack of
a structured mechanism for removing reconciled or former
Taliban from the sanctions list. Sanctioning countries were
then hesitant to apply the sanctions, and Afghans resisted
adding current Taliban field commanders, businesses, and
associates to the list.


3. (C) Barrett said the key problem the committee faced on
delisting was the hesitation of some nations, most notably
Russia, to remove Taliban, reportedly reconciled or not.
Those on the list had been placed on it for having done very
bad things, and the Russians wanted demonstrable proof that
these people had reconciled. Barrett acknowledged that while
it was important to support the reconciliation process, he
advised that the reviewing states also had to be careful not
to weaken the committee's charter and the sanctions regime.
He argued the focus of the sanctions regime should be on
preventing future behavior, not on punishing past misdeeds.


4. (C) Barrett said National Security Advisor Rassoul, the
National Directorate of Security (NDS) and the other Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) would each have a role to
play in gathering the information necessary to make the case
for delisting. The international community needed to
reassure the Afghans that a delisting mechanism would work,
and urge them to help prepare the information needed to
demonstrate reconciliation.


5. (C) Barrett proposed a two-step approach to address
Afghan and international concerns: 1) France would meet with
Russia and the United Kingdom to discuss proposed criteria to
delist reconciled Taliban; and 2) the Afghans should then
submit two or three names of people who met those criteria
for consideration for delisting. Barrett felt once the
submitted Taliban were reviewed and delisted, the existence
of a delisting program with demonstrable effect would satisfy
the concerns of sanctions-implementing countries. This
confidence-building step, in turn, could encourage the
Afghans to submit the names of current Taliban. Barrett's
team was to meet that day with NSC and NDS personnel to
discuss ways forward.

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Expanded Pool of Potential Listees
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6. (C) There are currently 509 names on the UN 1267
sanctions list - 142 Taliban members, and 367 al Qaeda
members, associates or business entities. The Sanctions
Committee has expanded the categories of those who could be
listed under UN 1267 to include "associates" of known
Taliban. Associates would include narco-traffickers,
business fronts, and others that provide direct financial
assistance to the Taliban. Those same categories of direct
supporters of al Qaeda are already listed.


7. (C) There are a number of prominent current Taliban that
have not yet been listed, including Baitullah Mehsud.
Barrett attributed their absence from the list to concerns
over the listing and delisting mechanisms. On the other
hand, Barrett is concerned the list has become so large as to
be meaningless. He believed the sanctions list should be
only 2/3 of its current size, contending the sanctions would
be much more effective when applied to a smaller pool of
listees. A smaller pool would also make it easier for
sanctioning countries to review and implement.

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Way Ahead
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8. (C) The Sanctions Committee has proposed a review of the
entire Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions list by June 2010. The
committee would require each country to review its
submissions, and to update its rationale for the listing, if
necessary. Barrett asked that the U.S. share with the
Committee any developed information on Taliban associates
outside of Afghanistan, for possible listing. He encouraged
the Embassy to keep working closely with the various GIRoA
entities on the issues of illicit financing, registration of
hawaladars, and development of Afghanistan's financial
intelligence unit as means of further damaging financial
support for the Taliban.
EIKENBERRY