AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF DAUDZAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001519 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/A, EUR, NEA STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR WOOD OSD FOR FLOURNOY CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICENT KABUL FOR COS USFOR-A E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM SNAR AF SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN: PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF DAUDZAI ON TURKISH FONMIN VISIT, IRAN ELECTION OUTCOME, REELECTION CAMPAIGNING BY AFGHAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Classified By: POLMIL Counselor Robert Clarke for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary: Presidential Chief of Staff Minister Umar Daud Zai (Daudzai) said that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu shared "fresh ideas" on improving Turkish-Afghan bilateral relations and regional ties during his June 11-13 visit here. Daudzai mentioned education, economics, and investment. Daudzai, a former Afghan Ambassador to Tehran, also opined that an election victory by Ahmadinejad in Iran was not surprising. Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli informed Daudzai about the state of play on the U.S. request for transfer of Haji Bagcho to U.S. custody (septel). Daudzai outlined several steps the Afghan government (GIRoA) has taken to keep government employees from working on President Karzai's reelection campaign. He discussed the difficulties of applying this principle to himself. End Summary. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT 2, (C) On June 13, Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli called on Minister Daudzai to inform him about the efforts to transfer major drug figure Haji Bagcho to U.S. custody, to ask for a readout on the June 11-13 visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu to Afghanistan, and to raise the issue of GIRoA employee involvement in the Karzai political campaign. Davutoglu had visited Mazar-e-Sharif in the North, had meetings with President Karzai, Foreign Minister Spanta, Defense Minister Wardak, Interior Minister Atmar and been the guest of honor at a GIRoA diplomatic dinner with the international community. ¶3. (C) Daudzai said that, for the first time, Davutoglu had come with "fresh ideas" on how to expand and improve Turkish-Afghan relations, both bilateral and regional. A key example was Davutoglu's offer to expand Turkey's role in "secular" education by building more schools in the provinces and sending more school teachers. Ambassador Mussomeli noted that beyond "secular" education, Turkey could also provide a useful model of moderate Islamic instruction. ¶4. (C) The Turkish FonMin also offered more support in the economic sector, according to Daudzai. He promised Turkey's help with bilateral and regional connections to find ways to boost trade. He spoke of much heavier Turkish investment in Afghan infrastructure. Daudzai commented that the exchanges seemed more substantial than talks on this subject in the past. ¶5. (C) Daudzai said that the bottom line for Afghanistan seemed to be a political evolution to a "new regional stature." It was reflected in the Turkish Foreign Minister's approach on this visit and even in a shift in Saudi Arabia's decision to accept Afghanistan passports. There appears to be an end to "looking at Afghanistan through Pakistan lens, and perhaps even a reversal," Daudzai commented. ¶6. (C) During the meeting Daudzai received a cellphone call from Abdul Rashid Dostum, the northern warlord. Darzai did not take the call but confirmed that Dostum is still in Turkey. AHMADINEJAD VICTORY IN IRAN "NOT SURPRISING" ¶7. (C) Daudzai, who was posted to Iran as Aghanistan's ambassador, said an Ahmadinejad victory was "not surprising." It was in Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's interest for Ahmadinejad to win, would ensure that support was marshaled, and had one of his sons managing Ahmadinejad's election campaign. The lopsided result had a basis in popular support generated by Ahmadinejad's pro-poor promises, including one to redistribute more of the oil profits to the poor. Daudzai, briefing discussing Iran's uneven relations with Afghanistan, noted that Iran's Persian sense of cultural and historical superiority led Iran to consider the United States as the only "people" fully worthy of contesting. This was in large part how the regime defined and buttressed itself, making the basis for better relations difficult. ¶8. (C) Daudzai volunteered, in an entirely affable manner, that he had heard he was considered too pro-Iranian by some in the USG. He said that such an assessment was mistaken and anyone holding it should consider that there were some who wished to discredit him. He claimed that when he was posted to Tehran, it had been said by some senior Iranians that his appointment was "tantamount to establishing a U.S. Embassy." He said that he had been constantly followed, and his interpreter held to divulge what Daudzai had said during meetings with western ambassadors. The interpreter finally convinced his interrogators that he had not been in the meetings because Daudzai did not need translation for English. (Bio note: Daudzai, a confident and polished individual, speaks perfect English. He has seven children. His eldest son studies at the American University Dubai. His other six children are enrolled in primary/secondary level classes at the International School of Kabul, where he was this year's commencement speaker. End Bio note.) GIRoA EMPLOYEES AND KARZAI'S CAMPAIGN ¶9. (C) Ambassador Mussomeli raised the issue of GIRoA employees being involved in President Karzai's election campaign. Daudzai responded that the government was conscious of the issue and dealing with it. The President himself had told a recent cabinet meeting that no ministers are to be involved in campaigning for his reelection--and by extension, none of their subordinates. There is naturally an urge among some in the Palace to be involved, and they are being offered a three-month leave of absense,or temporary resignation with rights of reinstatement (although not necessarily to the same post). ¶10. (C) Daudzai, who earlier in the conversation had suggested that he is running Karzai's campaign, said he could not take a leave of absence from being presidential chief of staff. "I don't participate in the campaign, the President might have to be more involved himself, which could be worse," he said. "If worse comes to worse," he added, "I will consider not being involved in campaign work from 8 am to 4 pm." EIKENBERRY