ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS:KABUL RESPONSES

UNCLAS KABUL 001493

DEPT FOR S/CRS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS:KABUL RESPONSES

REF: STATE 59361



INTRODUCTION
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1. The USG and its international partners are taking steps to help
Afghanistan hold credible presidential and provincial council
elections in 2009. The augmented U.S. Mission will lead
implementation of a number of efforts. Successful realization of
these objectives will rely in most cases on broad international
community consent, ISAF/USFOR-A support, and most importantly, GIRoA
buy-in and action. This cable does not represent the entirety of
Mission efforts in support of elections, but instead identifies some
key nodes designed to enhance the credibility of elections.


2. Achieving credible elections requires a proactive strategy of
changing Afghan popular perceptions that elections will be
inherently flawed and that the United States will determine the
outcome of the election. In order to change this perception, we
must aggressively implement a strategy of impartiality through
definitive action and not by words alone.
MESSAGING: A VITAL ELEMENT
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3. Embassy Kabul recommends POTUS make a statement endorsing the
elections process as a sign of Afghanistan's progress, underscoring
USG support for the process, and declaring our impartiality over
candidates. We additionally recommend that all USG elements refrain
from making predictions on electoral outcomes - both publicly, to
President Karzai, and in private conversations. It is increasingly
clear that statements implying the outcome is a forgone conclusion
directly influence the behavior of political figures in Afghanistan.
SRSG Kai Eide and leaders of key donor nations should make similar
statements of neutrality.


4. Ambassador Eikenberry will continue to meet with presidential
candidates to demonstrate impartiality. He would deliver a
three-pronged message: a) The elections are an Afghan-led process
with strong international support; b) Candidates must present the
electorate clear choices by discussing concrete issues and programs;
c) Whatever the outcome, it is vital that Afghans see these
elections as advancing the institutionalization of processes toward
representative government; hence the critical need for fairness and
transparency.
BOLSTERING MEDIA FREEDOM
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5. We will continue to publicly call for President Karzai to gazette
the Media Law. Meanwhile, we will focus on strengthening the
Electoral Media Commission (EMC),as described in the next
paragraph, and scrutinizing any IEC Media Commission sanctions or
referrals to the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism. We
will encourage the EMC to refer complaints to the Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC) when feasible. USG or partner-initiated
media monitoring activities at this stage would send a signal of
over-involvement. Three bodies work to improve election-related
media monitoring: the Independent Election Commission (IEC),the
Media Commission, and UNDP-ELECT.

CANDIDATE ACCESS TO MEDIA
--------------


6. In addition to enforcing the Mass Media Code of Conduct to seek
fair media treatment for candidates, the Media Commission has
accepted responsibility for providing "Sponsored Advertising
Programming" which offers each presidential candidate a baseline
amount of cost-free radio or TV airtime. While the IEC has set
aside USD 2 million for candidate roundtable discussions, we
recommend establishing a separate fund that could buy additional
airtime for candidates on private airwaves, or sponsor private
presidential debates. The IEC and the ECC would approve this fund,
likely be administered by UNDP-Elect, prior to its creation. We
understand UNDP has a small budget for candidate media access and
has agreed to add to this budget. At issue is the D/SRSG contention
that access be equitable, not equal. The problem is who determines
candidate strength to realize equitable funding.

REPORTING ELECTORAL IRREGULARITIES
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7. The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is behind schedule in
building its office and staff capacities in the provinces. This is
a significant weakness. Post has engaged with the IEC, UNDP, IEC
and donors to identify ways to accelerate this timeline. Further,
Ambassador Carney has proposed the establishing a regionally-based
ECC Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that would respond to substantial
violations in a short amount of time.


8. We have consulted with the ECC on how to raise its profile in
publicizing instances of electoral intimidation.


9. Post has developed guidelines and FAQs for civilian PRT and
Regional Command representatives for their appropriate role in
reporting and acting on electoral fraud and irregularities. These
guidelines will emphasize that USG employees may not refer
complaints directly to the ECC under Afghan law, but that they may
advise Afghans on how to report complaints. By following this
process, we will help strengthen the ECC as an Afghan institution.
Post has set up a portal to collect and compile reports on election
irregularities from U.S. Mission elements "in the field." PRT
officers regularly meet with provincial election officials and
candidates to identify logistical issues, to discuss basic elections
concepts, and to report on elections-related news from their
provinces. We expect the volume of reporting to increase
significantly as the campaign season kicks off on June 16.


10. We will work with the MoI to set up the joint police monitoring
body proposed by Minister Atmar to Ambassador Carney on June 9
(septel). This body would include representatives of the
international community, presidential candidate agents, political
party agents, existing MOI inspector general officials and
international military representatives. The team would review ANP
performance and behavior in relation to the elections and evaluate
observed or reported irregularities in ANP behavior. The team would
report incidents to the MoI and the ECC for appropriate follow up
action.

CANDIDATE SECURITY
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11. The MoI will make ANP personal security details (PSD) available
to all candidates, but we anticipate that candidates will want to
source their own private security. We have engaged MOI to ensure it
will allow candidates to choose private, licensed security. This
may require raising the current cap on private security companies.
Ambassador Carney asked Minister Atmar on June 9 to use his
authority to raise the cap. Atmar has agreed in principle to allow
candidates to select their own PSDs and ensure these individuals
receive similar training to those ANP assigned PSD duty. While
candidate security is important to fair and transparent elections,
USG direct funding of candidate PSDs would be problematic for
political and legal reasons.

TRANSPORT FOR CANDIDATES
--------------


12. The presidential incumbent has a natural advantage with regard
to transport and logistical support. However, commercial aviation
- which reaches all major cities - is available to Afghans with
sufficient financial resources. The GIRoA agreed to establish a
fund for candidates' travel, but it has not identified a funding
source nor agreed who would manage such a fund. Other
non-commercial air transport options include the United Nations,
ISAF, and U.S. Mission aircraft. The international community in
Kabul are discussion options for providing support in this area.
The number of candidates and their desire to travel (not a
traditional method of campaigning in Afghanistan) would impact the
design of this scheme.


13. Note: USAID is exploring the capacity to temporarily increase
the number of aircraft in its fleet to partially accommodate the
demand for election observers, officials, and media. Post views the
equal provision of travel to candidates on U.S. Mission-provided
transport as a tangible demonstration of USG neutrality in the
election.

ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE IEC
--------------


14. The IEC is generally perceived by the Afghan public as biased in
favor of the inumnal election polls if
fve audit process
aimed at limiting potential fraud from bogus registration cards and
polling staff collusion. ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample
and check ballot boxes at provincial centers, especially in areas
deemed highly vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the
ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants
it. Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit
idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department.

21. In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would
dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a
public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling
station workers that would begin one month before elections. This
process was used with some success in Iraq.
EIKENBERRY informing voters and poll workers of the regulations
and possible consequences of misapplication or fraud.

POLLING
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16. The International Republican Institute (IRI) will soon release
the results of a long-in-the-works poll. A second USAID-funded IRI
poll is awaiting IRI submission of a contract request. There are
few unbiased polling agencies that can reliably perform credible
country-wide polls. We will continue to seek out polling agencies
that could provide credible elections polling. Given these
constraints, in addition to the short timeframe before the election,
the Embassy will arrange two to three additional election polls if
funding can be arranged. Due to the unreliability of exit polling
in Afghanistan, and the weak public understanding of their purpose
we believe exit polls could undermine the normal electoral process,
particularly if initial feedback does not reflect the final result.

OTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY
OF ELECTIONS -- ACCELERATING CIVIC EDUCATION
--------------


17. International partners will continue supporting the ongoing IEC
national civic education on the electoral process and election
safeguards. For elements particularly aimed at youth and female
audiences, the international community should augment country-wide
dissemination of IEC approved materials - including through ISAF
media facilities - and discuss elections with local religious and
civil leaders to gain their understanding, support to the election
process, and commentary on local concerns and issues. We have
forwarded three funding proposals to S/SRAP that would expand civic
outreach. These efforts include a national newspaper ($200k),
additional radio stations in the South and East ($3M),and election
outreach, interviews, and SMS texting ($40k),and would support
immediate election goals and long-term strategic communication
objectives.

STIMULATING NATIONAL DEBATE
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18. Post is working with locally-based partners to encourage Afghan
media to stimulate a deliberative dialogue of key local and national
issues. This, in turn, will require candidates to articulate
specific visions and platforms, and will serve to emphasize that
individual votes count. Tolo TV and Radio Watandar have several
initiatives on this front. The Embassy will continue to host "web
chats" with Afghan citizens on topics related to elections. Our
goals are to foster a deeper civic understanding of the spirit of
elections.

SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND INTERNATIONAL
MEDIA
-------------- --------------


19. With UNDP endorsement donor buy-in, the Interagency Elections
Support Team is working to establish an ad-hoc Secretariat to
coordinate international observation - which we expect will be
around 200 observers strong - and facilitate international media
observation country-wide. The Secretariat will map international
observer delegations, including those from resident diplomatic
missions, identify observer standards, create an observer training
program, and share information (when appropriate) on deployment.
The Secretariat might also facilitate logistical support to
observers and media in outlying regions. We are also outlining the
bedspace and transport facilities available at Regional Commands and
subordinate units and will work with ISAF to produce an order
outlining appropriate support. We may require support in obtaining
NATO HQ or SHAPE guidance to ISAF to facilitate observer and media
missions.

AUDIT CONCEPT
--------------

20. The Elections Team has proposed, and IEC Chief Electoral Officer
Najafi has enthusiastically endorsed, a comprehensive audit process
aimed at limiting potential fraud from bogus registration cards and
polling staff collusion. ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample
and check ballot boxes at provincial centers, especially in areas
deemed highly vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the
ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants
it. Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit
idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department.

21. In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would
dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a
public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling
station workers that would begin one month before elections. This
process was used with some success in Iraq.
EIKENBERRY