ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS:KABUL RESPONSES

UNCLAS KABUL 001493 DEPT FOR S/CRS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL AF SUBJECT: ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS:KABUL RESPONSES REF: STATE 59361 INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. The USG and its international partners are taking steps to help Afghanistan hold credible presidential and provincial council elections in 2009. The augmented U.S. Mission will lead implementation of a number of efforts. Successful realization of these objectives will rely in most cases on broad international community consent, ISAF/USFOR-A support, and most importantly, GIRoA buy-in and action. This cable does not represent the entirety of Mission efforts in support of elections, but instead identifies some key nodes designed to enhance the credibility of elections. ¶2. Achieving credible elections requires a proactive strategy of changing Afghan popular perceptions that elections will be inherently flawed and that the United States will determine the outcome of the election. In order to change this perception, we must aggressively implement a strategy of impartiality through definitive action and not by words alone. MESSAGING: A VITAL ELEMENT -------------- ¶3. Embassy Kabul recommends POTUS make a statement endorsing the elections process as a sign of Afghanistan's progress, underscoring USG support for the process, and declaring our impartiality over candidates. We additionally recommend that all USG elements refrain from making predictions on electoral outcomes - both publicly, to President Karzai, and in private conversations. It is increasingly clear that statements implying the outcome is a forgone conclusion directly influence the behavior of political figures in Afghanistan. SRSG Kai Eide and leaders of key donor nations should make similar statements of neutrality. ¶4. Ambassador Eikenberry will continue to meet with presidential candidates to demonstrate impartiality. He would deliver a three-pronged message: a) The elections are an Afghan-led process with strong international support; b) Candidates must present the electorate clear choices by discussing concrete issues and programs; c) Whatever the outcome, it is vital that Afghans see these elections as advancing the institutionalization of processes toward representative government; hence the critical need for fairness and transparency. BOLSTERING MEDIA FREEDOM -------------- ¶5. We will continue to publicly call for President Karzai to gazette the Media Law. Meanwhile, we will focus on strengthening the Electoral Media Commission (EMC),as described in the next paragraph, and scrutinizing any IEC Media Commission sanctions or referrals to the Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism. We will encourage the EMC to refer complaints to the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) when feasible. USG or partner-initiated media monitoring activities at this stage would send a signal of over-involvement. Three bodies work to improve election-related media monitoring: the Independent Election Commission (IEC),the Media Commission, and UNDP-ELECT. CANDIDATE ACCESS TO MEDIA -------------- ¶6. In addition to enforcing the Mass Media Code of Conduct to seek fair media treatment for candidates, the Media Commission has accepted responsibility for providing "Sponsored Advertising Programming" which offers each presidential candidate a baseline amount of cost-free radio or TV airtime. While the IEC has set aside USD 2 million for candidate roundtable discussions, we recommend establishing a separate fund that could buy additional airtime for candidates on private airwaves, or sponsor private presidential debates. The IEC and the ECC would approve this fund, likely be administered by UNDP-Elect, prior to its creation. We understand UNDP has a small budget for candidate media access and has agreed to add to this budget. At issue is the D/SRSG contention that access be equitable, not equal. The problem is who determines candidate strength to realize equitable funding. REPORTING ELECTORAL IRREGULARITIES -------------- ¶7. The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) is behind schedule in building its office and staff capacities in the provinces. This is a significant weakness. Post has engaged with the IEC, UNDP, IEC and donors to identify ways to accelerate this timeline. Further, Ambassador Carney has proposed the establishing a regionally-based ECC Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that would respond to substantial violations in a short amount of time. ¶8. We have consulted with the ECC on how to raise its profile in publicizing instances of electoral intimidation. ¶9. Post has developed guidelines and FAQs for civilian PRT and Regional Command representatives for their appropriate role in reporting and acting on electoral fraud and irregularities. These guidelines will emphasize that USG employees may not refer complaints directly to the ECC under Afghan law, but that they may advise Afghans on how to report complaints. By following this process, we will help strengthen the ECC as an Afghan institution. Post has set up a portal to collect and compile reports on election irregularities from U.S. Mission elements "in the field." PRT officers regularly meet with provincial election officials and candidates to identify logistical issues, to discuss basic elections concepts, and to report on elections-related news from their provinces. We expect the volume of reporting to increase significantly as the campaign season kicks off on June 16. ¶10. We will work with the MoI to set up the joint police monitoring body proposed by Minister Atmar to Ambassador Carney on June 9 (septel). This body would include representatives of the international community, presidential candidate agents, political party agents, existing MOI inspector general officials and international military representatives. The team would review ANP performance and behavior in relation to the elections and evaluate observed or reported irregularities in ANP behavior. The team would report incidents to the MoI and the ECC for appropriate follow up action. CANDIDATE SECURITY -------------- ¶11. The MoI will make ANP personal security details (PSD) available to all candidates, but we anticipate that candidates will want to source their own private security. We have engaged MOI to ensure it will allow candidates to choose private, licensed security. This may require raising the current cap on private security companies. Ambassador Carney asked Minister Atmar on June 9 to use his authority to raise the cap. Atmar has agreed in principle to allow candidates to select their own PSDs and ensure these individuals receive similar training to those ANP assigned PSD duty. While candidate security is important to fair and transparent elections, USG direct funding of candidate PSDs would be problematic for political and legal reasons. TRANSPORT FOR CANDIDATES -------------- ¶12. The presidential incumbent has a natural advantage with regard to transport and logistical support. However, commercial aviation - which reaches all major cities - is available to Afghans with sufficient financial resources. The GIRoA agreed to establish a fund for candidates' travel, but it has not identified a funding source nor agreed who would manage such a fund. Other non-commercial air transport options include the United Nations, ISAF, and U.S. Mission aircraft. The international community in Kabul are discussion options for providing support in this area. The number of candidates and their desire to travel (not a traditional method of campaigning in Afghanistan) would impact the design of this scheme. ¶13. Note: USAID is exploring the capacity to temporarily increase the number of aircraft in its fleet to partially accommodate the demand for election observers, officials, and media. Post views the equal provision of travel to candidates on U.S. Mission-provided transport as a tangible demonstration of USG neutrality in the election. ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE IEC -------------- ¶14. The IEC is generally perceived by the Afghan public as biased in favor of the inumnal election polls if fve audit process aimed at limiting potential fraud from bogus registration cards and polling staff collusion. ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample and check ballot boxes at provincial centers, especially in areas deemed highly vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants it. Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department. ¶21. In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling station workers that would begin one month before elections. This process was used with some success in Iraq. EIKENBERRY informing voters and poll workers of the regulations and possible consequences of misapplication or fraud. POLLING -------------- ¶16. The International Republican Institute (IRI) will soon release the results of a long-in-the-works poll. A second USAID-funded IRI poll is awaiting IRI submission of a contract request. There are few unbiased polling agencies that can reliably perform credible country-wide polls. We will continue to seek out polling agencies that could provide credible elections polling. Given these constraints, in addition to the short timeframe before the election, the Embassy will arrange two to three additional election polls if funding can be arranged. Due to the unreliability of exit polling in Afghanistan, and the weak public understanding of their purpose we believe exit polls could undermine the normal electoral process, particularly if initial feedback does not reflect the final result. OTHER MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY OF ELECTIONS -- ACCELERATING CIVIC EDUCATION -------------- ¶17. International partners will continue supporting the ongoing IEC national civic education on the electoral process and election safeguards. For elements particularly aimed at youth and female audiences, the international community should augment country-wide dissemination of IEC approved materials - including through ISAF media facilities - and discuss elections with local religious and civil leaders to gain their understanding, support to the election process, and commentary on local concerns and issues. We have forwarded three funding proposals to S/SRAP that would expand civic outreach. These efforts include a national newspaper ($200k), additional radio stations in the South and East ($3M),and election outreach, interviews, and SMS texting ($40k),and would support immediate election goals and long-term strategic communication objectives. STIMULATING NATIONAL DEBATE -------------- ¶18. Post is working with locally-based partners to encourage Afghan media to stimulate a deliberative dialogue of key local and national issues. This, in turn, will require candidates to articulate specific visions and platforms, and will serve to emphasize that individual votes count. Tolo TV and Radio Watandar have several initiatives on this front. The Embassy will continue to host "web chats" with Afghan citizens on topics related to elections. Our goals are to foster a deeper civic understanding of the spirit of elections. SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA -------------- -------------- ¶19. With UNDP endorsement donor buy-in, the Interagency Elections Support Team is working to establish an ad-hoc Secretariat to coordinate international observation - which we expect will be around 200 observers strong - and facilitate international media observation country-wide. The Secretariat will map international observer delegations, including those from resident diplomatic missions, identify observer standards, create an observer training program, and share information (when appropriate) on deployment. The Secretariat might also facilitate logistical support to observers and media in outlying regions. We are also outlining the bedspace and transport facilities available at Regional Commands and subordinate units and will work with ISAF to produce an order outlining appropriate support. We may require support in obtaining NATO HQ or SHAPE guidance to ISAF to facilitate observer and media missions. AUDIT CONCEPT -------------- ¶20. The Elections Team has proposed, and IEC Chief Electoral Officer Najafi has enthusiastically endorsed, a comprehensive audit process aimed at limiting potential fraud from bogus registration cards and polling staff collusion. ECC/IEC auditors would proactively sample and check ballot boxes at provincial centers, especially in areas deemed highly vulnerable to fraud. The audit teams would have the ability to void results of these locations if the evidence warrants it. Election Support Team staff have begun discussions on the audit idea with the head of the IEC Secretariat Procedures Department. ¶21. In recognition that public knowledge of the audit process would dissuade potential fraud, the Embassy will help the IEC develop a public information campaign targeted at political elites and polling station workers that would begin one month before elections. This process was used with some success in Iraq. EIKENBERRY