TEPID PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HEDAYAT ARSALA

UNCLAS KABUL 001489 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV AF SUBJECT: TEPID PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HEDAYAT ARSALA -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Former Senior Minister Hedayat Arsala laid out to the Ambassador on June 8 a substantive agenda that would focus on strengthening governance by fighting government corruption and interdicting the narcotics trade. He asserted that Karzai held such strong advantages of incumbency that the United States had to help opposition candidates. The Ambassador reiterated our position on favoring no candidate, and challenged the opposition to take responsibility to use Afghan institutions to draw attention to any electoral irregularities. Arsala had equally little detail on his campaign strategy. He grouped himself with Abdullah and Ghani as the three strongest candidates, and hoped he would edge them out and make it to a second round to challenge Karzai. -------------- Few details on policy or campaign strategy -------------- ¶2. (U) Arsala focused his policy agenda on strengthening governance, speaking about the mistakes made early in the transition by allowing too much authority to go to former warlords. Without citing a specific plan, he spoke about fighting government corruption and interdicting the narcotics trade. He asserted that our combined focus should be on improving the lives of farmers, so they would choose licit crops over poppy, and on creating jobs in urban areas to alleviate poverty. Arsala had few specifics beyond that. ¶3. (SBU) Arsala acknowledged that Karzai appeared to hold the upper hand in the contest now. Arsala recognized that the United States was backing no candidate, but he contended that the field was not level. He recited similar complaints that we have heard from other opposition candidates about officials using government resources to favor Karzai. He asserted that Karzai held such strong advantages of incumbency that the United States had to help opposition candidates. He did not specify what form of help he had in mind. ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador made clear our policy of favoring no candidate ) either the incumbent or the opposition, and put the responsibility back on Arsala and others to use electoral institutions, the media and public opinion to draw attention to electoral irregularities. He added that the United States was working to support a fair and transparent process, and we would encourage all candidates to make this a campaign involving a competition of ideas. ¶5. (U) On his campaign, Arsala was working quietly both in Kabul and in the regions. He was not appearing in the media yet, but planned to do so as soon as the official campaign season begins. As for resources, he would use his own, though he is seeking support from certain businesspeople and traders. When pressed, he had little more specific to say on his campaign strategy. ¶6. (SBU) Arsala contended that he, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani constituted the strongest candidates. He had hoped the three would align together, and thought he would be the right person to head the ticket. He argued that many people knew Ghani had a hot temper, a quality that people would not want in a president. Arsala declared that both Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns distrusted Abdullah, in part because of his Panjshiri Tajik background. Arsala insisted that no one opposed him. The key would be for him to rise above the other candidates to run against Karzai in a second round. ¶7. (U) Notwithstanding press reports to the contrary, Arsala confirmed that he had resigned his position as senior minister in order to contest the election. EIKENBERRY